The aim of present paper is to analyse two different interpretations of Xenophanes’ scepticism sketched by Sextus Empiricus in his work Against Logicians. The very first attempt of a systematic grasping of the meaning of the poet’s epistemological concerns can be understood in the light of the so called hypatyphos problem ascribed to Xenophanes already by Timon of Phlius, namely the question of alleged tension between two sides of Colophonian’s thought: dogmatic and sceptical ones. As a result, shared vital points of these interpretations can be mentioned: an endeavour to understand the poet’s philosophical doubts through later concepts of the sceptical school and its distinctive technical terms on the basis of silent epistemological assumptions. Also some characteristic features are presented (different modes of grasping the idea of opinion – dokos). Some prospective analyses concerning traits of these exegetic approaches in contemporary interpretations of Xenophanes’ scepticism are needed.

According to Descartes, it is possible to doubt successfully that there is external world, all around us, yet still to have language, in place, without any complication. According to Wittgenstein, to doubt everything about the external world except language means nothing more than to doubt everything about the external world including language. Why? No speaker is more certain about the meaning of his words than about the external things he believes to be unassailable (for example, that he has two hands and two legs). Without this constitutive connection there would be no communication of a definite sense. Wittgenstein suggests that, after the author of the Meditations on First Philosophy adopts the hypothesis of evil deceiver, we are only under the impression that we deal with language (or that we read a text). We instead deal with symptoms of something rather different. The objective of this paper is to critically reassess Wittgenstein’s criticism of the possibility of holding such a radical sceptical position.