

CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES

SOCIAL RESPONSE TO EUROPE'S REFUGEE INFLUX: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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European migration and asylum policies reflect the public opinion of the continent's citizens. This is the presumption of this article outlining a theoretical analysis of Europe's civil and civic society and speculating what would be necessary to change from the currently prevailing mood of paranoia and nationalist exclusivism to a more generous open, equal and humanitarian society. After outlining the current public opinion climate in the EU, the text builds upon Jürgen Habermas's public sphere theory and Nancy Fraser's post-Westphalian critique thereof, I use Ferdinand Tönnies distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society) as well as M.R.R. Osenwaade's study of the civil and civic society concluding with an appeal for broad political reforms, because only when political elites change their approach to society and governing will Europe become a compassionate and generous society. The article's contribution to this debate centers upon the notion that civil society as a distinctive social organization is *antithetical* to citizenship and instead generates individuals whose lives evolve around individualism, consumerism, and personal gratification rather than democracy, political responsibility and participation. Only with a strong but open state counter-posing the neoliberal economic trends, can we move closer to the ideal civic society.

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European Union (EU) asylum and immigration policies are inept, confused and inefficient and national governments are failing to respond to the refugee and migrants' influx adequately. The EU addressed the humanitarian crisis in numerous summit meetings in 2015 and 2016 but member states could not agree on a common asylum policy and efforts at setting country quotas for migrants. The best the EU could do was an aloof pledge to relocate 160,000 refugees over two years, less than 15% of the approximately 1.2 million who had arrived in Italy and Greece in 2015 alone. More than 268,269 refugees have arrived in Europe in 2016, according to UNHCR (2016). For some time now governments have had problems agreeing on an equitable, humane, and appropriately funded response to these migratory pressures. Today a number of Central and Eastern European states have completely turned away from migrants and refugees, pledging to take nobody or too few to make a difference. It has instead become apparent that almost 27 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain, a new wall encircles Europe. More specifically, it has become life threatening for the majority of people who seek protection and shelter on the continent. Despite tokenism and pretentiousness of the EU Member States' governments, these responses might actually be reflective of their citizens' attitudes.

This article firstly describes the current public opinion climate in Europe with its strong anti-immigrant and Islamophobic tendencies. Secondly, drawing on Jürgen Habermas' theory of the structures of the democratic public, Nancy Fraser's critical analysis of the public sphere and Ferdinand Tönnies work, as well as M.R.R. Osenwaade's exploration of the citizenship and civil society, I have developed an analytical perspective that seeks to reinvigorate the classic civic society, the *Gemeinschaft*, albeit with a twist. Finally, I attest that only a severe reevaluation of the current political direction overall, but also in particular in reference to the current refugee and migrant population in Europe will lead to the reestablishment of confidence in the current political elites. I conclude by showing that while this civic society is already in the making through, for example, many volunteer projects, the overall trend at the present time goes in the opposite direction — aiming at recreating the traditional exclusivist nation-state with its clearly demarcated borders and body of citizenry.

In addition to a fresh read of primary sociological texts, methodologically this paper is based on data sets from the current Eurobarometer and PEW polls, and a qualitative analysis of texts pertaining to the refugee crisis, posted mostly in anti-immigrant blogs and letters to the editors in newspapers. I also read about 25 letters to the editors that, like the blog posts selected, pertained mostly to questions of a common EU refugee policy and migrant and refugee acceptance in Austria and Germany, respectively. The letters were usually located

right in the public response feeds to articles published online in the German weekly Spiegel and the Austrian daily paper Die Presse. I used qualitative discourse analysis focusing on the language in these texts, and how the various writers used German in a running discourse theme usually covering a number of sentences or the entire letter. I was interested in anti-immigrant and xenophobic discourses as they unfold in these blogs and letters. I also conducted half a dozen qualitative open-ended interviews with activists and citizens with a clear anti-immigrant public stance in Vienna, Carinthia and Lower Austria in June 2016. My questions focused mostly on the rationale behind the anti-immigrant and xenophobic frenzy and were aimed at gaining some basic understanding of the emotionality that can be found behind much of the current political and public climate in Central Europe.

THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC

The quintessential problem for European governments is that many of their citizens feel threatened by refugees and migrants who attempt to enter their countries. In a 2014 PEW poll surveying 10 EU countries, six in ten Europeans (60%) disapproved of their government's handling of immigration, including around three-quarters in Spain (77%), Greece (75%), and the U.K. (73%) (Poushter, 2015). While more than 2,700 migrants have drowned in the Mediterranean Sea and many others have died in vans and ditches in the past two years, numerous voices have emerged in almost every corner of Europe calling for isolation, mass deportations, and the construction of more walls and fences. Germany, for example, whose government has accepted more asylum seekers than any other European country, is witnessing a spate of violent attacks. In 2015 alone far right and neo-Nazi groups organized about 202 attacks, mostly aiming at the housing facilities of asylum seekers and migrants ("Ugly Attacks" 2015). The Hungarian government has facilitated anti-migrant talk through its public rhetoric coupled with official policies intended to keep migrants out, most notably a high fence along the 109-mile border with Serbia. Austria, France and Switzerland turned back migrants from Italy. The U.K. has been up in arms over migrants from Eastern Europe — with dire results, as exemplified in the recent killing of a Polish migrant in the town of Halo in West Essex, U.K., — and Africa who are clustered in squalid camps in northern France, trying to sneak into England through the Eurotunnel (Grierson, 2016). In Poland itself, the refugee situation was frequently presented as an Islamic invasion of Europe in the right wing press, using terms such as "raid," "conquest," and "penetration"

(Wigura, 2016). At the same time, Western Europe was described as a weak, decaying culture dominated by leftist influence, in which values like Christianity, tradition, and family had been long forgotten. For example, one columnist wrote about a “leftist-genderist idiocracy and depravation of nations and societies,” another of “European ideological blindness” (Wigura, 2016). Domestically, for some, Poland was apparently in danger of fighting a “race war”, in which, as one commentator put it, “Muslims will combat us, and not with terrorism, but with [the] uterus of their women” (Wigura, 2016). It seems that throughout Europe “xenophobia and open racism are running rampant, and nationalist, far-right, parties are gaining ground” everywhere (Fisher, 2015).

Many of these discursive strategies, it seems, come straight out of the playbook of right wing populism, as analyzed by Ruth Kodak (2015). In addition to the construction of fear through political imaginaries and identity narratives, some commentators also applied the victim-perpetrator reversal, claiming that, for example, the Polish people, the Austrians, the Germans, and by extension Europeans will be the victims of “these people’s” movement. For example, as was stated in the online publication *Fronda* “more Muslims means more rapes. If someone does not see this, he must be either blind or stupid” (Wigura, 2016). In some regions and states, the media frenzy and public stance of many mainstream politicians vis-a-vis the migrants and refugees further stirred the popular rage to engage in violent and xenophobic actions.

What is going on in the hearts and minds of so many Europeans? How can often well-educated European citizens become anti-immigrant activists and sympathizers with populist, apparently anti-democratic movements? Why do Eastern Europeans appear to be such fervent racists and Islamophobes even though, with the accession to the European Union their governments have long signed off on and promised to adhere to the entire body of humanitarian law? Part of the answer lies in the logic of a fortress under siege, which leads to claustrophobic xenophobia and has so far been one factor in the rising right-wing extremism and nationalism in Europe (Nardelli et al., 2015). Xenophobic attitudes have been escalating in Europe, also propelled in part by a moribund economy and, in some regions, high unemployment. For example, 26 percent of the 2014 Pew poll respondents believe that the primary motivation for refugees to move to Europe is to seek social benefits (Poushter, 2015). In Poland, media outlets depict refugees as eager beneficiaries of the European welfare state, often emphasizing that they were to perform “social jihad” in the EU (Wigura, 2016). In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo, the Paris and Brussels attacks, the priest killing in Rouen, and the Nice attack, mounting resentment and Islamophobia elsewhere have also lifted the fortunes of right-wing parties with often largely

single-issue anti-immigrant platforms, such as the National Front in France and the U.K. Independence Party, as well as popular movements such as Bloc Identitaire and Patriotic Europeans Against Islamization of the West (Pegida) (Erlanger and Bennhold, 2015).

