The aim of this paper is to highlight the relationship between normative theory and social ontology through an analysis of John Rawls’s concept of ‘well‑ordered society’. By expressing the ontological assumptions underlying Rawls’s theory, it is possible to better understand the role of practices and institutions in A Theory of Justice and to counter some of the criticisms levelled against Rawls’s institutionalism. The proposed interpretation of Rawls’s theory may be recognized as a contribution to the interactionist approach in the field of social ontology.

The paper analyses and develops John Rawls’s defence of his theory of justice against the conservative objection that egalitarian conceptions of social justice are an expression of envy. The defence involves the following claims: (1) The content of the difference principle does not match an essential property of envy. (2) The parties in the original position are not motivated by envy. (3) None of the conditions imposed on the original position arise from envy. Next, it is argued that there are reasons to suppose that the parties in the original position would choose a more egalitarian principle of distributive justice than the difference principle. These reasons are grounded in the claim that self respect is the most important primary good and in the fact that the level of economic inequalities is negatively correlated with self respect among the least advantaged members of society. It is shown that even though the content of the more egalitarian principle matches the essential property of envy, the conservative objection remains unjustified.

My current considerations concern the way in which the category of animals is present in contemporary philosophy, especially if it occurs in the context of moral philosophy and the theory of cognition and mind. These are, I suppose, the areas of inquiry inspiring wide interest, even if we focus on the narrow question of the place of animals in the domains of morality, cognition, and consciousness. Although John Rawls himself approaches these issues with caution, and his interest in these types of problems is marginal, they deserve some philosophical attention. There is a close relationship between the belief that non‑personal living entities such as animals are capable of feeling pain and pleasure on the one hand, and the human sensitivity or social sentience, on the other. We should face the question of what kind of society we want to live in: effective or sensitive. Ethical utilitarianism is in favor of an effective society. It may seem that there is no place for social sensitivity in it, and consequently that public interest is postulated in its place instead. However, I believe that an effective society is more sensitive to the harm done to or the plight suffered by non‑personal subjects than a sensitive society, if the latter is understood as Rawls frames it. Thus, we come to a specific paradox – which I shall refer to as the blunted sentience paradox – that the utilitarian, efficient society criticized by Rawls is in fact more morally sensitive than the egalitarian society he postulates. The paradox of the blunted sentience has its source in Rawls’s egalitarianism, for this egalitarianism is offered only to the chosen. It does not extend to those members of society who extend their care to those creatures whom Rawls denies subjectivity, but whose unhappiness constitutes an important factor in the social life of humanity. I propose to look at the fate of animals in modern society, and if we do so, we will notice some flaws in Rawls’s theory of justice that can perhaps be amended by espousing some aspects of emotivism. This proposed approach avoids what I have called the blunted sentience paradox.

Iris Marion Young was one of the most inventive political philosophers who responded to John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, published in 1971. This work had brought political philosophy to life in an unprecedented way, and prompted Young, as well as R. Nozick, M. Sandel, M. Walzer, Ch. Taylor and R. Dworkin to engage in penetrating criticisms. The extensive discussion had been triggered by the normative content of the two principles of justice. Young’s analysis did not diminish Rawls’s contribution to the history of socio‑political thought, but rather reinforced the ideas he had formulated. She did not present an alternative view of her own, but extended the original thought by incorporating two elements in the theory: (1) refinement of procedural requirements, (2) revision of the normative content in such a way that it takes into account historical and situational contexts, complementing thereby Rawls’s ‘original position’ through a ‘politics of difference’ that takes into account the reality of unjust differences in the position that various individuals and groups occupy in a society.