Search results

Filters

  • Journals
  • Keywords
  • Date

Search results

Number of results: 1
items per page: 25 50 75
Sort by:
Download PDF Download RIS Download Bibtex

Abstract

The article aims to show that the criticism of the psychophysiological theory of cognition formulated by Roman Ingarden in the work U podstaw teorii poznania (‘The Groundwork of Epistemology’) is in some aspects still sound. The psychophysiological theory of cognition is the forerunner of modern naturalized epistemology. Thus the author of this article undertakes to show that Ingarden’s critique applies to this modern epistemology. The paper focuses on an issue that is discussed in both theories, i.e. the problem of causal generation of cognition. Moreover, it investigates two allegations that Ingarden has formulated. The first concerns the causal explanations of the possibility of knowledge, namely the objection of a vicious circle in theory. The second concerns the objection that causal theory is unable to provide essential epistemological concepts and criteria that are necessary for the analysis of cognition. The author supports the charge of the vicious circle and agrees with the purport of the second objection by showing that it can be interpreted as the claim that causal theory is incapable of solving the problem of causal underdetermination of cognition. These responses seem to hold irrespective of whether one adopts foundationalism or anti‑foundationalism in epistemology.
Go to article

Authors and Affiliations

Rafał Lewandowski
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Gdański, Szkoła Doktorska Nauk Humanistycznych i Społecznych, ul. W. Stwosza 63, 80-308 Gdańsk

This page uses 'cookies'. Learn more