Perhaps the most important answer to this question lies in feelings of impotence, humiliation and nationalism that many Europeans express. The EU's attempts to create European bonds and a common identity have failed miserably. Instead it appears that members of the white middle and working classes frequently see themselves as disenfranchised from Brussels, and detached from their national elites while clinging to a low-brow nationalism that Michael Billig has called "banal" (1995). On the one hand, for some immigrant communities in Europe nationalism is clearly associated with religious affiliations, as in the Turkish case, and some young Muslims have found a new piety in following the call of Daesh to fight for the Caliphate in Syria and elsewhere (Franz, 2015). Authors, such as Oliver Roy and Peter Neumann explain the rise of xenophobia in Europe with the growing radicalization among supporters of jihadist organizations and the white working class increasingly feeling disenfranchised and uncoupled from elites (Chotiner, 2016; Erhardt, 2016). Currently, the most prevalent link between rising feelings of xenophobia and nationalism coupled with entitlement questions on the one hand and growing radicalization and feelings of disenfranchisement on the other is, of course, immigration. The 2016 Eurobarometer shows that European citizens are the most concerned with the issue of migration. In every member state, except Portugal, citizens refer to immigration as the key problem of the union; 48% mention migration at EU level as one of the top two concerns. Curiously the link is the strongest in states with limited or no immigration. Thus, migration is of *particular* concern in states that experienced very limited (or no) immigration, such as Estonia (73%), Denmark (71%) and the Czech Republic, Latvia and Hungary (each with 67%) (Eurobarometer 2016: 6). Distance and unfamiliarity apparently magnifies fears and xenophobia.

While overall 58% of the respondents feel that immigration is the most important issue facing the EU at the moment (an increase of 20% from the previous poll), 25% believe the issue is terrorism (an 8% increase from the 2014 poll) (Eurobarometer 2016: 13). This is, of course, not meant as an appeal to ignore the rising fanaticism and lack of tolerance among the sympathizers of Daesh and al-Nusra and their like. It also is not a call to ignore the threat that terrorists have used (and in the future might continue to use) refugee routes to come to Europe. Daesh members, if they are part of the refugee population entering Europe, of course, should be dealt with separately from the refugee population. However, it is a sign that workers and members of the middle class

belonging to both the majority society and immigrant groups see themselves as isolated and misunderstood. This easily can turn into rage and inimical decision-making, as seen in the Brexit vote (Hackesberger, 2015).

These patterns are in part based on geographic and economic circumstances. The majority of Europeans today live, again, in largely closed societies that are either based on one large homogenous majority with minimal presence of traditional or new ethnic minorities—such as in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia or Hungary—or somewhat open societies that allow for the residence of ethnic minorities but do not necessarily absorb, incorporate and include these immigrants as equals within their society. Residential clusters of ethnic minority concentration, consisting often of a number of isolated communities within one geographic location, usually bigger cities, are commonplace in Europe today, for example, in the U.K., Austria, France and the Netherlands. Sofia, Vilnius, Bratislava and Budapest are examples for the former, with a population homogeneity of 95% of the residents being national citizens (Eurostat 2015). By contrast, the four EU capital cities whose share of nationals is below 80% are London (78.4%), Rīga (73.9%), Brussels (66.2%) and Luxembourg (36.8%) (Ibid). In the U.K., more than 20% of residents in Bradford and 17% in Slough and Pendle have Pakistani roots, and in Belgium immigrants of North African and Middle Eastern background account for 23% of the population of Brussels, most of whom reside in Molenbeek (Graham, 2015; Burke, 2015). Thus ethnic homogeneity in neighborhoods—whether in reference to wealthy centers such as in London and Vienna, or poverty-stricken centers such as for example, in Brussels can breed isolation. In these clustered societies where commonalities of interest between the different segments of civil society have all but disappeared one could argue for the rise of a number of segregated, so-called parallel societies where members reside in primarily isolated districts and do not interact with each other albeit living in geographic proximity. In Eastern Europe of course, new ethnic minorities are largely absent, such as in Poland or the Czech Republic. This, however, does not mean that these countries have not been exposed to ethnic divergence, for example, through the existing pockets of Roma populations in the regions. In both instances, questions of commonality and common public interest arise.

