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## THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF METONYMY IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS

Today's discussions concerning metonymy abound in distinctions that may be far from obvious for those who would like to get acquainted with the major achievements and directions of research in this field. That is why the article aims to trace the path that metonymy has covered within Cognitive Linguistics from its initial characterisation in the publication by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) to the present day. The article attempts to provide a general historical perspective on the phenomenon trying to indicate and discuss both the major trends as well as the consecutive stages in the development of the cognitive thought on metonymy. The author identifies different directions of expansion of the phenomenon, enumerates different types of metonymy, and its most frequently discussed dimensions. The article is concluded with an attempt to summarize the key elements of progress that has been made in understanding metonymy since 1980.

### 1. Introduction

Cognitive Linguistics is often associated with the study of metaphor. Despite the fact that it constitutes only a fraction of what Cognitive Linguistics deals with today (cf. Geeraerts and Cuyckens 2007a), Taylor (2002: 487) notes that some people may have an impression that it actually *is* the study of metaphor. Although it is probably true to say that the study of metaphor was a dominating trend in the early 1980s, Cognitive Linguistics offers much more than that (an overview of the diversity of cognitive trends can be found in e.g. Geeraerts and Cuyckens (2007a) or Evans and Green (2006)). What the present article aims to point out is that beside metaphor Cognitive Linguistics is also increasingly concerned with “no less important phenomenon of metonymy” (Taylor 1995: 122).

The study of metonymy as a subject *per se* is, due to its long history and a diversity of approaches, an overwhelming task, as noted by e.g. Geeraerts (1988), Koch (1999), Panther and Radden (2005), or Bierwiazzonek (2006, 2013). That is why the present article focuses on the issues and approaches taken

up in the study of metonymy rooted in Cognitive Linguistics (henceforth CL) from the publication of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) (acknowledging, though not discussing, two other contributions that provided the theoretical basis for the cognitive thought: Nunberg (1978) and Norrick (1981)).

Still, despite such a limitation, it is virtually impossible to discuss *all* the possible directions of research that have been formulated over the last three decades. Consequently, the author limited the amount of the discussed issues to the ones that underlie the divergences found in present-day analyses as well as to the research that has somehow contributed to the advances in the field. Also, it needs to be stressed that the author, wishing to stay neutral and objective in his account of other scholars' research, decided to present it without taking issue with the discussed ideas. This, it is assumed, can always be the choice of the reader. Instead, the author focused on relations between theories and their development.

The article aims to present metonymy in all its complexity: accommodating both the major directions of research as well as numerous additional observations that have been made about it. To tackle such a task, the article had to combine two competing perspectives: on the one hand, the historical development of the most characteristic traits of metonymy and, on the other hand, tracing how each of these characteristics evolved. Because the author believes it is better to maintain the coherence in the description of each such trait rather than to follow closely the dates at the cost of distortions of the discussed issues, the historical order is accorded a less prominent role. As a consequence, an account of a parallel trait sometimes requires moving backwards in time.

The article is organised as follows: first, several CL constructs stemming from the theory of metaphor and indispensable in discussing metonymy are introduced. Then, a general, historical division into two stages is proposed: the phase of the first definitions and characterisations as well as the phase of expansion. The former of them concerns the claims made by such American scholars as: Geore Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Mark Turner, and Ronald Langacker. These initial observations can be seen as the core from which further elaborations have grown. The latter phase focuses on the achievements of mainly European scholars who extended these first definitions and significantly contributed to a better understanding of the phenomenon that has been achieved today. The overview ends with the characteristics of metonymy that have been noticed since 1980.

## 2. The basic assumptions and tools

At the start, one observation should be made – within Cognitive Linguistics the study of metonymy was one of the offspring of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory (henceforth CMT). It can be concluded, then, that the latter indirectly opened the way for the study of metonymy. As a consequence, a number of issues discussed within the theory of metonymy have to do with some facets of the theory of metaphor, which the section discusses.

