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## METONYMIC MOTIVATIONS BEHIND PARAGONIC USES OF PROPER NAMES IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE: A COGNITIVE LINGUISTIC APPROACH

The present contribution focuses on one specific figurative usage of proper nouns, namely paragon names, currently employed as derogatory or scornful terms in the debate about public affairs in Poland, as exemplified by the sentence *Dlatego Kaczyńscy-PL i Trumpy-PL wygrywają wybory*<sup>1</sup> [That is why Kaczyńskis and Trumps win elections]. The article argues that metonymic approaches advocated by cognitive linguists (Lakoff 1987, Kövecses and Radden 1998, Barcelona 2003, 2004, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007, and Bierwiaczonek (2013, in press) proffer a more felicitous and precise explanation of the motivational processes behind paragonic uses of names than the metaphoric model advanced in Polish onomastic research, represented, among others, by Kosyl (1978), Kaleta (1998), Cieślukowa (2006) and Rutkowski (2007a, 2007b, 2008, 2012, 2017). We provide a detailed discussion of the recent cognitive linguistic literature on paragons, followed by an analysis of two Polish examples of paragonic uses, which serve as illustration of the explanatory power of selected metonymic frameworks presented in the paper.

Keywords: *proper name, paragon, metonymy, category structure, construal of meaning, political discourse*

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<sup>1</sup> Source: <http://studioopinii.pl/archiwa/175007> (posted on 5.02.2017).

## 1. Introduction

Proper names have long proved to be a resourceful area of diverse theoretical and methodological research both in philosophy of language and in more experimentally oriented onomastic studies in contemporary linguistics (Frege 1952, Russell 1956, Kripke 1972, Lehrer 1999, Van Langedonck 2007, Kosyl 1978, Kaleta 1998). The interest in proper names is maintained in the mainstream cognitive linguistic tradition, which has shifted attention to figurative uses of proper names, such as paragonic ones (e.g. Lakoff 1987, Kövecses and Radden 1998, Barcelona 2003, 2004, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007, Bierwiazzonek 2013, in press).

The primary goal of the present analysis is to show that metonymic models that have been proposed in the field of Cognitive Linguistics are capable of explicating the figurative meanings denoted by paragons and the motivations behind them more felicitously than models relying primarily on metaphorical mappings. We attempt to critically examine metonymic construals of paragons through the prism of the internal structure of categories and inter-categorical relations, as they are conceived of in the cognitive linguistic methodology. A minor objective of this analysis is to briefly present selected examples of paragons that are employed in the current political discourse in Poland.

## 2. The characteristics of proper names

As pointed out by Barcelona (2004: 358-359), proper names typically originate as definite descriptive noun phrases with specific reference, often motivated by metonymic mappings that link the referent of a name with a circumstance or aspect closely related to it (see Bierwiazzonek 2013: 142-149, 198-200 for further details). In the course of time, those descriptive noun phrases become *rigid designators*<sup>2</sup> with inherently unique (and definite) reference (Barcelona 2004: 359), which means that unlike common nouns, names do not evoke a category (and a class of referents), “but only a *single instance*” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 100; cf. Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007: 127-128; Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 99). As “real names”, severed from their original motivation, proper nouns refer by means of an arbitrary association with entities in the referential world, have little or no descriptive meaning, and serve the function of pointing and labeling rather than characterizing their referents (Barcelona 2004: 359; Kaleta 1998: 17-18).

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<sup>2</sup> Putnam (1975: 231; *emph. added*) provides the following definition: a designator is called “*rigid*” (in a given sentence) if (in that sentence) it refers to the same individual in every possible world in which that designator designates”. Logical and philosophical arguments supporting the traditional rigidity approach to proper nouns can be found in Kripke (1972) and Pendlebury (1990).

The above conceptual and semantic characteristics of proper nouns restrict their morpho-syntactic behaviour and set them in stark contrast with common nouns. In consequence, names exhibit the following syntactic properties (Barcelona 2004: 359-360; Quirk et al. 1985: 288-290):

- (i) They generally lack number contrast and contrastive definiteness (article contrast), cf. *\*Parises*, *\*the Paris*, *\*a Paris*, *\*some Paris*;
- (ii) They can only be postmodified by nonrestrictive modifiers, i.e. nonrestrictive relative clauses or nonrestrictive apposition, e.g.
  - (1) *Dr Brown, who lives next door, comes from Australia.*
  - (2) *\*Dr Brown who lives next door comes from Australia.*
- (iii) Their nonrestrictive premodification is limited to “adjectives with emotive colouring”, e.g. *dear little Eric*, *beautiful Spain*.

However, as observed by Quirk et al. (1985: 288), the category of proper nouns has fuzzy boundaries; for instance, there exist common nouns with unique denotation that behave like proper names, such as *Fate*, *Heaven*, *Hell*, etc. What is more, under certain circumstances, proper names can be “reclassified as common nouns”, losing unique reference and assuming the characteristics typical of common nouns (ibid.). Thus, a reclassified proper noun can: (i) occur in the plural; (ii) occur with contrastive determination, and (iii) accept various types of restrictive modifiers.

Quirk et al. (1985: 288-297), Greenbaum and Quirk (1991: 87-88) and Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 520-522) discuss a variety of exceptional (secondary) uses whereby a proper noun is converted to the status of a common noun:

- I. Multiple (different) referents bear the same proper name (a personal, locative or geographical name, or an animal name), e.g.:
  - (3) *There are several P. Johnsons in the phone book.*
- II. Different referents of the same temporal proper noun collectively refer to numerous occasions and thus constitute a conceptual class:
  - (4) *She always spends her Mondays / Octobers / Christmases here.*
- III. A proper name acquires a partitive meaning as the unique referent of a name is split up “into different parts or aspects” (Quirk et al. 1985: 290), cf.:
  - (5) *the young Shakespeare* (= ‘Shakespeare when he was young’);
- IV. Reclassifications due to “informal conventions” (Greenbaum and Quirk 1991: 88):
  - A) a surname in the plural designates a married couple or a family (together with the whole household), as in *the Johnsons*;
  - B) “a famous name” is used to mean “the type that made it famous” (ibid.):
    - (6) *There were no Shakespeares in the nineteenth century.*
- V. ‘Miscellaneous’ uses (Barcelona 2004: 360), subsuming referrals to sets of (commercial) products created by the bearer of a proper name and sets of copies or editions of a newspaper (Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 520-522), illustrated by examples in (7) and (8), respectively:

- (7) *Let's listen to some Beethoven tonight.; He has a Rolls Royce.; I bought a pack of Chesterfields (= 'cigarettes').*  
 (8) *Can I have your Guardian for a moment?*

The present contribution focuses on type IV(B) in the above typology of proper-to-common noun conversions, i.e. on proper nouns used as paragons. The paper is organized as follows: Section 3 offers an introduction to the analysis of paragons. It subsumes a brief presentation of selected Polish onomastic studies into the nature of such uses (Section 3.1), followed by a summary of the main assumptions of the cognitive linguistic approach to paragons, sketched against the background of possible construals of category structure (Sections 3.2 and 3.3). Section 4 comprises a critical overview of metonymic models of paragonic names. Its results are briefly discussed in Section 5, and applied in Section 6 to an analysis of two Polish sentences featuring paragons. Section 7 summarizes the main findings and conclusions of this research.

