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Abstract

The article discusses Rawls’s idea of the original position. I present two arguments in support of the claim that it is impossible to meet the necessary conditions (proposed by Rawls) for recreating the reasoning that presumably is performed in the original position. I claim therefore that the idea of the original position cannot fulfil its function of justifying the principles of justice. As the solution to the problem I propose a modified version of the original position argument, which can be labeled ‘a slightly lifted veil of ignorance’.
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Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

Artur Szutta
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Gdański, ul. J. Bażyńskiego 4, 80‑309 Gdańsk
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Abstract

My current considerations concern the way in which the category of animals is present in contemporary philosophy, especially if it occurs in the context of moral philosophy and the theory of cognition and mind. These are, I suppose, the areas of inquiry inspiring wide interest, even if we focus on the narrow question of the place of animals in the domains of morality, cognition, and consciousness. Although John Rawls himself approaches these issues with caution, and his interest in these types of problems is marginal, they deserve some philosophical attention. There is a close relationship between the belief that non‑personal living entities such as animals are capable of feeling pain and pleasure on the one hand, and the human sensitivity or social sentience, on the other. We should face the question of what kind of society we want to live in: effective or sensitive. Ethical utilitarianism is in favor of an effective society. It may seem that there is no place for social sensitivity in it, and consequently that public interest is postulated in its place instead. However, I believe that an effective society is more sensitive to the harm done to or the plight suffered by non‑personal subjects than a sensitive society, if the latter is understood as Rawls frames it. Thus, we come to a specific paradox – which I shall refer to as the blunted sentience paradox – that the utilitarian, efficient society criticized by Rawls is in fact more morally sensitive than the egalitarian society he postulates. The paradox of the blunted sentience has its source in Rawls’s egalitarianism, for this egalitarianism is offered only to the chosen. It does not extend to those members of society who extend their care to those creatures whom Rawls denies subjectivity, but whose unhappiness constitutes an important factor in the social life of humanity. I propose to look at the fate of animals in modern society, and if we do so, we will notice some flaws in Rawls’s theory of justice that can perhaps be amended by espousing some aspects of emotivism. This proposed approach avoids what I have called the blunted sentience paradox.
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Bibliography

Andrews K. (2020), The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition, New York: Routledge.
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Garner R. (2013), A Theory of Justice for Animals: Animal Rights in a Nonideal World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Rowlands M. (2013), Can animals be moral?, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sumpter D.J.T. (2006), The Principles of Collective Animal Behaviour, „Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences” 361 (1465), s. 5–22.
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Authors and Affiliations

Adriana Schetz
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Instytut Filozofii i Kognitywistyki, ul. Krakowska 71–79, 71-017 Szczecin
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Abstract

John Rawls’s idea of the ‘veil of ignorance’ offers an opportunity to reflect on liberal‑democratic freedom of speech. Rawls’s method is to make political rules a priori, i.e. to give them the status of general principles hopefully applicable in most cases of real life. The rules of liberal‑democratic justice are formal in a way that makes them comparable to rules of formal logic. Encouraged by this similarity, we may ask: What logical form should be given to publicly discussed opinions allowed in a liberal democracy – when ‘allowed’ is meant in its legal or moral sense? The opinions expressed in the form of the particular judgment („Some S’s are P’s”) should obviously be always allowed in a public debate. But we must note that liberal democracies of our time tend to be more and more essentialist in the matter of ‘political correctness’. However, it is dangerous for law and political decisions to follow this new form of social prejudice. Liberal democracy turns in such circumstances into ‘ideological democracy’, and therefore becomes one that is no longer ‘liberal’. The opinions expressed in the form of general judgments („All S’s are P’s”) should always be permitted in public debate but only as a rhetorical (or emphatic) way of presenting personal beliefs. We should not try to make a political use of the logical ‘principle of double negation’. In logic, it is natural to assume that „Every S is P” implies that „No S is not‑P”. But in politics every citizen should be allowed to say instead that „Some S’s are not‑P’s”. The rules of law and political correctness must not restrict our freedom in this respect.
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Authors and Affiliations

Łukasz Kowalik
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, Redakcja „Przeglądu Filozoficznego”, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa

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