A discussion of the cognitive approaches to metonymy needs to begin with the book that constitutes a “significant landmark” (Taylor 1995: 130) in the cognitive study of metaphor, that is, *Metaphors We Live By* (Lakoff, Johnson 1980). At the same time, it was also one of the first publications of a research paradigm – Cognitive Linguistics and, as such, it also cleared the path for the whole movement. Hence, a number of characteristics of this work became later definitional for CL, e.g. the experiential basis of metaphor as well as language in general (cf. Evans and Green 2006: 27, Geeraerts and Cuyckens 2007b: 5, Dirven and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2010: 38-44, etc.).

This publication provided also several observations and constructs that, though they were meant for an account of metaphor, were later applied to metonymy. One of them was the conclusion that e.g. orientational metaphors are not arbitrary but have a basis in human physical and cultural experience (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 14). An illustration of the point can be the conceptual metaphor MORE IS UP, which may stem from the observation that adding physical objects to a pile results in raising its level. This kind of motivation can be also found in metonymy, with the exception that generally in metonymy the motivation seems more obvious because it “usually involves direct physical or causal associations” (ibid.: 39).

It is also Lakoff and Johnson (1980) that introduced the notion of **domain** to linguistic analysis. Initially, the authors (ibid.: 117) postulated that the “domain is a structured whole within our experience that is conceptualized as what we have called an *experiential gestalt*. [...] They represent coherent organizations of our experiences in terms of natural dimensions (parts, stages, causes, etc.)”. At the same time, the authors related the notion of domain to concept by indicating that concepts correspond to “natural kinds of experience” (ibid.: 118) and implied that they might actually be equal to domains: “domains of experience [...] seem to us *natural kinds of experience*” (ibid.: 117). This stance can be also seen in Kövecses (2010: 7): “conceptual metaphors typically employ a more abstract concept as target and a more concrete or physical concept as their source”.

This led to the situation when the domain was tacitly assumed to be synonymous to concept. Later, when Langacker’s (1987: 147-182, cf. section 3 below) characterisation of domain became more widely acknowledged and applied to the CMT (e.g. Croft 1993), Lakoff (1993: 206) reduced his characterisation of the notion to a laconic “domain of experience”. The present-day definition of domain applied in the cognitive study of metaphor is actually based on Langacker (1987): “any coherent organization of experience” (Kövecses 2010: 4).

Still, the key issue about domains in the CMT is that there are two of them: source and target. The source one is often more concrete, and the target one – more abstract (Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 118, Kövecses 2010: 7, etc.). This means that the source domain provides structure for understanding the target one, e.g. the abstract concept of TIME (the target domain) can be structured metaphorically e.g. by the more concrete source domain of THIEF (Lakoff, Turner 1989: 35-40).

The authors indicate that such an understanding of time can be found in Milton's poetry: time has "stolen on his wing my three and twentieth year".

The relation between the two domains was technically called **mapping**. Initially, the characterisation of mapping was unclear. On the one hand, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 4-5) emphasised, while discussing the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor, that "many of the things we do in arguing are partially structured by the concept of war" or "ARGUMENT is partially structured, understood, performed, and talked about in terms of WAR". This strongly suggests that mapping should be understood as an imposition of the structure of the source domain on the target, which was explicitly formulated in e.g. Lakoff, Turner (1989: 38-39). On the other hand, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 151) also used a different term in their analysis: "conventional metaphors (orientational, ontological, and structural) are often based on **correlations** we perceive in our experience" (emphasis mine), which was later applied by e.g. Lakoff (1993: 207) or Kövecses (2010). Consequently, one of the divergences that can be found in the literature of the topic is the use of these two terms: imposition vs. correlation.