### 3. The notion of paragon

Barcelona (2004: 357) characterizes *paragons* as “well-known individual members of a category that represent an ideal of the category”. One of the oft-quoted examples of paragonic proper nouns is the name *Shakespeare* used to refer to any talented writer, as in *That young man is a real Shakespeare* (ibid.). A more technical definition is put forward by Bierwiazzonek (2013: 51-52): paragons are “the terms of the lowest possible level of categorization, the level of unique designators” that are “used as common nouns to denote the most salient property of the individual they normally refer to”. The latter scholar distinguishes two types of paragons: (i) paragonic uses of names of well-known individuals/entities, and (ii) uses of common proper names (such as *Jack*) in the generic sense, i.e. paragons of ordinary people with average characteristics (2013: 51, 55). Representative Polish examples of paragons of both types, employed in political discourse, are provided below. All of them bear a negative axiological value and are utilized as derogatory terms or “political insults” (Kamińska-Szmaj 2006: 109).

- (9) *Córka leśniczego kolejnym Misiewiczem?* (1)<sup>3</sup>  
 daughter-NOM forester-GEN another-INSTR Misiewicz-INSTR  
 ‘A forester’s daughter as another Misiewicz?’

<sup>3</sup> Polish example sentences are followed by numbers in brackets – referrals to the websites from which they have been extracted. A complete list of the Internet sources, together with the dates when particular texts (articles, tweets or comments) were uploaded, can be found at the end of the References section.

- (10) (...) *różne Ziobry, Gowiny, Dudy czy Szydły nie liczą na szybki awans.* (2)  
 various Ziobry-NOM.PL, Gowiny-NOM.PL, Dudy-NOM.PL or Szydły-NOM.PL  
 not count-IMPER on quick promotion  
 ‘Various Ziobros, Gowins, Dudas and Szydłos do not count on a quick promotion’.
- (11) (...) *chyba że do tego czasu uda mu się znaleźć i wylansować „nowego Trumpa”.* (3)  
 unless till that-GEN time-GEN manage-FUT him REFL find-INF and promote-INF new-ACC Trump-ACC  
 ‘(...) unless till that time he manages to find and promote “a new Trump”’.
- (12) *Junckery z Timmermansami wpuszczili im do domu bandytów.* (4)  
 Juncker-NOM.PL with Timmermans-INST.PL let them-DAT in house-GEN bandits-ACC.PL  
 ‘Junckers with Timmermanses let bandits into their house’.
- (13) *Liczne Jarki i Antki szczelnym kordonem oddzielać będą Rosję od Europy.* (5)  
 numerous Jarki-DIM.NOM.PL and Antki-DIM.NOM.PL tight-INST cordon-INST separate-INF will Russia-ACC from Europe-GEN  
 ‘Numerous Jareks and Anteks will separate Russia from Europe with a tight cordon’.
- (14) *Wszelkiej maści Janusze Biznesu liczą, że coś za darmo będzie.* (6)  
 all-GEN type-GEN Janusz-NOM.PL business-GEN count that something-NOM for free be-FUT  
 ‘Januszes of Business of all kinds hope that there will be something for free’.

The surnames *Misiewicz, Ziobro, Gowin, Duda, Szydło, Trump, Juncker* and *Timmermans* in sentences (9)-(12) denote public figures that are unique in the context of Polish and/or world politics and sufficiently well-known to be recognized by average members of the public in Poland. Sentences (13)-(14), in turn, feature paragonic Christian names. The diminutivized forms *Jarek* and *Antek* in example (13), corresponding to the full forms *Jarosław* and *Antoni*, stand for Jarosław Kaczyński (leader of the party Law and Justice that is currently in government in Poland) and Antoni Macierewicz (the former Polish Minister of Defence), respectively. Sentence (14) is different, as the common first name *Janusz* designates an ordinary average middle-aged Polish man with his stereotypically negative characteristics, and not a specific, well-known and unique individual. It instantiates what Bierwiaczonok (2013: 51) classifies as paragonic “common proper names” in the *generic* sense.

It deserves note that the plural forms of surnames (*Dudy, Gowiny, Szydły, Junckery, Timmermansy*) sound markedly odd, which seems to be a consequence of the clash between their original unique designation and the class construal invited by the plural suffixes. In the plural, they effectively attract the readers’

or hearers' attention and perform a persuasive function in discourse. Names in the singular, in contrast, need to be premodified by some qualifying element in order to evoke the paragonic interpretation, for instance an adjective (cf. *kolejny* ('next') and *nowy* ('new') in examples (9) and (11), respectively).

### 3.1. The nature of paragons in Polish onomastic research

In the Polish onomastic tradition, paragonic names are characterized as secondary uses resulting from *appellativization* or *deonymization* of proper nouns (Rutkowski 2007: 27-32), defined as the transfer of a name into the category of common nouns (*nomina appellativa*) (Kamińska-Szmaj 2006: 103; Cieślíkowa 2006: 48, 51). The term *paragon* is not employed, various other – more generic – labels are preferred, including: *eponym* (Kopaliński 1996), *appellative*, *appellative neosemanticism*, and *semantic onomastic derivative* (Kamińska-Szmaj 2006).

Paragonic uses like (9)-(13) above are claimed to involve a metaphorical transfer. The crucial assumption behind this approach is that speakers perceive a *similarity* between the original bearer of a given name and the person/people that the name figuratively denotes (Kaleta 1998: 31; Rutkowski 2008: 95-96, 2012: 2, 4-5). Rutkowski (2007a: 158-159) argues that proper names evoke the prototypical representative of a conceptual category established *ad hoc* in the process of metaphorization. The process is claimed to enable extending some salient property(/ies) of the name's original referent onto a whole class of entities (Cieślíkowa 2006: 51). However, the precise nature of the mapping(s) that motivate such a transfer is not explicated.