THE PUBLIC SPHERE: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION SURROUNDING CIVIL AND CIVIC SOCIETY

This is the case because the public sphere, the precondition for a mobile active public, according to Jürgen Habermas (1962), has been altered and might no longer provide the necessary space for the communicative production of public opinion. The Habermasian public sphere was a space where private individuals could debate public matters. Such discussions provided a counterweight to political power and happened often in art, the media, coffee houses and public squares where people had critical debates about public issues (Randall, 2008). Habermas saw a vibrant public sphere as a positive force keeping authorities within bounds lest their rulings be ridiculed. Although in the 1980s already he problematized the growing administrative efficiency as an intervening variable in people's private lives (Holzleithner, 2016: 164). Along those lines Nancy Fraser points out that the public sphere assumes a "bounded" community which she relates to the existence of the sovereign state in the Westphalian sense (2007). This bounded community does no longer exist in Europe today. For Fraser, Habermas failed to register the full range of systemic obstacles that "deprive discursively generated public opinion of political muscle" (Fraser, 2007). Revoking Hardt and Negri (2000), she argues that today hegemony increasingly operates through a "post-Westphalian model of disaggregated sovereignty" (Fraser, 2007). This jeopardizes the *critical* function of public opinion to question political authorities and articulate the citizens' political will.

States host non-citizens on their territory; most states today are considered multicultural and/or multinational, and every nationality is territorially dispersed (Ibid). The public spheres today are not coextensive with political membership. Frequently, the interlocutors are neither co-nationals nor fellow citizens and "(t)he opinion they generate, therefore, represents neither the common interest nor the general will of any *demos*" (Ibid, Linklater, 1999). Fraser thus no longer sees the *critical* standard of *efficacy* and *legitimacy* meaningfully applied to transnational public opinion in a post-Westphalian world. For her, the consistence of the state has changed and thus in today's post-Westphalian world the public sphere can conceivably no longer perform the democratic political functions with which it has been associated historically: To "generate *legitimate* public opinion, in the strong sense of considered understandings of the general interest, filtered through fair and inclusive argumentation, open to everyone potentially affected" (Fraser, 2006). While Fraser's argumentation is very powerful it lacks historical depth and economic perspective.

It is questionable to assume that historically the public spheres have had these rather ideal-typical functions if we consider, for example, traditional societal camps (*Lagermentalität*) in Austria in the interwar period, the function of Block Warde (*Blockwarte*) in Nazi Germany, or Victor Orban's government restricting the freedom of the press in Hungary today, as illustrations of well-known limitations of public discourse in states. However, the necessity of a critical public in neoliberalism is questionable because of neoliberal governance rules, for example, as illustrated by many EU regulations that remove major matters of public concern from any possibility of public debate and thus political regulation. In some instances it seems today that the European public attempts to wrestle back some of the policy issues that had become a matter of EU regulations, e.g. CETA and TTIP. Nevertheless, in neoliberalism today there is a systematic reversal of the democratic project occurring, using markets to tame politics instead of politics to tame markets. How can citizens' public opinion continue to impact policy? And is this even desirable?

