The article discusses Nicholas Rescher’s metaphilosophical view of orientational pluralism. In his essay Philosophical Disagreement: An Essay towards Orientational Pluralism in Metaphilosophy Rescher explains a substantial difference between philosophy and science—namely, that philosophers—differently than scientists— continuously propose and undermine various solutions to the same old problems. In philosophy it is difficult to find any consensus or convergence of theories. According to Rescher, this pluralism of theoretical positions is caused by holding by philosophers different sets and hierarchies of cognitive values, i.e. methodological orientations. These orientations are chosen in virtue of some practical postulates, they are of axiological, normative, but not strictly theoretical character. Different methodological orientations yield different evaluations of philosophical theses and arguments. This article shows that Rescher’s account does not determine clearly acceptable cognitive values. If there are no clear criteria of evaluation of methodological orientations, then the described view seems to be identical to relativism adopting the everything goes rule. In addition, accepting orientational pluralism it is hard to avoid the conclusion that discussions between various philosophical schools are futile or can be reduced to non-rational persuasion.

The paper tries to defend the thesis that it is impossible to decide upon moral issues without any references to the ontology of the world we live in. An illustrative example of the main argumentation line is the choice made by Cypher—a second plan character in the movie Matrix. Cypher decides to betray human rebels fighting against machines for freedom and, as a reward, accepts affluent life in the virtual reality. His choice seems to be superficially reprehensible because of the abandonment of the real world and authentic life. However, one can argue that the dichotomy between the real and virtual world is seeming. By choosing the virtual reality Cypher decided to act in a world which, like the real world, makes it possible to be a moral subject and enables authentic experience. The difference between both the worlds lies in the type of determination limiting any conscious subject. Cypher prefers to live in a world determined by the algorithm of Matrix more than in a world where his behaviour is determined by genes and other biological factors.

It is nearly impossible to study behaviour effectively without any reference to its context. This is because it is generally known in the psychological literature that behaviour is partially a product of its environment. This suggests that many behavioural processes may be universal but there are significant variations in their manifestations. For instance, love may be a universal process but its manifestation varies from one society to another. Given that ethical decision-making is a behavioural process, it stands to reason that its manifestation will vary from one culture to another. It is against this premise that this paper seeks to demonstrate that despite the existence of the ‘universal’ normative ethical principles, ethical decisions will be expected to vary across cultural space and even evolve with time. This paper achieves this objective by employing typical ethical dilemmas that Ghanaian psychologists and other health professionals encounter to show how and why what is ethical in one culture becomes unethical in the Ghanaian context and what is unethical in the Ghanaian context becomes ethical in another culture.

Interpreting the Gospel parable of the Prodigal Son and the Loving Father (Luke 15:11–32), J. Ratzinger/Benedict XVI shows the essence of the biggest problems of modern (particularly Western) society. The younger son’s journey to remote places, far from his father, symbolizes the fundamental gap between the present and God, which - although promising a happy and independent life – turns out to debase him. Blind questioning of the existing order (including the order of Creation!), an apotheosis of variability and a priori assumption of the new-over-the-old superiority, inevitably lead to confusion, with relativism becoming a “moral” reference and criterion for every action. Finally: bitterness and a protest generating violence, emptiness looking for satisfaction in drug-induced ecstasy, men seen as destroyers and enemies of nature. The only solution is a spiritual battle and metanoia – a return to the Father.

University and the Church need each other. Following the example of Christ incarnated, Christianity “incarnates” the spiritual. The Church and theology need university and cooperation with other sciences to be able to “incarnate” Christ’s issue into our world. Th e university, on the other hand, needs the Church and theology because otherwise it would be deprived of cultural and spiritual foundation: there is no alternative to a discussion about Christ (God and a human). Theology is sometimes defined as scientia fidei; it is determined by the mind and faith. It’s a discussion about God, but due to the Christ event it is also a discussion about mankind. Th erefore it has the form of a dialogue, a discussion. The dialogue is always held in a specific context (nowadays postmodern), in which theology not only has to ask but also answer the question about the meaning. In this sense it is wisdom. Theology as a discussion has to approach the most urgent human problems. These include agnosticism towards which Benedict XVI suggests the “veluti si Deus daretur” rule, relativism in case of which theology cannot stop asking about truth, despair in case of which theology reminds about God, in whom there is no darkness.

The article considers Roman Ingarden’s fundamental questions in the context of the position called philosophical fundamentalism. It turns out that the defining feature of this position, i.e. the search for answers to the question about the conditions of validity of statements in the sphere of traditional branches of philosophy: ontology, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, finds its counterpart in Ingarden’s ontological and epistemological assumptions in phenomenology. They guarantee the legitimacy of any other claims. Ingarden’s philosophical fundamentalism, considered here in relation to the work- ‑scheme, weakened with time, which seems to be evidenced by the author’s doubts as to the legitimacy of the existence of the sphere of ideal objects determining this work. It seems highly possible that this is Ingarden’s bow to culture, and to cultural and historical relativization of the unchanging sphere of ideal objects.