Metonymy is only invoked in order to account for figurative uses of names that rely on an obvious conceptual or experiential *contiguity*<sup>4</sup> between the metonymic vehicle and target, such as *Bardzo lubię słuchać Chopina* ('I like listening to Chopin very much'), licensed by the metonymy AUTHOR FOR WORK, and *Napoleon zdobył Wiedeń* ('Napoleon concurred Vienna'), motivated by the mapping CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED (Rutkowski 2007b: 94, 96). Paragonic uses like *nowe Waterloo* ('a new Waterloo') are analyzed as motivated by a metonymy-metaphor chain, whereby metonymy enables the interpretation of the place name as denoting the defeat of Napoleon's army there, and

<sup>4</sup> The classic cognitive linguistic definition of *conceptual metonymy*, proposed by Kövecses and Radden (1998: 39), characterizes it as "a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same domain or ICM" (idealized cognitive model). The criterion that is constitutive for metonymic transfers is conceptual *contiguity* (or *contingent association*) between the metonymic vehicle and target – one that is construed rather than objectively given. It can be exemplified, among others, by the relations between: container-content, part-whole and essential property-thing (Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006: 273; Bierwiazzonek 2013: 33).

a metaphorical mapping licenses the subsequent application of the term to any defeat or complete failure (Rutkowski 2017: 98).

This approach ascribes to metaphor the key role in the conceptualization of categories created on the basis of salient properties of their prototypical members. The real or perceived similarity between the primary and secondary referents of a name is treated as constitutive for the mapping, whose precise nature is left unspecified. In the ensuing sections, we delineate the cognitive linguistic standpoint on paragons, according to which the paragon-like understanding of proper nouns is not licensed by metaphors but by metonymic mappings.

### **3.2. The cognitive linguistic approach: the role of metonymy in the interpretation of paragon names**

Cognitive linguistic research on paragon names draws on Lakoff's (1987: 79, 84-85) fundamental insight that *metonymy* plays a pivotal role in structuring models for categories. One way to comprehend categories is via a paragon – an ideal or typical category member which “may metonymically stand for the category as a whole” (Barcelona 2004: 363). One of Lakoff's (1987: 87-88) examples is the baseball player Babe Ruth, who – as a paragon – may be used to refer to any talented baseballer. Crucially, the underlying metonymic mappings bring about “the suspension of the inherent grounding” and unique reference of proper names (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007: 129). In consequence, a name – recategorized as a common noun – evokes a *category* and denotes a *class* of entities rather than a single and unique instance.

In order to make explicit the various metonymic motivations for paragonic names proposed in cognitive linguistic literature, we need to survey the ways in which language users conceptualize categories, their internal structure, as well as inter-categorical links.

### **3.3. Alternative construals of categories**

Under the cognitive linguistic approach, a *category* is “the conceptualization of a collection of similar experiences that are meaningful and relevant” to language users (Radden and Dirven 2007: 3). Conceptual categories are expressed by linguistic ones; the latter, however, cover only “a very small fraction of our conceptual distinctions” (ibid.: 5). Categories are composed of members: the prototypical (located in the centre of a category) and peripheral ones (ibid.: 7, 17; Rosch 1978). Membership in a category can be viewed from several different perspectives (Croft and Cruse 2004: 75), two of which – the *extensional* and *intensional* ones – will be of concern here.

*Extensionally*, a category is defined “by means of the types of entities to which it refers” (Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006: 307) so that members of a category are the referents of the category name. On this view, categories can be represented by *classes* (or *collections*) of (similar) specific instances (entities

in the referential world) that form a type and can be referred to by the same name (Radden and Dirven 2007: 106, cf. Barcelona 2009: 378). For example, the extensional characterization of the category CAR would imply enumerating various car models – members of a class, such as Opel, Fiat, Ferrarri, etc. Likewise, the category TALENTED PLAYWRIGHT would be represented by a collection of famous playwrights, including, among others, Shakespeare, Molière and Ibsen.

Looked at from the perspective of *intension*, categories have “conceptual entities, i.e. subcategories, as their members” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 106). When categories are defined as clusters of concepts (cf. Taylor 2002: 130), they can be represented in terms of “a list of the attributes of category members” (Croft and Cruse 2004: 81). The prototype will then be “an idealization represented by the full set of features”, and the centrality of a category member in the category and the degree of its prototypicality will depend on “how many of the relevant set of features it possesses” (ibid.). Considered from an intensional perspective, the categories CAR and TALENTED PLAYWRIGHT are defined by means of the characteristics of the prototypical member. The more features of the prototype a given playwright or car possesses, the better an example of the respective categories they will be.

In addition to the extensional and intensional conceptualizations of categories, language users entertain *metaphorical* construals of category structure. As observed by Lakoff (1993: 212-213), membership in a (classical) category can be perceived as a relation of inclusion between a bounded region or container and its content. Under the metaphor (CLASSICAL) CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS, the elements that are members of a category are construed as located inside it, while non-members – as located outside. Furthermore, according to the folk understanding, the relationship between a category and its members is that of a whole and parts (Kövecses and Radden 1998: 52). The metaphor that is operative in this conceptualization is CATEGORY STRUCTURE IS PART-WHOLE STRUCTURE (Barcelona 2009: 377). Thus, extensionally, the referents of a category name can be perceived either as located inside a category-container or as parts of a whole. Finally, if conceptual categories are defined intensionally by sets of properties/attributes of their members, those defining or essential properties may – by virtue of the same metaphors – be construed as located inside a container or as parts of a whole (Kövecses and Radden 1998: 53; Croft and Cruse 2004: 81).

In order to identify the metonymies that motivate paragonic names, we also need to draw attention to the fact that conceptual categories form part of “an overall system of categories” (Radden and Dirven 2007: 4). More specifically, categories are construed as included in larger groupings: (i) *taxonomies*, (ii) *partonomies* (also referred to as meronomies), and (iii) frames and domains, i.e. “coherent area[s] of conceptualization” (ibid.: 8). Taxonomies are conceptual classificatory hierarchies within which hyponym-hyperonym (or: species-genus) relations obtain, while partonomies are hierarchies structured by part-

whole relations (for details concerning taxonomies and partonomies, see Cruse 1986). Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006: 302) introduce two types of part-whole relations, namely *assemblies* and *collections*, represented by a body consisting of body parts and a committee consisting of members, respectively. The feature that sets them apart is the uniformity of category members: assemblies are “functional structures of different parts”, while collections are “sets of roughly equal members” (Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006: 302). Under this view, various talented playwrights may be perceived as forming a collection, which, crucially, is a type of a part-whole structure and not a type-of hierarchy.


