In the article I present and criticize the view of classical compatibilism on freedom, i.e. the view according to which free subjects and free actions can exist in the world ruled by universal, exceptionless causality. I claim that compatibilism does not solve the problem of freedom and determinism, but avoids and disregards it. Compatibilism pretends to accomplish the task by playing with semantic tricks that create a misleading impression of ‛compatibility’.

The integration of chaos theory and history has been an issue ofmany scientific discussions, but failed to produce any results. Author reexamines the discussions, mathematical features of the theory and claims that proposed ways of integration couldn't have been used practically. Author asks if such integration is possible and i fit can have any intrinsic value for advancement of historical knowledge. Proposed solution is to use chaos theory as a tool, which enables historians to analyze causal relations in the past.

In the paper I try to reconstruct the main theoretical assumptions underlying Paul Veyne’s vision of the ancient world that are to be found in his book L’empire gréco-romain. First of all, recalling the opposition between two ways of making the past intelligible: “explication” versus “explicitation”, I show how the French historian uses that second type of historical analyse to reveal some ancient phenomena (i.e. “democracy”, “imperialism”, “soul”, “faith”) in their original and singular forms. Then, I pass to the question of causality and genesis in history. It seems that in Veyne’s book we can distinguish three different “models” of becoming: 1) “time of a project”, 2) “epigenesis” and 3) “discourse effectiveness”. All these fi ndings lead me to the conclusion that Veyne’s writing of history is essentially “essayistic”.

In the first part of the article, I reconstruct the philosophical thoughts of Czesław Białobrzeski, a Polish philosophizing physicist. In the second part, I outline his biography and contribution to the development of physics. Philosophical reflections of Białobrzeski formed based on the leading issues in physics of the late 19th and mainly 20th century. He carried out his considerations in close connection to his scientific practice. The activity of the Polish scientist takes place in the formation and development period of quantum mechanics. Białobrzeski, similarly to many other physicists of the time, was well aware of the necessity of coherent explanation of the fundamentally new phenomena of the quantum mechanics. His take on the subject is rather original—he referred to the classical, philosophical theory of categories and proposed its ontological interpretation.

The article discusses the evolution of Marian Smoluchowski’s reasoning in his research on causality and understanding the essence of chance. Initially, Smoluchowski focused on the epistemic study of causality, looking for evidence supporting the kinetic-molecular theory. In proving the causes of Brownian motion, he used the concepts of physical causality. The fundamental change in Polish physicist's perception of causality was the understanding of the position of chance on the cause-effect line. Introducing mathematical relations into his considerations, he analyzed the aspect of the occurrence of the effect. The chance suitable for calculating probability was distinguished from the chance in a broader sense by the essential regularity of the frequent recurrence of the phenomenon, regardless of the knowledge of the cause. Smoluchowski's merit was the distinction between the philosophical and physical understanding of causality, chance and probability theory. Shifting the considerations on the nature of chance to the ontological plane moved the study of chance into the area of science, thus leading to the practical application of probability theory in physics.

The Author discusses a book "The Robin G. Collingood s philosophy of History" by Witold M. Nowak. He considers it as well done monographic picture of Collingwood's thinking. Nowak regards the philosophy of history of famous English thinker as a hermeneutical philosophy rather than philosophy of history itself including such basic ideas essential for the understanding of his philosophy like theory ofquestioning and answering, the method of the re-enactment, the concept of the absolute conditions. The book written by Nowak provides also to the Polish readers many precious biographical data and an interesting analysis of the cultural context ofColingwoodian thinking. It pays special attention to the late period of his work and its meaning.

The term “cause” is ubiquitous in life and science. It is surprising how, generally speaking, the existing all-purpose dictionaries, and even «professional» ones, are clumsy in their attempts to define “cause” and its derivative terms. We urgently need a more satisfactory definition of these words, along the following lines: an acting of object x on object y is the cause of the change in object y, when at the same time object x acts on object y, object y changes, and if something of the type of object x acts on an object of the type of object y, then object y changes. When expanding the proposed definition, I consider, among others: (a) traditional counterarguments aimed at the existence of cause-effect relation, (b) the question of necessity as a component of the notion of causality, (c) the notion of acting on something and the circumstances of its occurrence, (d) the essence of change, and (e) the causality principle. In addition, I sketch the relation of the reconstructed notion of causality to the notions of motivation, perpetration, and the act of creation (in arts and in Catholicism).

Bertrand Russell formulated neutral monism by default, unguided by any strong idea of a uniform, monistic world. Apparently he worked under the urge to liberate philosophy from the quarrel between physicalists and idealists. But he did not succeed in defusing the controversy, instead he fanned it with his fresh ideas. He argued that matter was indestructible, that some mental regularities occurred independently of our will, and that they unfold as if guided by natural laws. He claimed that some conscious states were to be interpreted as objective events despite the fact that they were accessible only privately. But the concurrence between physical and mental facts indicated a similarity between the principles that guided them, or pointed to their singular common nature. He did not undertake to defend his unitary theory vigorously and did not claim it was indisputable. Possibly he hoped to find an additional support for his theory some day and this paper responds to this unspoken request.