In the text On Responsibility and Its Ontic Foundations Roman Ingarden stated that responsibility for an act requires the existence of a specific structure of objective and subjective realities, which presuppose the possibility of free choice, the existence of the past, non‑relatively understood values, and personal identity. However, Ingarden’s proposal, which includes ideas such as ‘relatively isolated systems’ or the ‘center of self’ as a condition of the ownership of action, results in insoluble theoretical difficulties. An important cause of this situation is the fact that the whole structure of the argument suggests reflection on the broadly understood issue of responsibility, while the actual intention of the text is narrower. The recurring theme in Ingarden’s A Little Book on Man is the question of inner dignity and the building up of a moral character by an individual, who in the moment of life’s predicament is able to make the right choice. The ontical foundations that Ingarden is looking for in the text On Responsibility and Its Ontic Foundations do not concern the general area of responsibility, but try to justify philosophically the belief in the project of building moral character.

The aim of this paper is defined in the two title questions related to Roman Ingarden’s research: (1) What constitutes the specificity and uniqueness of human cognitive system? (2) Is Roman Ingarden’s answer defensible in the light of today’s naturalistic tendencies? In response to the first question, the multidimensional structure of human being is indicated, thanks to which man has access to the sphere of values. In the axiological and ontological aspect the power of man to create new realities is emphasized. In the epistemological and ontological aspect three dimensions of this structure are shown, which are correlated, complex and relatively isolated systems of body, soul and consciousness. Next, in response to the second question, Ingarden’s nonreductive approach is discussed against the background of information processes and the issue of self-knowledge. However, his strong ontological assumptions are shown as well. In conclusion, the author emphasizes that Ingarden’s main research strategy remains consistently grounded in ontology (and in this sense it is anti‑naturalistic), but in some aspects it is compatible with today’s naturalist approaches favored in neurocognitive studies.

Roman Ingarden’s work is widely taken as promoting a philosophical anthropology in which considerations from philosophy of ecology, that is, ecophilosophy, have no secure place. I think this contention is too hasty, even though Ingarden himself did not undertake reflections on the responsibility of humans for their natural environment. It is true that here and there he was giving explicit expression to his conviction of the unimportance of biological origins of humans, and was putting a strong emphasis on culture and other intentional creatures of humanity. In my paper I have tried to trace and describe Ingardenian understanding of humans in relation to their environment, and especially to nature. I have made an attempt to show how free human actions are possible, which in turn enforces on humans some responsibility for their actions, including those that impinge upon the nature around them.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the assumptions and implications of Roman Ingarden’s concept of consciousness as a relatively isolated system in the context of contemporary discussions on mechanistic model of scientific explanation. Starting with a presentation of Ingarden’s position, I try to show that the key problem of the theory of consciousness is the discovery of its neurobiological mechanisms. The systemic approach proposed by Ingarden is only the first step towards a theory that integrates the phenomenology of consciousness and a mechanistic framework. The next step is to show that research on the mechanisms of consciousness is a natural extension and deepening of the systemic approach.