It is important to realize that only partonomies are “based on real-world constitutive relations” of contiguity, while taxonomies are purely “mental (re)classifications of categories”, based on “the conception of categorical hierarchy (...) in our mind” (Seto 1999: 94). However, as pointed out by Seto (*ibid.*, cf. Kövecses and Radden 1998: 52-53), by virtue of spatial metaphors, taxonomies can also be conceptualized as part-whole structures, leading to a confusion between the two types of classifications. In consequence, it is possible to say that an Opel is a part of the category CAR, analogically to an arm being a part of the BODY.

By way of illustration, consider three alternative extensional conceptualizations of the internal structure of the category PLAYWRIGHT, depicted in Figure 1: (i) a taxonomy, (ii) a partonomy, and (iii) a container with content. Figure 1A shows the position of this category within a taxonomy of writers. The middle line represents the basic level of categorization, and the bottom one – the sub-basic level. The capital letters in Figure 1C stand for names of playwrights, selected as examples: S for Shakespeare, M for Molière, B for Brecht and L for Lope de Vega.


For the sake of the present analysis let us note that while the relation of *taxonomy* (hyponymy in the narrow sense, cf. Cruse 1986: 137f.) holds between the basic and superordinate level of categorization (a novelist, playwright and poet in Figure 1A can all be described as kinds of writers), the individuals in the sub-basic level, which in this case is “the lowest possible level of categorization, the level of unique designators” (Bierwiazzonek 2013: 51), appear to represent a collection: Shakespeare is not a type of playwright but a member of a set or collection of playwrights. It seems, therefore, that the conceptual hierarchy depicted in Figure 1A may be considered as a combination of a taxonomy and a partonomy, illustrating the blurring of the distinction between the taxonomic and partonomic construals of categories.

It will be evident from the preceding discussion that the differences between the extensional and intensional perspectives on category structure and category membership, coupled with conceptualizations in terms of taxonomies, partonomies or containers, have a direct bearing on *metonymic models* of categories, which, in turn, are vital for establishing the motivations that license paragonic uses of proper names. A salient category member, a subcategory or an attribute may be metonymically highlighted and employed to access other


category members or the whole category that a given proper noun denotes (cf. Kövecses and Radden 1998: 53). Specifically, under the extensional perspective, whereby categories are conceptualized as classes (or collections) of members, the INDIVIDUAL-and-COLLECTION or MEMBER-and-CATEGORY metonymies can be applied. When a category is characterized intensionally – by a set of properties, the PROPERTY-and-ENTITY or PROPERTY-and-CATEGORY metonymies can be invoked (cf. Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006: 303, 307-308; Kövecses and Radden 1998: 52-54). Depending on whether a category is construed as a partonomy or taxonomy, the relations between the whole category and its members can be conceptualized in terms of either PART-WHOLE or SPECIES-GENUS configurations, resulting in two different types of extension mechanisms: metonymic or synecdochic, respectively (cf. Seto 1999, Bierwiaczonek 2013, in press). They will be explored in more detail in the ensuing parts of this article.



A. The category **PLAYWRIGHT** within a **taxonomy** of writers (modeled on Bierwiaczonek 2013: 53)



B. The category **PLAYWRIGHT** as a whole with parts (**partonomy**)



C. The category **PLAYWRIGHT** as a **container** with content

Figure 1. Alternative conceptualizations of the category **PLAYWRIGHT**

## 4. Metonymic motivations behind paragon names

This section outlines and critically appraises the major claims concerning metonymic models of paragons made by the following cognitive linguists: Zoltan Kövecses and Günter Radden (1998), Antonio Barcelona (2003, 2004), Bogusław Bierwiaczonek (2013, in press), and Mario Brdar and Rita Brdar-Szabó (2007). Their findings are presented according to the types of motivations that they identify as operational in paragons.

### 4.1. The metonymy CATEGORY FOR DEFINING PROPERTY (Kövecses and Radden 1998)

Kövecses and Radden (1998: 53) account for cases of recategorization of proper names as common nouns in terms of the relationship between a category and its properties, metaphorically understood as parts of the category (cf. Section 3.2). Their approach is based on the assumption that when categories are characterized intensionally, they “typically evoke, and may metonymically stand for, one or more of their defining or otherwise essential properties and, conversely, a defining or essential property of a category may evoke, and stand for, the category which it defines” (ibid.). Therefore, cases whereby names of well-known individuals are “recategorized as a class on the basis of their defining, stereotypical property” are licensed by the metonymy CATEGORY FOR DEFINING PROPERTY (ibid.: 54). Calling a treacherous person *a Judas* and referring to “an upcoming star in linguistics” as *a second Chomsky* exemplify the mapping (ibid.). The category JUDAS is thus defined by the feature ‘treachery’, and the category CHOMSKY – by ‘intellectual brilliance’.

According to Bierwiaczonek (2013: 52), Kövecses and Radden’s (1998) proposal is problematic due to the fact that proper “names refer to individuals and do not denote categories”, which renders the origin of the ‘category’ unclear. Instead, Bierwiaczonek (ibid.) postulates that a paragon name is “first mapped onto the higher node of the whole class of similar entities” – referents of the name, and in this way loses its grammatical status of a proper noun. Thus, the above-mentioned *Judas* would first be mapped onto “treacherous members of a group and *Chomsky* – onto brilliant linguists”. It appears that the metonymy that would be operative here is IDEAL MEMBER FOR CLASS<sup>5</sup> (Bierwiaczonek 2013: 52). As claimed by Bierwiaczonek (ibid.), “the re-categorised paragon name is strongly associated with the defining property of the category”. Therefore, “it may then metonymically stand for this defining property”. The metonymy CATEGORY FOR DEFINING PROPERTY, put forward by Kövecses and Radden (1998), would thus apply in the second step.

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<sup>5</sup> Bierwiaczonek (2013: 52) refers to it as the metonymy that is “typical of paragons”.