Eventually, Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 246) explained that what they meant by mappings were "the systematic correspondences across [...] domains" (cf. Grady 2007: 190, Kövecses 2010: 7, etc.). At the same time, however, Raymond Gibbs (personal communication) suggested a different interpretation of these contrasting terms. He concluded that actually both of them might be applied to an account of the metaphorical relation between the two domains, but at different stages of the metaphor's life. From this perspective, formulating a novel metaphorical expression is a result noticing certain general *correlations* between the domains, e.g. *We're under attack from competitors* would be a consequence of perceiving certain parallels between competitors' and soldiers' behaviour (encapsulated in the highly schematic metaphor BUSINESS IS WAR). However, when the metaphor becomes more entrenched, it is possible to explore more specific facets of the source domain and apply them in reference to the target domain. This would no longer be a correlation, but rather an *imposition* of the detailed structure of the source on the target, e.g. *cut-throat competition* would not be a result of noticing a similarity between the domains but rather an application of a very specific cruel war practice to an account of an inhumane behaviour in business.

### 3. Initial definitions and characterisations

This part of the outline focuses on the achievements of the early years of metonymy when American scholars took up this issue and started developing the first insights into it. Actually, for several years they were the ones who made advances in this field – one of the first cognitive collections of papers of European scholars mentioning metonymy was Paprotté, Dirven (1985), which almost uncritically adopted Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) views.

It is good to start this part of the account with what Taylor (1995: 122) calls a traditional definition of metonymy: “Metonymy is a figure of speech whereby the name of one entity  $e^1$  is used to refer to another entity  $e^2$  which is contiguous to  $e^1$ ” (cf. Ullmann 1972: 218). What is worth noticing about this definition is that it highlights three characteristics traditionally associated with metonymy: the fact that it functions at the level of words, that its major function is reference to an entity, and that the object actually referred to must be contiguous to the named one (cf. Panther, Radden 2005: 1, Panther, Thornburg 2007: 237, etc.).

Cognitive linguists took a significantly different stance on these issues. Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 39) stated that metonymy does not function solely at the level of words, but that metonymic concepts “structure our thoughts, attitudes, and actions”, that is, they are part of the way people think, act, and talk. Further characteristics of metonymy that the authors pointed to are: its referential function and providing understanding (ibid.: 36). In other words, metonymy establishes the “stand for” relationship between two objects – one object is used to replace another. However, it is not a simple exchange. Rather, metonymy directs us to a specific dimension of the target object, e.g. “The *Times* hasn’t arrived at the press conference yet” highlights a different aspect of the journalist than saying “Steve Roberts has not arrived at the press conference”. And this is so even if it is Steve Roberts that is the journalist working for the *Times* (ibid.: 36-37).

There are four more aspects of metonymy that were noted then. One of them, already discussed in section 2, was that metonymy, like metaphor, is grounded in our experience. The second is that metonymic mappings take place within one domain, that is, a waiter referring to someone as “*the ham sandwich*” does not probably do so because of the proximity between the man and the sandwich he has ordered. The reason is, rather, that both the customer and the sandwich are found within the same domain – restaurant, and that the sandwich is the most salient characteristic of this customer for the waiter (ibid.: 35). The next issue is that metonymic concepts are systematic (ibid.: 37-39), that is, metonymic expressions are not random but “are instances of certain general metonymic concepts in terms of which we organize our thoughts and action” (ibid.: 39). That means to say that such expressions as “*The White House* isn’t saying anything” or “*Wall Street* is in panic” are not just fancy associations but stem from the same underlying conceptual metonymy: THE PLACE FOR THE INSTITUTION (ibid.: 38). Finally, metonymy, like metaphor, is a conceptual phenomenon (Kövecses 2009: 173) – metonymic linguistic expressions reveal underlying conceptual metonymies (which also means that metonymy is embodied and functions at the neural level (cf. Bierwiazzonek 2005, 2013)).

The next important publication in which Lakoff added some new elements to the theory of metonymy was *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* from 1987. Arguably, one of its most significant developments that it produced for the theory of metonymy was introducing the construct that Lakoff called the Idealised Cognitive Model (ICM). Unfortunately, this construct poses a bit of a problem

because the properties that Lakoff ascribed to it make it strikingly similar to the constructs that had already been present in CL: domain, frame, scene, schema, or script (cf. Langacker 1987: 150, Clausner, Croft 1999: 2, Croft, Cruse 2004: 28, and the discussion later in section 3).

