The subject of many controversies has been both the understanding of the limits of scientific knowledge and the indication of the “boundary” conditions of orders placed for it. In some cases, we are in favor of widening these boundaries in such a way that they can also include religious and quasi-religious beliefs, while in others we are in favor of narrowing them so that knowledge and faith can be clearly distinguished. In these considerations, I cite examples of positions on both issues that have in the past met with both relatively wide acceptance and serious reservations. It is worth taking a closer look at them, because it turns out that in science nothing is decided once and for all, and what seemed to belong to the past sometimes comes back with even greater force. I show this on two examples of contemporary positions on the issue of understanding the limits of scientific knowledge.

W artykule badam naturę poznania intelektualnego opisaną przez Henri Bergsona w Ewolucji twórczej (1907). W pracy tej teoria wiedzy naukowej i potocznej zyskuje w istocie swój ostateczny kształt; zostaje umieszczona w ewolucji życia. W tym kontekście analizuję charakter relacji wytyczanych przez ludzki rozum oraz rodzaj zależności występującej między poznaniem intelektualnym i rozwojem gatunkowym człowieka. Według Bergsona można stosować z powodzeniem metody rozumu w naukach ścisłych czy przyrodniczych, lecz nie w tych gałęziach wiedzy, w których oddziałuje trwanie. Dlatego błędem jest rozszerzanie praw fizyki i matematyki na zjawiska zachodzące w materii organicznej i w umyśle. Z punktu widzenia epistemologicznego życie i świadomość konstytuują inny, specyficzny dla siebie poziom. Wyznaczenie dziedziny badań właściwej intelektowi i ograniczenie pola jego aktywności pozwala zarazem na przekroczenie relatywizmu poznawczego I. Kanta.

In this paper, I present a short 10-point characteristics of the classical conception of truth. Subsequently I point to the importance and comprehensive usefulness of this truth, among others, to the possibility of applying it in some virtual environments, e.g., in those which include virtual objects of types A and C. I also emphasize that—independently of views of promotors and creators of the “post-truth era” (e.g. the will of politicians, propagandists and the authors of conspiracy theories)—truth as it is grasped in the classical theory is in principle non-withdrawable from social discourse, including its philosophical and scientific fields.

In this article, I reflect on recent discussions of the methodological status of scientific knowledge within and outside the Academy. I draw attention to the problem of declining public trust in science (risk and fear society) and the phenomenon of post-truth. In the context of these issues, I present three positions whose authors define the relationship between official academic science in relation to other forms of knowledge (lay people) and forms of knowledge use outside the Academy (politics). The first position termed “elective modernism” was formulated by Harry Collins and Robert Evans in the context of discussions of the third wave of science disputes. Elective modernism defines the way in which policy decisions are made on the recommendations of scholars who have a methodological self-awareness of the possibilities and limitations of scientific knowledge. The second position is Steve Fuller's proposal of protestant science as a form of science in the context of posttruth conditions. In this view, knowledge can be produced by anyone, but it must meet certain specified scientific criteria. The third position is the view of expert knowledge proposed by Mark R. Brown, as a representation of various worldview or cultural options, whose representatives commission experts to make appropriate recommendations for certain political decisions.