While Bierwiaczonek's reservation seems valid, his solution leaves the difference between the extensional and intensional perspectives on category membership unaccounted for and blurred, in contrast to Kövecses and Radden (1988: 52-54), who discuss the Category-and-member ICM (extensions) and Category-and-property ICM (intensions) separately. They propose a different set of "category metonymies" for conceptualizations whereby referents (extensions) rather than properties (intensions) are seen as category parts. The extensional perspective is applied to hyponym-hyperonym (or species-genus) relations, exemplified by using the term *pill* to refer to a *contraceptive pill* (the metonymy A CATEGORY FOR A MEMBER OF THE CATEGORY) or by using *aspirin* to denote any *pain-relieving tablet* (A MEMBER OF A CATEGORY FOR THE CATEGORY) (ibid.: 53), which Bierwiaczonek (2013, in press) sets apart as synecdochic extensions (see Section 4.3).

#### 4.2. A two-metonymy chain (Barcelona 2003, 2004)

Barcelona (2003, 2004) assumes the intensional perspective as the starting point for conceptualizations that enable paragonic uses of proper names. Specifically, the scholar claims that a *property* of a name's referent is "always the potential basis for a class (...) constituted by entities bearing the [same] property" (2003: 24). What happens is that when the salient or stereotypical property associated with the standard referent of a name (e.g. Shakespeare, the famous playwright) is "discovered in other people", the authentic bearer of the name is "recategorized as a class", acting as "a metonymic reference point" for it, and in this way his/her name becomes a class-name, that is, a common noun (ibid.: 24, 28). Thus, the crucial difference between names used as paragons and names that are rigid designators is that paragons do not denote the name's well-known referent but refer to a figurative class of individuals that are conceptualized as displaying the defining property associated with him/her (here: a class of highly talented writers) (2004: 364). Sentences (15)-(18), borrowed from Barcelona (2004: 363; 2003: 25), provide illustration.

- (15) *Lope de Vega was not a Shakespeare.*
- (16) *A real Shakespeare would never use those trite images.*
- (17) *Lope de Vega was not the Spanish Shakespeare.*
- (18) *There were some Shakespeares in the twentieth century.*

Barcelona (2003: 38; 2004: 365-365) posits a chain of two PART FOR WHOLE metonymies as the motivation licensing paragonic uses of proper nouns. In the first step, the metonymy CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY OF AN INDIVIDUAL FOR THE INDIVIDUAL "assigns a stereotypical property to a famous individual", downplaying his/her other properties, and creates a stereotypical (and therefore metonymic [Lakoff 1987: 85]) conceptual model of the well-known referent of the name. In the second step, this conceptual model serves as the source

domain in the operation of the metonymy IDEAL MEMBER FOR CLASS (2003: 24; 2004: 369), also formulated as (IDEAL) MEMBER/ SUBCATEGORY FOR CATEGORY (2003: 23-26; 2004: 365). The second operation is critically important as it “*directly* motivates” the use of a paragon name as a common noun by activating a mental class of ideal members characterized by one or more salient properties imported from the conceptual model (2004: 369). Membership in this category is conditioned by the closeness of a given individual to the ideal set up by the standard referent of the paragon name.

It seems that several doubts may be raised with regard to Barcelona’s analysis. The first one concerns the metonymy CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY OF AN INDIVIDUAL FOR THE INDIVIDUAL (PART FOR WHOLE), meant to highlight a stereotypical property of a famous person, simultaneously defocusing his/her other features that are irrelevant in a given discourse context. Barcelona (2004: 368, cf. 2003: 24) characterizes this mapping as one that “simplifies the network, as it gets virtually reduced to” the relation of having immense literary talent, simultaneously “hiding other relations which would have equal status in a non-metonymic model of Shakespeare”. It follows from this description that the proposed mapping is a target-in-source metonymy, i.e. a WHOLE FOR PART one, exploiting the process of *domain reduction* (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza 2007: 14, Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera-Masegosa 2014: 113). Therefore, it appears that it might better be rendered in a reversed way, i.e. as AN INDIVIDUAL FOR HIS/HER CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY (WHOLE FOR PART). This view seems to be endorsed by Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 135), who employ the mapping BEARER OF PROPERTY FOR CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY (see Section 4.4 for details). The ‘reversed’ formulation complies with the assumption that seems standard in cognitive semantics, namely that a metonymic source is directly invoked by a given linguistic expression (Ruiz de Mendoza 2007: 15-16). A graphic representation for the metonymic reduction that is operative in paragonic names has been put forward by Ruiz de Mendoza (2011) and Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera-Masegosa (2014).




Figure 2. Domain reduction in paragonic uses of the name *Shakespeare* (modeled on Ruiz de Mendoza [2007] and Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera-Masegosa [2014: 114])

Barcelona (2003, 2004) employs two alternative formulations for the second metonymic tier (IDEAL MEMBER FOR CLASS and (IDEAL) MEMBER/ SUBCATEGORY FOR CATEGORY), which may appear confusing, especially since the first rendering seems to assume the extensional perspective on category structure (cf. Section 3.2), while the latter may be understood as appealing to intensions, in line with the first metonymic tier that he proposes (CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY OF AN INDIVIDUAL FOR THE INDIVIDUAL).

Moreover, as pointed out by Bierwiazzonek (2013: 52), it is not obvious what the stereotypical conceptual model of the referent of a given paragon name will be. As the possible interpretations of the above *Shakespeare* examples demonstrate, the specific components of the model can hardly be treated as defining, and the model – even if entrenched – is not necessarily fixed. Furthermore, Barcelona (2004: 369) insists that the existence of such a model conditions the emergence of the mental class of talented writers. However, according to Bierwiazzonek (2013: 53), “exactly the opposite seems to be the case”, since “most readers probably identify” a taxonomy of writers comprising – as one of its subcategories – a class of extremely talented playwrights, to which Shakespeare belongs as “a particularly salient member.” This intermediate level in the taxonomy of writers would be utilized in the recategorization of the proper noun *Shakespeare*. This proposal is elaborated on in the subsequent section.

#### 4.3. Synecdochic metonymy (Bierwiazzonek 2013, in press)

Before discussing the relevance of synecdochic metonymy to paragon names, we need to clarify the difference between synecdoche and metonymy, mentioned in Sections 3.2 and 4.1. It is one of Bierwiazzonek’s (2013, in press) key claims that *synecdoche* proper should not be subsumed under metonymy. The former is based on the conceptual relation of hyponymy and embraces transfers “along the axis of generality-specificity” (i.e. genus-species or hyperonym-hyponym), as in *pill* used for ‘contraceptive pill’ or *vehicle* for ‘car’ (2013: 33; in press: 5). Metonymy, in contrast, is characterized by the relation of contiguity or contingent association (cf. Section 3.2), exemplified, among others, by part-whole transfers (as in *She is just a pretty face*). Importantly, unlike metonymy and metaphor, synecdoche does not involve any “change of literal reference but only change of the level of schematicity of literal reference” (in press: 4).