If indeed the public opinion generated through discourse in the public sphere has never existed in the Habermasian ideal-typical form or is, at least, on the decline in the post-Westphalian world, as Fraser attests, then perhaps it is time to instigate an attempt to create a new post-Westphalian general will. This is where M.R.R. Osenwaade's analysis is useful. He builds on Ferdinand Tönnies' work making the analytical distinction between civil membership in the *Gesellschaft* and civic membership in the *Gemeinschaft* (Tönnies, 1955). Civil society is here defined as the entire complex of associations and organizations, including religious ones that are not part of the family, state or market (Smith and Shen, 2002; Lewis, 2005). It is usually juxtaposed to the state. What is no longer necessary in this society is a civil society that is organized exclusively for the sake of the gratification and satisfaction of the individual (Ossenwaarde, 2006: 6). Osenwaade claims that civil society as a distinctive social organization, is indeed *antithetical* to citizenship and instead generates individuals whose lives evolve around individualism, consumerism, and personal gratification rather than democracy, political responsibility and participation. Thus Europe today might benefit from a reorientation of civil society toward becoming a truly pan-European *civic* society, structured according to humanitarian principles, based on solidarity and cohesion.

Osenwaade holds that civil association in unions, churches, and clubs and political association in parties are not substitutes for citizenship, but rather its demise (2006). In the social organization of the *Gemeinschaft*, community members are defined by their political bonds *as citizens* because they share the same *fatherland*, traditions, and habits – in other words, the same political destiny. In the *Gesellschaft*, the political bond that ties citizens is broken and

associates have emancipated themselves from their communities to enter civil and political associations in which they establish weak social ties *as strangers with strangers* from different backgrounds (Keane, 2004: 12). Weak ties allow for multifaceted identity development in a multitude of social spheres, the creation of individuality and the freedom to develop as one sees fit, independent of one's background. For many, however, these changes have undermined the functions of the public sphere and have led to a society preoccupied with production and consumption and to the atomization and alienation of individuals (Arendt, 1958). This is specifically the case if they occur in neoliberal economic settings where market behavior is seen as more impactful and consequential for the state and her citizens than society.

Osenwaade argues that two types of persons, the bourgeois and the citizen are generated in two often antagonistic types of social organizations – the one organized for the development of the self, the other for the public interest (2006). In the former *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* the citizen disappears in bowling clubs, shopping malls, movie theaters, restaurants, bars and companies. Instead the bourgeois, the associate, the consumer, and the volunteer appear. The distinctive feature of the “civil” in particular, as contrasted with the “social” in general, is the “emancipation of members from the political community of citizens into the private domain” (Ossenwaarde, 2006: 5). The civil project of the self is radically different from the civic project of citizenship in the public domain and the public interest (Habermas, 2001: 56; Bell, 1976: 21). The development of the self through associational membership requires civil virtues that can maintain autonomy from hierarchy and emancipation from the community. Self-realization demands independence to choose the life one wants to live (Eisgruber, 2002). And indeed, Modern European civil society today (much like America), is concerned mostly with individualism centered upon institutions and experiences in the private sphere, such as the family and the church, and personal gratification. Within this individualist civil framework, the efforts by the EU and national European governments have failed to spark among large segments of their citizenry humanitarian motivation, international unity, and a sense of solidarity with other people, even those in need.

WEAK POLITICAL ELITES AND POPULISTS

Citizenship, however, requires civic virtues, and to a degree, the renunciation of the self, which make self-government in the political community possible (Heater, 1999). It also calls for subsidiary authorities to cultivate civic virtues, for establishing or maintaining political bonds in the community according to

the constitutive principles that define the public interest of the particular state or supranational arrangement like the European Union (Donnelley, 1989: 42–43). This is one of the levels where the connection between the EU and residents has been severed, and instead of trust and reliance a climate of insecurity and paranoia has come to characterize the relationship between the EU and its citizens. In addition, many citizens throughout Europe feel humiliated and insulted by their governments. Albeit crucial for the democratic well-being, in many cases the relationship between citizens and politicians, whether on the regional, national or supranational level, has been broken. A wide-spread lack of faith has emerged in the political competence of most party politicians, beginning with local mayors to the president of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker. Citizens frequently interpret establishment politicians as being either corrupt or powerless or both (Franz, 2016). This is also the space through which figures of the populist right disguised as new elites have entered the public room. The major commonality between Donald Trump, Heinz-Christian Strache, Nigel Farage, Boris Johnson, Viktor Orbán and other such popular figures is that they all have been successful in making their audience believe that they belong to a new group of the anti-establishment, anti-elite politicians. Their credo is based on the re-establishment of an idealized *Gesellschaft*, an imagined Golden Age of social tranquility based on mostly ethnic homogeneity, that in reality has never existed. Along these terms it is interesting to note that both jihadists and nationalist populists view their own community in terms of *Gemeinschaft* and their opponents, the Other, in terms of *Gesellschaft*. Individuality and different backgrounds, however, have always existed. The ideal-typical notion of the *Gemeinschaft* that life in the 18th century farming village in the Alps was harmonious and idyllic, of course, has never been true. In fact, there are few places on this earth that are more hostile than small localities during neighborhood and family disputes and civil wars. What modern Europe needs today is competent and effective subsidiary authorities and a rapprochement between the citizen and the political establishment. But what exists here today is a large reservoir of mistrust, especially against the representatives of the major parties, a strong sense of entitlement albeit with much humility.

