The author develops a non‑literary, theistic Weltanschauung. It is based on the acceptance of the role of ‘did’ and ‘knows’ as non‑empirical conceptual (indefinable) ‘primes’. The basic argument of this paper is derived from a detailed linguistic observation of the idiosyncratic behaviour of the concepts ‘why’ and ‘because’ vis‑à‑vis other questioners and the functor ‘can’. The item ‘because’ presupposes a conjunction with a clause indicating an obligatorily altogether different state of affairs than one that is given in ‘a because ...’, as an expression patterned on * ‘a because a’ that constitutes a case of one of the most extreme linguistic deviances. Such a putative phrase cannot belong to any natural linguistic code, nor can it be its real product (that is no other than a quip in a purely perlocutionary utterance in J.L. Austin’s sense). Similarly, a generalized version of ‘did’ or ‘knows’ ( someone did / knows something without any specification) cannot be positioned in such a conjunction on pain of engaging in a destructive infinite regress, unless they are coupled with some further, different concept (i.e. a concept other than ‘did’ resp. ‘know’) in a concatenation with ‘because’. According to the author, this shows that precisely the two indicated concepts are conceptual ‘primes’, or the fundamental synthetic a priori’s whose denotata underlie the whole of the reality. The author tries to show that it is unacceptable to reduce Reality to a single and unique empirical universe conceived of as an effect of ‘doing’. He claims that Ockham’s idea of multiplicity of universes represents a logical necessity. But he rejects the mystical höheres in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus as including „pure logic”, ethics and aesthetics. All the three areas, he claims, belong to the created natural realm of speaking beings. Reality, grasped by logic, is broader than that realm.

W artykule została omówiona relacja pomiędzy teologią filozoficzną a klasycz-nym teizmem. Jest ona szczególnie ważna zwłaszcza w kwestii analizy problemu natury Boga i boskich atrybutów. Przywołując dwie strategie w podejściu do analizy boskich atrybutów, wskazuję, że dzięki strategii tomistycznej można wyróżnić siedem podstawowych atrybutów Boga: 1) prostotę, 2) niezmienność, 3) wieczność, 4) wszechwiedzę, 5) wszechmoc, 6) dobroć, 7) wszechobecność.

Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), brilliant explorer and great scientist, creator of the heliocentric system, was a deeply religious person. He dealt mainly with astronomy. He was a man of science and a faithful son of the Catholic Church. He was not a theologian and did not leave behind theological or ascetical writings. Nevertheless, important theological ideas can be found in his legacy, above all in his life’s work De revolutionibus: theism and creationism. These should be read in the context of the scientist’s astronomical and cosmological research. Observing the beauty, harmony and order of the universe, Copernicus points to its perfect Creator ( Opifex omnium). The cosmos and all created works are an epiphany of God. Copernicus’ God is the Best and Greatest Being ( Optimus Maximus), who manages the ‘divine factory’ of the universe ( Regularissimus). Man is at the centre of creation. Exploring and contemplating the cosmos gives him joy, detaches him from evil, ennobles him and leads him to God. Copernicus’ theological views bear the mark of Renaissance humanism.

This article discusses the main points in the Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston’s debate about the existence of God. Copleston defended the cosmological argument based on a sufficient reason and argued against radical contingency in explaining the origin of the world. During the debate, the understanding of necessity was discussed, whether the word ‘God’ is a proper name or a description, whether the universe as a whole can have a cause, and the arguments about the origin of the world formulated in modern physics. The whole debate is an excellent example of the difference between a theist and an atheist with regard to Leibnizian type of the cosmological argument.i

The paper summarizes the debate concerning the divine hiddenness argument. First, it presents two versions of the argument that was initially formulated by J.L. Schellenberg and subsequently discussed over the last twenty years and it marks its most important theses. Then the author indicates some possible rebuttals, segregating them according to the challenged premises. Particularly noteworthy, he argues, are these theistic answers that accuse the images of God assumed by the hiddenness argument of excessive anthropomorphism and those that try to point out higher goods justifying divine hiddenness. In conclusion the author claims that the hiddenness argument proves atheism only if by theism one understands theistic personalism. Other positions, such as ultimism or theism of transcendence, are not threatened by the argument.

Stanowisko Feuerbacha nazywam antropomorfizmem co do pojęcia Boga, krócej – antropomorfizmem teologicznym. Uznaję je za teorię, i akceptuję. Teza główna tej teorii głosi (w sformułowaniu semantycznym): w każdej deskrypcji „Bóg” (takiej, że jej skrótem jest nazwa „Bóg”) występują wyłącznie wyrażenia dotyczące człowieka. W języku mentalistycznym natomiast (endemicznym Feuerbachowi): nie ma w pojęciu Boga niczego, co wykraczałoby treściowo poza pojęcia dotyczące człowieka. Antropomorfizm Feuerbacha ma wersję słabą oraz wersję mocną. Słaba – pojęcie Boga ma faktycznie feuerbachowską charakterystykę. Mocna – feuerbachowska charakterystyka pojęcia Boga jest konieczna na sposób konieczności przyrodniczej. Wersje te można zespolić, korzystając z dictum znalezionego dla opisu analogicznej sytuacji – ignoramus et ignorabimus. Antropomorfizm Feuerbacha konfrontuję z najmocniejszym argumentem, jaki potrafię sobie wyobrazić – z argumentem wymierzonym w naturalizm, rezerwuar przesłanek Feuerbacha. Argument ten dozbrajam obiecującą ontologią pojęć, zaczerpniętą od Bernarda Bolzano. Pokazuję na koniec, że maszyneria ta nie pracuje, a (niefeuerbachowskie) absolutne pojęcie Boga jest (uwaga: zależność o kontrintuicyjnym przebiegu!) niekonstruowalne, bo nieskonstruowane. W tym położeniu, mając antropomorfizm teologiczny za hipotezę przyrodniczą, czekam cierpliwie (zgodnie skądinąd z postulatem Stratona) na jej obalenie.