Apart from clarifying the two notions, Bierwiazzonek (in press: 4-6, 9-10) proposes to refine the typology of figures of speech by distinguishing two borderline relations that combine taxonomic links, characteristic of synecdoche, with either close associative links (contiguity), which are typical of ‘ordinary’ metonymy (as in (i) below), or with relations of similarity or analogy, typical of metaphor (as in (ii)):

- (i) *synecdochic metonymy* (or *syntonymy* for short) – a SPECIES FOR GENUS transfer (the generalizing variety of synecdoche), exemplified by the Polish terms *adidas* and *szampan* (an adaptation of the French *champagne*),

- used to designate all kinds of sports footwear and all kinds of ‘sparkling wine’, respectively (in press: 5-6),
- (ii) *synecdochic metaphor (syntaphor)* – a SPECIES-SPECIES transfer based on perceived similarity or analogy between closely-related concepts, operating on the horizontal level of a taxonomy between members of a category on the same basic or sub-basic taxonomic level. Examples include calling a Pekinese a *poodle*, and referring to an Opel Corsa as a *Mercedes* (2013: 34; in press: 10, 14, 16; 22-23).

The modified typology of figures of speech is depicted in Figure 3.




Figure 3. A general typology of figures of speech (reproduced from Bierwiazzonek [in press: 17])

The diagram demonstrates that syntaphor and syntonymy occupy the ‘middle ground’ between metaphor (based on analogy or similarity), synecdoche (based on taxonomic relations) and metonymy (based on association or contiguity). It deserves note that the specializing type of synecdoche, involving “reduction in the ‘vertical’ GENUS FOR SPECIES transfers of meaning” (Bierwiazzonek in press: 22), is set apart from the SPECIES FOR GENUS mapping (a generalizing vertical transfer), which is classified as a ‘borderline’ relation.

The common feature of the two additional types of mappings (syntonymy and syntaphor) is that they involve a “synecdochic vertical shared membership in a single higher category” (ibid.: 10). In addition, both bring about semantic extensions that enrich existing conceptual taxonomies of categories in ways which, according to Bierwiazzonek (ibid.: 21), cannot be satisfactorily explained by resorting solely to synecdoche, metonymy or metaphor.

The relation that is relevant in accounting for paragonic uses of proper names, such as *Shakespeare* referring to other very talented playwrights, is synecdochic metonymy. In Bierwiazzonek’s (in press: 5-6) view, this type of transfer comes in two sub-varieties. In the first one, “a lower term stands for the whole category C to which it belongs”, as is the case with the above-mentioned Polish words *adidas* and *szampan*. In the other variety of syntonymy,

“a lower term, usually the unique paragon, stands for an *axiologically marked* subcategory of C to which it belongs” (emph. added), which can be exemplified by the paragonic interpretations of the nouns *Shakespeare* and *Mercedes*. The syntonymic mapping that motivates all such transfers is formulated as SALIENT MEMBER OF CATEGORY C FOR WHOLE CATEGORY C (ibid.: 6). It fulfils a vital role in “reorganizing categories” (ibid.: 21), as it can modify speakers’ conceptual hierarchies in two ways: (i) by using an existing taxonomy and elevating the name of one of the sub-basic level categories to the status of a category name on a higher level (e.g. *adidas* for ‘sports footwear’ in Polish), and/or (ii) by adding a new intermediate level to a taxonomy and providing a label for it, e.g. when *Shakespeare* denotes the subcategory EXTREMELY TALENTED PLAYWRIGHT or *Mozart* – EXTREMELY TALENTED MUSICIAN (ibid.: 6).

It follows from the foregoing discussion that two aspects of syntonymy are particularly pertinent to paragonic names. One is the mapping’s ability to create an intermediate taxonomic level (a subcategory) in a speaker’s conceptualization, which he/she utilizes in recategorizing a proper name as a common noun (2013: 53; in press: 6). For the paragonic uses of the name *Shakespeare*, represented by sentences (6) and (15)-(18) above, the modified taxonomy of writers might look as follows:




Figure 4. A taxonomy of talented writers employed in the recategorization of *Shakespeare* as a common noun (modified from Bierwiazzonek 2013: 53)

The added arrow marks the syntonymically motivated shift from the proper name *Shakespeare* to the category name *Shakespeare*<sub>fig</sub> (a common noun), which figuratively denotes any Shakespeare-like playwright of outstanding talent.

The other crucial aspect of Bierwiazzonek’s (in press) proposal is the focus on the value judgment attached to the target by virtue of syntonymy. In the examples at hand (*Shakespeare*, *Mercedes*), the evaluation is positive.

Despite those effective solutions, it appears that some reservations concerning the application of Bierwiaczonok's (2013, in press) approach to paragonic names are in place. Firstly, its core part does not seem to differ substantially from the claims made by Barcelona (2003, 2004). That is, the syntonymy SALIENT MEMBER OF CATEGORY C FOR WHOLE CATEGORY C employed as motivation behind paragonic proper-to-common noun conversions seems equivalent to the metonymy (STEREOTYPICAL) MEMBER/SUBCATEGORY FOR CATEGORY (extensionally rendered as IDEAL MEMBER FOR CLASS), exploited by the latter scholar. However, unlike Barcelona, Bierwiaczonok (in press) does not appear to explain how the salient property of a paragon is 'extracted' and mapped onto the class of entities that are construed as resembling it. Metonymic reduction of a paragon to its salient components is only mentioned in passing – in reference to Ruiz de Mendoza and Galera-Masegosa's (2014) analysis of the sentence *Humboldt is the Shakespeare of travelers* (in press: 7-8). Let us recall that Bierwiaczonok (2013) expressed criticism towards the stereotypical model of a paragon that is a prerequisite for the operation of metonymy in Barcelona's analysis (Section 4.2). It is not immediately obvious what the alternative explanation is.

#### **4.4. An alternative account of paragon names circumventing the class construal: multiple chained metonymies (Brdar and Brdar-Szabó 2007)**

In the analyses put forward by Barcelona (2003, 2004) and Bierwiaczonok (2013, in press), the paragonic interpretation of proper nouns rests on the assumption that a speaker necessarily construes a figurative class of referents of a given name who are perceived as resembling the standard bearer of the name. This extensional class construal is thus a prerequisite for the recategorization of the name as a common noun.