Lakoff (1987: 68-69) saw one of the basic properties of the ICM in providing the conceptual content for an expression (cf. the property of domains identified by Langacker (1987: 147-148) discussed later in section 3). Also, all of its elements form a certain whole and point to a unity between the domains constituting the basis for a concept, e.g. of mother or bachelor (Lakoff 1987: 70-71, 74-76). What is more, Lakoff (1987: 68) claimed that ICMs use four types of structuring principles: propositional structure, image-schematic structure, metaphoric mappings, and metonymic mappings. Consequently, he (ibid.: 113-114) distinguished four types of ICMs: propositional models, image-schematic models, metaphoric models, and metonymic models. To conclude, an important characteristic of the ICM needs to be noted – that it is *idealised* (that is, it involves an abstraction of the physical world (Cienki 2007: 176)). As argued by Langacker (2008: 46-47), this characteristic makes it the construct of the narrowest range of applications (out of frame, domain, script, scene, and schema), for it is not suitable for an account of basic domains or the ongoing discourse.

Lakoff (1987: 78-79) used this construct to redefine metonymy as a stand for relation between one element of an ICM and another element of the same ICM or the whole ICM. An example of the latter case can be the ICM of going somewhere, which, according to Lakoff (ibid.: 78), consists of several elements:

Precondition: You have (or have access to) the vehicle.

Embarkation: You get into the vehicle and start it up.

Center: You drive (row, fly, etc.) to your destination.

Finish: You park and get out.

End point: You are at your destination.

And it is only by having such an ICM in mind that we can use one of these elements to refer to the whole process, e.g. when someone asks you how you got to the party, a possible answer is *I have a car*. In other words, the answer makes reference to the precondition that is used to stand for the whole ICM of going to the party.

Another contribution made by Lakoff (1987: 84-90) was distinguishing several kinds of metonymic ICMs. However, because a detailed discussion of them all is beyond the scope of the present work, only one of them will be discussed as an illustration of the point – **social stereotypes**. In a metonymic model one element of an ICM (e.g. a given person) is understood in terms of another element of the same ICM. Such a replacement is possible because this latter element is “either easier to understand, easier to remember, easier to recognize, or more immediately useful for the given purpose in the given context” (ibid.: 84). The role that this latter element plays in the given ICM determines the kind of metonymic model.



If, for instance, someone was referred to as “John is a real politician”, it would entail describing him from the perspective of the social stereotype of a politician – someone who is conniving, egoistic, and dishonest. Naturally, the reference to the social stereotype as well as the use of the hedge “real” suggests that we do not mean a “genuine” politician but socially attributed politician’s behaviour (this behaviour being, at the same time, a metonymic mapping (narrowing) from “politician”). And because such a social stereotype is an element of the politician ICM, the discussed utterance replaces John’s actual characteristics with those from another part of the same ICM – the features that are typically attributed to politicians.

Probably the most explicit summary of Lakoff’s approach to metonymy was presented in Lakoff and Turner (1989: 103-104). Since that publication was generally devoted to metaphor, metonymy was characterised from the perspective of its differences from and similarities to metaphor:

- Metonymy involves one conceptual domain; a metonymic mapping occurs within a single domain, not across domains.
- Metonymy is used primarily for reference: via metonymy one can refer to one entity in a schema by referring to another entity in the same schema.
- In metonymy one entity in a schema is taken as standing for one other entity in the schema, or for the schema as a whole. [...]
- Both are conceptual in nature.
- Both are mappings.
- Both can be conventionalized, that is, made part of our everyday conceptual system, and thus used automatically, effortlessly, and without conscious awareness.
- In both, linguistic expressions that name source elements of the mapping typically also name target elements. That is, both are means of extending the linguistic resources of a language.

Two points need to be made at this juncture. First, there are actually two definitions of metonymy proposed by Lakoff: one based on the notion of domain (from 1989), and one on the notion of ICM (from 1987). Although, as has already been mentioned, these constructs bear a very close resemblance, this divergence had significant consequences for further development of the theory of metonymy. Depending on the approach that other scholars began their considerations with, different facets of the phenomenon were discussed, different elaborations were made, and different conclusions were arrived at, as shown below in section 4.1. and 4.2.

