The feature that most attracts private parties from different states to referring their dispute to an arbitral tribunal is the flexibility of the procedure. However, the differences between arbitration and court litigation are not only procedural, but they concern the substance of the parties’ cases. This is because in the realm of international arbitration the law applicable to the merits of the case is determined according to other provisions than the statutory conflict of laws rules. Depending on the arbitration law of the seat, the entire private international law statute can be captured in a single provision – “absent the parties’ choice, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to be appropriate”. It follows that arbitral tribunals, unlike state courts, are not bound by the conflict of laws rules of the forum. What’s more, the merits of a dispute submitted to arbitration may be governed not only by some national body of law (e.g. the Polish Civil Code) but also by a non-state, nonnational set of provisions – “rules of law” (e.g. the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts). The aim of this article is to analyze how the parties and tribunals may make use of their autonomy in determining the law applicable to a dispute. Furthermore it examines whether there are any limits thereto in light of the Rome I Regulation.

This article contributes to the growing literature on Art. 7 TEU by showcasing the strong and weak points of this provision in the context of the on-going rule of law backsliding in Hungary and Poland – backsliding which threatens the very fabric of EU constitutionalism. The article presents the general context of the EU’s institutional reactions to the so-called “reforms” in Poland and Hungary, which are aimed at hijacking the state machinery by the political parties in charge. Next it introduces the background of Art. 7 TEU and the hopes the provision was endowed with by its drafters before moving on to analysis of its scope and all the mechanisms made available through this instrument, including the key procedural rules governing their use. The author posits that it may be necessary to put our hopes in alternative instruments and policies to combat the current rule of law backsliding, and the article concludes by outlining three possible scenarios to reverse the backsliding, none of which are (necessarily) connected with Art. 7 as such.

Over the last three years European Union (EU) law has experienced a veritable revolution triggered by the Court of Justice’s rethinking of the fundamental aspects underpinning both the EU’s competence to deal with Rule of Law matters (especially related to the independence and the irremovability of judges at the national level), and the substantive understanding of the key elements of the Rule of Law pertaining to the newly-found competence. An upgraded approach to interim relief in matters related to the Rule of Law completes the picture. As a result, EU law has gone through a profound transformation and the assumptions as to the perceived limits of its reach – insofar as the organization of the national judiciaries is concerned – no longer hold. However, there is also the opposite side to this “Rule of Law revolution.” While its effectiveness in terms of bringing recalcitrant Member States back on track has not been proven (and Poland and Hungary stand as valid reasons for doubts); the division of powers between the Member States and the EU has been altered forever. Rule of Law thus emerges as a successful pretext for a supranational powergrab in the context of EU federalism. The picture is further complicated by the fact that the substantive elements of the Rule of Law required by the Court of Justice of the European Union of the Member States’ judiciaries are seemingly perceived as inapplicable to the supranational level itself. These include structural independence from other branches of power and safeguards of the guarantees of irremovability and security of tenure of the members of the judiciaries. Taking all these elements into consideration, the glorious revolution appears to have triggered at least as many questions as it has provided answers, while being entirely unable to resolve the outstanding problems on the ground in the Member States experiencing significant backsliding in the areas of democracy and the Rule of Law.

This article analyses the capacity of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance to counteract the democratic governance shortfall. It argues that the tangible impact of the treaty on the states’ practice has been limited by various endogenous and exogenous factors. The former are identified as directly linked to content of the document and refer to the accuracy of the drafting. The latter are rooted outside the text and beyond the character of the Charter and include issues relating to the states’ reluctance to ratify the document, certain constitutional constraints undermining implementation on the national level, and the weak international guarantees of enforcement.

The case law of the CJEU dealing with the rule of law touches upon the question of execution of European Arrest Warrants (EAWs) issued by Polish courts. The year 2020 witnessed the second important judgment of the CJEU in this respect (the Dutch case). As in its 2018 predecessor (the Irish case), the CJEU excluded the possibility of overt denial of all EAWs issued by Polish courts. Instead it insists on a two-step examination, comprising not only a general evaluation but also the examination of the individual situation of a requested person. It remains to be seen whether this is a promise of armistice in the CJEU’s approach to Poland, although this is not believed by the author of the text.

When discussing justice, John Rawls focuses on smooth functioning, impartiality and social acceptability of the system of political obligations. His theory of justice is forged as a system of liberal democracy combined with constitutionally established principles of welfare state. Although Rawls distinguishes between political and moral norms, he believes that in a welfare constitutional state a reliable method of negotiating between demands of all citizens is accessible by adoption of a social contract. A social contract presupposes a nearly unanimous view on the character of a good political system. This is a case of soft naturalization. The author distinguishes it from hard naturalization that is not applicable to normative political theories.

Recent years have witnessed the publication of a number of research papers and books seeking to assess threats of electoral victories of anti-establishment politicians and political parties, described as authoritarian populists. This essay focuses on three books directly addressing the origins and threats of authoritarian populism to democracy. It consists of six sections and the conclusion. The first section presents findings (Norris and Inglehart) based on surveys of values of voters of various age cohorts concluding that authoritarian populism is a temporary backlash provoked by the post-materialist perspective. The second section examines the contention, spelled out in Levitsky and Ziblatt, that increase in openness of American political system produced, unintentionally, a degradation of the American political system. The third section continues brief presentations focusing on to the causes and implications of “illiberal democracy,” and “undemocratic liberalism” (Mounk). The fourth section examines developments in the quality of democracy in the world showing that despite the decline in Democracy Indices, overall there was no slide towards non-democratic forms of government in 2006–2019. The next two sections deal with dimensions missing in reviewed books; the notion of nation-state, international environment, civic culture and, in particular, dangers of radical egalitarianism to democracy. The last section concludes with regrets that the authors ignored rich literature on fragility of democracy and failed to incorporate in their analyses deeper structural factors eroding democracy: by the same token, return to the pre-populist shock trajectory is unlikely to assure survival of liberal democracy.