In contrast, Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 131) follow Kövecses and Radden (1998) and assume the intensional perspective on category structure, treating the mapping CATEGORY FOR DEFINING PROPERTY as foundational for the notion of paragon. They contend that in some contexts positing a class or collection of individuals characterized by some salient property(/-ies) of the paragon may be problematic, since such a class would be "a rag-tag collection", lacking internal homogeneity and organization. This is particularly apparent in paragonic uses linking "quite distinct domains" and involving metaphorical mappings<sup>6</sup>, which may be illustrated by the expression *the Shakespeare of travelers* used to describe Alexander von Humboldt – an outstanding explorer (ibid.: 135). As a solution, they advocate a refined approach that circumvents the class construal in favour of additional chained metonymies operating on various tiers of conceptualization, and suggest that the enriched analysis may eliminate

<sup>6</sup> Such construals are *metaphonymic* (metonymy within metaphor in Goossens' [2002/1990] terms) in that metonymic tiers – indispensable for the paragonic interpretation of names – are topped with metaphoric processing.

the need for an “ICM-like class or collection of individuals with a specified property” (ibid.: 131). In addition, they account for the axiological notion of “either an ideal or its opposite”<sup>7</sup> inherent in paragons, as originally suggested by Lakoff (1987: 87).

In what follows, we briefly discuss Brdar and Brdar-Szabó’s (2007) proposal, employing sentence (19) as exemplification. It instantiates the construction Determiner + X<sub>personal name</sub> + *of* Y, whose meaning can be rendered as “X endowed with immense talent/skill as far as Y is concerned” (p. 126, 135).

(19) *Steven has a bag of tricks, a good passer, can operate in confined areas and is the Zidane of Villa whose left foot is nearly as good as his right.*  
(ibid.: 126)

According to Brdar & Brdar-Szabó (ibid.: 132-133), the first metonymic tier involved in the interpretation of this example consists in “some type” of the WHOLE FOR PART metonymy that reduces the name *Zidane* (a metonymic vehicle), which normally covers the whole encyclopedic knowledge about the person, to ‘Zidane the footballer’ as the metonymic target. The mapping highlights the information that is relevant in the context of football (the intersection of the domain (matrix) of Zidane with the FOOTBALL domain) and “defocus[es] or almost totally obliterate[es]” other portions of knowledge about the player (ibid.: 132, 135). Put differently, this metonymy “effects the conceptual division of an otherwise unitary domain” and constitutes “the basic input for any further metonymic and metaphorical mappings” (ibid.: 133). In the second step, the metonymy BEARER OF PROPERTY FOR CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY operates (ibid.: 135). It narrows down the interpretation of ‘Zidane the footballer’ to his contrastive, unique properties, such as precise passes, etc. The final metonymic tier – the mapping WHOLE SCALE FOR UPPER/LOWER END OF SCALE – imposes a scalar model on Zidane’s unique skills and in this way enables interpreting them as “exhibited to the maximum, either in the positive or negative sense” (p. 137-138). This metonymy brings about the axiological notions ‘best of’ or ‘worst of’, giving rise to a positive or negative evaluation of the referent’s contrastive traits that are interpreted as outstanding. Importantly, it is the operation of the full metonymic chain that results in the paragon-like understanding of proper names (ibid.: 138).

Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 138) draw attention to the fact that the outcome of the series of mappings is available for further – “presumably metonymic” – elaboration, producing “an instance of the metonymic type”, illustrated by sentence (20):

<sup>7</sup> Lakoff (1987: 87) characterized paragons as members of categories “who represent either an ideal or its opposite.”

(20) *It doesn't take an Einstein to understand that this is a very important game for us...*

As indicated earlier, when the characteristics of a paragon are conceptualized as shared by entities in distinct conceptual domains, as is the case with *the Shakespeare of travelers*, the outcome of the metonymic chain can further serve as input for metaphorical mappings. For lack of space, such uses will not be examined here; see Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 139ff.) for details.

## 5. Discussion

It will be evident from the foregoing scrutiny of approaches to paragonic uses of proper nouns that metonymic models enable a far more felicitous and in-depth explication of the conceptual processes involved in their interpretation than the metaphoric account presented in Section 3.1. The latter type of analysis does not seem to have a satisfactory expository value as it does not make precise the mechanisms that allow a speaker to reduce a holistic conceptualization of the authentic bearer of a name to their salient properties and to map them onto other entities. We hope to have shown that the mappings that motivate a paragonic construal of names are metonymic. The metonymy that seems constitutive for paragons can be rendered as BEARER OF PROPERTY FOR CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY OF SALIENT MEMBER OF CATEGORY FOR WHOLE CATEGORY, assuming the intensional or extensional perspective, respectively.

It appears that Brdar and Brdar-Szabó's (2007) framework has the greatest explanatory potential among the metonymic accounts outlined here. It exhaustively addresses a full range of aspects and motivational factors involved in paragonic uses of names, and accounts for their axiological value. The authors do not appeal to the class construal at all, which makes their approach consistently intensional. When used as a paragon, a name (e.g. *Zidane* in example 19) represents a conceptual category (A FOOTBALLER OF OUTSTANDING SKILLS), defined in terms of the paragon's selected contrastive properties, and licensed by metonymic mappings operating within the CATEGORY-AND-PROPERTY ICM, as originally proposed by Kövecses and Radden (1998). Circumventing the class construal appears especially effective with regard to uses that feature the paragon name in the singular.

We would like to argue, however, that in the case of paragonic uses of pluralized proper names, an extensional conceptualization in terms of a class or collection of referents that share the paragon's contrastive traits is likely, if not necessary. In such cases, by virtue of a syntonymic mapping (Bierwiazczonek in press), a speaker appears to conceptualize an axiologically marked, intermediate level in a mental taxonomy, which subsumes the referents of the name recategorized as a common noun.

In the next section, we apply the results of the foregoing discussion of metonymic models to two examples of paragonic names retrieved from the

Polish mass media. We will resort to Brdar and Brdar-Szabó's (2007) refined metonymic chain, and to the class construal motivated by synecdochic metonymy, put forward by Bierwiczek (in press).

## 6. An analysis of selected Polish examples of paragons extracted from political discourse

For a more thorough examination, we have selected sentences (9) and (12), included in the overview of Polish examples of paragons in Section 3, and repeated here for convenience as (21) and (22). In sentence (21), the Polish male surname in the singular is used predicatively as a complement of the elided copula *be*, not matching the gender features of the subject noun phrase (*córka leśniczego*), without producing an effect of ungrammaticality. The two foreign surnames in example (22) are marked for plurality by suffixation, in accordance with the rules of Polish morphology.