In response to globalization and the expansion of neoliberalism turning the planet into an increasingly remote kind of *Gesellschaft*, Eric Hobsbawm has correctly predicted a revival of identity politics (2007). Everywhere in Europe today exclusivist identity trends are looming from populist right wing parties such as the German AfD (Alternative for Deutschland) and the French Front National to alternative movements which are largely based on rigid anti-immigration stances, such as Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West)

and the pan-European group Bloc Identitaire. These group formations seek to reconstruct group bonds and identities. For about 30 years the mainstream parties in France, Austria, Germany, and elsewhere in Europe have been catering toward the populist right, adhering to their demands and adopting their language in the public discourse. Much of the recent xenophobic laws against, for example, wearing the burqa, and its beach-going variant, the burkini, could be interpreted as efforts of the remaking of the French, German, Austrian national *Gemeinschaft* by artificially reconstructing group bonds and identities through, for instance, the symbolic act of excluding such exotic outfits (Hobsbawm, 2007; Dreckers, 2017; France's Identity, 2016).

THE GLOBAL GEMEINSCHAFT AND ITS CITIZENSHIP

Perhaps a new form of social bond is possible, one that is based on civic values that take into consideration the fact that we all live in one global world, in *one global Gemeinschaft*. In this community, members would be defined by their political bonds *as citizens because* they share the same planet instead of one fatherland, and while adhering to different traditions and habits, they also share the same political destiny in a world defined by climate change and the subsequent natural catastrophes. Ossenwaarde emphasizes that the civic perspective aspires to limit individualized society and resist individualism and instead seeks to develop a “democratic *Gemeinschaft* of civic fellowship” (Ossenwaarde, 2006: 14). Only in the political *Gemeinschaft* of “natural township associations” is civic unity and citizenship possible. Of course this *Gemeinschaft* is also associated with an ethnically exclusive patriarchy that is based on traditional family values. Albeit it seems clear that the values defining Tönnies' *Gemeinschaft* ought to be changed in the 21st century it is comprehensible that this change will neither be quick nor easy. Historically speaking, populations have opposed many societal enhancements, such as Civil Rights in the U.S., but in this case, with a transformation in the composition of citizen and denizen a change of the key values is indispensable. This is exactly what needs to happen.

Radical change in behavior and values requires institutional and ideational support. It occurs through exposure to new settings, ideas and people over time and through policy feedback loops (Schross and Schram, 2007). This, however, will only work if trust between political leaders and citizens exists. EU leaders in Brussels and politicians in member states must rebuilt societal trust in the regional and national governing institutions if the objective is to sustain the EU as an institution. In the case of the current migration debate, only politicians

who offer credible alternatives to the current xenophobic migration “crisis” management policy—addressing the problems and providing acceptable solutions for both newcomers and citizens—will be able to do so. This could be *one* valid step in the direction of recreating confidence in the existing governing institutions and bringing the continent one step closer to the development of a European Gemeinschaft based on, perhaps, such values as global, inclusive humanitarianism, rather than the currently rising xenophobic nationalism. But many more steps are necessary.