The other observation is of a more general nature: after 1989 Lakoff and his collaborators directed their attention to phenomena and constructs other than metonymy, for instance image schemas and their relations with the CMT (e.g. Lakoff 1990, 1993, Turner 1990, 1993, Brugman 1990, etc.). At the same time, it must be noted that metonymy had been also developed within the more general framework of Cognitive Grammar (CG) (Langacker 1987, 1990, 1991, etc.).

Since this approach also became a source of many references in the cognitive-linguistics literature on metonymy, its most significant achievements are now briefly summarised.

As opposed to the CMT, which was virtually preoccupied with metaphor, Cognitive Grammar (CG) offered both a coherent vision of language (Langacker 1987: 11-96), and a complex set of analytical tools stemming from it (*ibid.*: 99-274). Its general aim was also ARTICULATED explicitly: to formulate the grammar of a language that would be “exhaustive in coverage, fully explicit, and psychologically accurate” (Langacker 1987: 56). And this goal remains the leading principle of CG despite the fact that, as the author acknowledges, such an undertaking is unfeasible.

Initially, Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1990, 1991, etc.) seemed to have little to do with metaphor and metonymy. Instead of a simple pattern of the type “Y IS X”, Langacker (1987) offered a rigorous account of both the semantic (things, atemporal and temporal relations), as well as grammatical structure of a language (nominal structure and verbal structure of finite clauses). In time, however, he also showed that the same tools and procedures can be successfully applied also to such phenomena as metonymy and metaphor (Langacker 1990, 1993, 2000a, 2000b, 2008, Taraszka-Drożdż *in press*, etc.).

What must be first noted about CG (Langacker 1987: 147-154) is that it managed to elucidate the notion of domain (despite the high level of abstraction of this notion, Croft (2006: 320) called this characterisation “succinct”). Domain was primarily defined as the implicit or explicit basis for understanding and defining a concept (Langacker 1987: 147-148), e.g. a definition of KNUCKLE requires introducing the conception of FINGER. In such a case, FINGER would play the function of a domain for KNUCKLE. FINGER, in turn, can be defined relative to HAND, which becomes a domain for it, and so on. There are two observations to be made at this stage. First of all, actually “any concept or knowledge system can function as a domain” (*ibid.*: 63) (providing that there is a concept that can be defined relative to them). The other observation is that domains form hierarchies.

These hierarchies are, however, organised in a specific manner. Langacker (*ibid.*: 148-150) notes that there is a point beyond which a further reduction of domains is not possible (the domain of HAND can be reduced to a more basic domain of ARM, ARM to BODY, and BODY – to the domain of SPACE, which cannot be further reduced). This last stage is the level established by our sensory capacities, that is, beside space, these are colour, pitch, taste, smell, kinaesthetic sensations, etc. Langacker called them basic domains and assumed that they occupy the lowest level hierarchies of conceptual complexity. Concepts characterised relative to a basic domain form higher-order concepts that provide the domain for still further concepts, which can be domains for still further concepts. Consequently, “any concept or conceptual complex that functions as a domain for the definition of a higher-order concept” (*ibid.*: 150) is called an abstract domain (later Langacker (2008: 45) replaced this name with nonbasic





mentioned that what Langacker calls active zone is very close to prototypical instances of metonymy. Gradually, Langacker (2000, 2004, 2008) called active zone a special case of metonymy, and Taylor (2006: 56) concluded that “the active zone phenomenon gradually shades into the more general process of metonymy” (actually, the debate whether it really is a type of metonymy can be seen even today, as shown in e.g. Barcelona 2012).

Concluding this part of the overview, it needs to be stressed that CMT and CG provided a significant portion of the theoretical foundations upon which further analyses and developments were made. What should also be remarked is that a considerable part of the further research was conducted by European linguists who, either combining the two trends of the American thought or the CMT and CG with the European theoretical background (discussed in section 4.1), were able to develop a whole range of observations concerning metonymy.