- (21) *Córka leśniczego kolejnym Misiewiczem?*  
 daughter-NOM forester-GEN another-INSTR Misiewicz-INSTR  
 'A forester's daughter as another Misiewicz?'
- (22) *Junckery z Timmermansami wpuścili im do domu bandytów.*  
 Junker-NOM-PL with Timermans-INSTR-PL let them-DAT in house-GEN bandits-ACC-PL  
 'Junkers with Timmermanses let bandits into their house'.

Bartłomiej Misiewicz, whose surname is utilized in sentence (21), became known to the Polish public after the parliamentary elections in 2015. Despite his very young age, lack of qualifications and experience, he was appointed to lucrative positions in the Ministry of Defense, the Minister's political cabinet, and the Polish Armament Group. In consequence, he became infamous as an undeserving protégée. In the Polish political discourse, his name is now frequently employed to refer to "people associated with the governing party who benefit from the current political situation because of their loyalty to the party, irrespective of their qualifications" (Góralczyk and Paszenda 2017: 65-66).

We would like to suggest that the metonymic chain, proposed by Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007), can most effectively account for the motivations that license example (21). Firstly, a WHOLE FOR PART metonymy reduces the full ICM of encyclopedic knowledge about Bartłomiej Misiewicz, which an average speaker of Polish may have, to the part that intersects with the domain of politics and is relevant for political discourse. This first process of domain reduction isolates the information concerning Misiewicz's political career and involvement. In the second tier of domain reduction, the BEARER OF PROPERTY FOR CHARACTERISTIC PROPERTY metonymy pinpoints the contrastive properties of the referent that make him stand out as a paragon, namely undeserved

benefits enjoyed despite the lack of necessary qualifications and experience. The conceptualization resulting from this double domain reduction is schematically depicted in Figure 5.




Figure 5. Double domain reduction in the paragon *Misiewicz*

Finally, as suggested by Brdar and Brdar-Szabó (2007: 137), the mapping WHOLE SCALE FOR UPPER END OF SCALE licenses the conceptualization of Misiewicz's traits as "exhibited to the maximum". Because of the nature of those characteristics and the original context in which the person is considered to have displayed them, the interpretation is negative. The full metonymic chain gives rise to the paragonic interpretation of the name *Misiewicz*, which we can tentatively formulate as 'a person enjoying great undeserved benefits despite his complete lack of necessary qualifications and experience'. Once available, this complex conceptualization can be mapped onto other individuals, such as a forester's daughter in sentence (21). In consequence, they will be construed as resembling Mr. Misiewicz in terms of his unique properties. It appears that a syntaphoric co-hyponymous transfer, proposed by Bierwiazzonek (in press), may be suggested as the final step motivating the meaning of the whole sentence.

Let us now turn to example (22), produced with regard to the refugee wave that the European Union attempts to cope with. It features the surnames of Jean-Claude Juncker and Frans Timmermans, who are known to the interested members of the Polish public because of the leading roles they perform in the European Commission. Juncker tends to be perceived as behaving too informally in his office, while Timmermans is criticized by the supporters of the Polish government for his current involvement in the defense of democracy and the rule of law in Poland. We assume that this encyclopedic knowledge about the two politicians, coupled with the information about refugees arriving in Europe, provides the basis for the paragonic interpretation of the surnames in question. The employment of the plural forms appears to imply that in uttering sentence (22), a speaker conceptualizes an intermediate subclass of European politicians, consisting of officials who are responsible for letting refugees enter Europe. Its tentative shape is depicted in Figure 6, in accordance with Bierwiazzonek's (2013, in press) proposals.




Figure 6. A likely taxonomy of politicians involved in the paragonic interpretation of sentence (22)

We would like to suggest that Brdar and Brdar-Szabó's (2007) chain of metonymies can be employed in the construal of the meaning of this sentence as well, culminating in the reduction of the ICMs 'Juncker' and 'Timmermans' to 'politicians who are responsible for the refugee crisis'. It follows from the contextual information that the resultant axiological evaluation is negative. The plural forms invite a class construal, motivated by the syntonymy SALIENT MEMBER OF SUBCATEGORY FOR WHOLE SUBCATEGORY (cf. Bierwiazzonek in press), which may give rise to a new subcategory in the typology of politicians, namely POLITICIANS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REFUGEE CRISIS.

## 7. Conclusions

Figurative uses of proper nouns, including paragonic human names, continue to attract considerable interest of linguists of various theoretical backgrounds. In the present analysis we have attempted to demonstrate that a satisfactory explication of conceptualizations behind paragons needs to make precise the nature of at least two processes: (i) the domain reduction that takes place when a name's referent is narrowed down to some salient property(/ies), and (ii) the projection of the property(/ies) onto a class of referents when the name is used in the plural. As argued by contemporary cognitive linguists, it is metonymy rather than metaphor that plays the key motivational role here. A critical appraisal of four metonymic models advanced by leading cognitive scholars, taking into account the interplay between intensional and extensional construals of category structure, yields us to conclude that Brdar & Brdar-Szabó's (2007) framework, consisting

in a series of metonymic mappings, appears to have the greatest explanatory potential with regard to paragonic expressions. The employment of a name in the plural form, however, invites a class construal, in which case synecdochic metonymy, put forward by Bierwiazzonek (in press), can conveniently be applied as an additional tier elaborating the outcome of the metonymic chain.

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- (1) <https://fakty.tvn24.pl/fakty-po-poludniu,96/sprawa-corki-lesniczego-moze-traffic-do-cba,750120.html> (19.06.2017)
- (2) <https://onet100.vod.pl/p/tokrecimy/jaroslaw-kaczynski-nieraz-zapowiadal-przejscie-na-emeryture-kto-go-zastapi/0234e1> (23.03.2016)
- (3) <http://kulturaliberalna.pl/2017/10/31/tarczynski-trump-flake-republikanie-wojna-domowa/> (31.10.2017)
- (4) <https://dorzeczy.pl/kraj/25024/Scheuring-Wielgus-Zamach-w-Londynie-to-dobra-okazja-by-straszyc-uchodzcami.html> (23.03.2017)
- (5) <http://studioopinii.pl/archiwa/155212> (12.06.2016)
- (6) <http://www.telepolis.pl/wiadomosci/-aktualizacja-orange-i-nju-mobile-przywraca-ja-i-podwajaja-bonus-za-rejstracje-numeru,2,3,37271.html?cp=1> (10.10.2016)