Grassroots projects are sometimes much closer to this ideal European community than imagined. For example, responding to a Facebook call by the teacher Bryndis Bjorgvinsdottir, last year more than 11,000 families in Iceland offered to host Syrian refugees, although the country is only required to accept 50 asylum seekers per year (Dearden, 2015). The international crowd-funded project Refugees Welcome has found housing and covered other needs for hundreds of refugees in Germany, Austria, Poland, Greece, Spain, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal and other countries (Harding, Olterman and Watt, 2015). The Willkommensbündnis für Flüchtlinge (Welcoming Alliance for Refugees) was established by Günther Schulze in late 2014 in the upper middle-class Berlin quarter of Steglitz-Zehlendorf. About 300,000 people live in the district along with a few hundred refugees divided up among five shelters. More than 1,000 people, many of whom are retirees, support the initiative with 300 people volunteering to help the newcomers with bureaucratic formalities or by collecting donated clothing for them (Aman et al., 2015; Knobbe et al., 2015). It is in the interest of all—politicians, citizens, and refugees—to foster such grassroots projects. This could be done in various ways, for example, by creating public-private partnerships, introducing (perhaps only nominal) public support for various volunteer activities, such as teaching languages. In countries with mandatory military service an alternative kind of service, along the lines of working with the Red Cross but based on refugee and migrant initiatives could be established. However, at the moment these humanitarian activities are almost exclusively driven by volunteer work. Therewith they all exist within civil society. This has clear negative effects. For example, in this case, it juxtaposes volunteer work and pro-refugee initiatives with the popular right-wing movements, such as Pegida, popular political parties, such as the AfD, and in some instances with governments (that at least rhetorically) are often in support of the latter, splitting society further apart. A clear involvement of the state—and by extension the supranational entity of the EU—is necessary to show public responsibility and transfer public goodwill to those in need. In other words, it is time that the EU and other political institutions begin to stand for and promote humanitarianism,

compassion, and solidarity among the people of Europe, old and new, and not fall for the popular and chauvinist political stance to further propagate the existing exclusivist and racist cleavages in education, housing, and the job market.

CONCLUSION

While change is coming either way, the question is in what direction the EU will change and what Leviathan it will become. Today, it seems it is not monetary policy but the refugees that will force the EU to question its current direction with an emphasis on big corporations and international trade, its democratic deficit and lack of transparency. Poland, the U.K. and other countries such as Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic have fiercely resisted the plan to resettle refugees in their territory. The German chancellor Angela Merkel captured the European dilemma in the following way: “If Europe fails on the question of refugees, its close connection with universal civil rights will be destroyed” (Harding et al., 2015). The debate about citizenship caters critically to this view. In this sense, Montesquieu equates citizenship with political virtue that he defines as “a continuous preference of the public interest to one’s own” (1995: 36). While this view might be a bit too militant today, to change the generally prevailing xenophobic and Islamophobic climate in Europe it is necessary to involve society more effectively in refugee and migrant acceptance.

There is of course also a huge credibility problem that many politicians and other elites face in Europe today. To change this it will take a reinvigoration of European institutions and likely an end of standard party politics and political leadership. In the long run it will take strong states to reclaim the position of the umpire vis-a-vis capital and what remains of organized labor. In policy terms in Central Europe an overhaul of the general educational system is necessary, changing from a structure and curriculum that is based on class to one founded on equity, with perhaps the introduction of a number of new subjects such as political education and philosophy, while subjects such as religion should be eliminated from the curriculum. Finland could lead the way in this reform endeavor (Partanen, 2011). However, the European (and U.S.) inclination today goes in the opposite direction—away from openness and tolerance toward closeness and exclusivity. On the one hand nationalism is experiencing its greatest revival in the Western world, possibly since the end of World War II. On the other hand, however, it has become paramount in today’s *global* community to begin to understand the principles of humanitarianism, sustainability, international unity, tolerance, and equality because it is apparent that we all share *one* common

political destiny on this planet. It will take time and gifted politicians leading Europe in the future to attempt to crystallize those values that have essential functions for the continued existence of modern democratic society. Integrating these global values into the traditional notions of civic society might aid in the creation of a European community rooted in compassion and humanitarianism.

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