## **4. Expansion of the theory of metonymy**

What followed these first cognitive formulations concerning metonymy was, on the one hand, a time of applying them to different linguistic phenomena and, on the other, a time of elaborating the definitions. Actually, it was often the case that one direction of research accompanied the other. However, for the clarity of presentation it is important to indicate certain analytical tendencies without immediately getting involved in definitional considerations, which is why the present section is divided into two major subsections: the first one discusses two trends in the study of metonymy: the consequences of applying the notion of ICM to metonymy as opposed to the domain-based metonymy-metaphor relations. The other subsection elaborates on the definition of the phenomenon.

### **4.1. Trends in the study of metonymy**

Scholars discussing metonymy from the cognitive perspective often refer to different constructs: domains, ICMs, domain matrices, frames, scripts, etc. What is more, on one occasion these constructs are treated as different, while on another they seem to be used almost interchangeably. Since simple definitions do not suffice in clearing up the situation, the author decided to focus on three constructs derived from the CMT and CG: domain, domain matrix, and ICM. They are shown to encourage both different types of observations in analyses of linguistic material as well as different ranges of topics that are discussed together with an application of each of them. Naturally, the fact that researchers decided to apply one construct rather than another did not have to be based on a simple contrast between them. Rather, their choice was motivated by the scope of analytical possibilities that each construct enabled, which is an additional reason supporting the adopted division. That is why the present section is divided into a subsection based on the notion of ICM and one based on the notion of domain.

As has already been mentioned, the stage of expanding the theory of metonymy is characterised by a rapid increase in the number of dimensions discussed in relation to it. The starting point for it was, on the one hand, the American thought and, on the other hand, numerous theories (cf. Jäkel 1999, 2003, Peirsman, Geeraerts 2006, Panther 2006, etc.) that European scholars could refer to. Among the most important ones, two need to be mentioned: Richard's (1936) and Jakobson's (1971 [2002]). As for Richards (1936), his observations concerning metaphor seemed to predict, as Jäkel (2003:106) called it, the cognitive approach: "when we use a metaphor we have two thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word, or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction" (Richards 1936: 93). It was also Richards that introduced two notions often used in debates on metaphor and metonymy: *tenor* and *vehicle*. The former was characterised as "the original idea", "what is really being said or thought of", "the underlying idea", "the meaning", or "the principal subject" (ibid.: 96-97). As to the latter, Richards (ibid.) characterised it as "the borrowed idea", "the imagined nature", "what the subject resembles", "the metaphor", or "the image".

The other of the trends is significant, because it stems from the "post-structuralist" tradition (Dirven 2002) – its source was the work by Jakobson (1971 [2002]). His central claim was positing a continuum between metaphor and metonymy – the paradigmatic relations being metaphorical, and the syntagmatic being metonymic. This idea determined one of the popular directions of analysis taken up and developed by a number of linguists (e.g. Goossens 1990 [1995], Dirven 2002, Radden 2002, Ruiz de Mendoza and Diez Velasco 2002, Barcelona 2003b, 2011, Panther 2006, etc.) – analysing possible types of relationships between metaphor and metonymy.

#### **4.1.1. The ICM-based approach to metonymy**

The article that significantly contributed to the wave of interest in metonymy in Europe was originally published in 1998. Reprinted one year later, it appeared as the introductory article in the first cognitive monograph dealing exclusively with metonymy (Panther, Radden 1999). Its authors, Radden and Kövecses, conducted one of the most exhaustive classifications of conceptual metonymies in the cognitive linguistics literature and based their definition of metonymy on the notion of ICM: "Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model" (Radden, Kövecses 1999: 21).

Through its reference to the ICM and retention of the X FOR Y notation for conceptual metonymies, the approach was clearly a development of the Lakoffian thought. However, there were also three points with respects to which the authors distanced themselves from the CMT. First, it was the very terminology – although Radden and Kövecses (1999: 19) could have easily followed Lakoff, they chose to apply Richard's (1936) notion of tenor and vehicle in their definition.

Second, the article has strong European roots. In fact, the major classification of metonymy-producing relationships propounded by Radden and Kövecses (1999) was a development of the division formulated by Norrick (1981) (Bierwiazzonek 2013: 6). Finally, the authors (1999: 18-19) replaced one of the major claims formulated by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 36) and Lakoff and Turner (1989: 103-104) – the substitutional function of metonymy – with the insight provided by Langacker (1993). What Langacker observed was that metonymy is a process in which one entity serves as the reference point for mental access to another entity. It is worth noting that this property was later developed (e.g. Warren 1999, 2002, Dirven 2002, Panther 2006, etc.) into the claim that “the source meaning does not vanish but remains part of the conceptual structure of the target meaning” (Panther 2006: 151). This view can also be traced back to Langacker’s (1987: 293-297) observation that compositional paths constitute a significant part of the expression’s meaning.

In the article Radden and Kövecses (1999: 23-29) pointed to three ontological realms where metonymy operates: the world of “concepts”, the world of “form”, and the world of “things” or “events”. These realms roughly correspond to the components of the semiotic triangle by Ogden and Richards (1923: 11) and enabled Radden and Kövecses to point to three basic types of ICM (Sign ICM, Reference ICM, and Concept ICM), as well as to formulate the basic characteristics of metonymic mappings, i.e. their reversibility (Radden, Kövecses 1999: 29).

The authors also distinguished three types of metonymy producing relationships (encompassing both novel expressions as well as entrenched ones that are no longer felt to be metonymic). The first two are called *the whole ICM and its parts* (ibid.: 30-36). In the first relation the whole ICM stands for its part, e.g. WHOLE THING FOR A PART OF THE THING: *America* for “United States” or WHOLE SCALE FOR THE UPPER END OF THE SCALE: *Henry is speeding again* for “Henry is going too fast”. Because metonymic mappings are in principle reversible (ibid.: 22), in the second relationship a part of an ICM stands for the whole ICM, like in PART OF A THING FOR THE WHOLE THING: *England* for “Great Britain” or MATERIAL CONSTITUTING AN OBJECT FOR THE OBJECT: *wood* for “forest”, etc.

The third type of relationship is *parts of an ICM* (ibid.: 36-43), that is, where a part of an ICM stands for another part of an ICM, e.g. INSTRUMENT FOR ACTION: *to ski, to hammer*, MANNER FOR ACTION: *to tiptoe* into the room, or INSTRUMENT FOR AGENT: *the pen* for “writer”. Altogether the authors enumerated forty nine conceptual metonymies, which is the highest number in the cognitive literature.

Concluding, several issues are worth noting. First of all, Radden and Kövecses’s approach to metonymy became the standard view of the phenomenon in Cognitive Linguistics for a number of years. At the same time, it inspired a lot of new research that led both to a deeper understanding of the notion of ICM as well as to attempts to modify its range of applications. Actually, some researchers equalled or replaced it with the notion of frame (e.g. Barcelona 2011: 41, Barcelona 2012: 254-255, Benczes 2011: 198), domain (e.g. Benczes 2011: 197, Paradis 2004: 247), or domain matrix (e.g. Barcelona 2011: 14, Benczes 2011:



On the basis of Goossens' (1995: 167) observation that "metaphor from metonymy" was the most frequent type of correlation found in the analysed corpus, Barcelona (2000b) posed a radical hypothesis: all metaphors are motivated by metonymies. Motivated, in this case, meant "be a conceptual prerequisite for" metaphor (ibid.: 31). He also assumed that the metonymic motivation can be both prior to metaphorical mapping as well as simultaneous with it. To test his hypothesis, he proposed a very broad definition of metonymy (incorporating Radden and Kövecses's (1999) definition): "metonymy is a conceptual mapping of a cognitive domain onto another domain, both domains being included in the same domain or ICM, so that the source provides mental access to the target" (Barcelona 2000b: 32-33).

In his attempt to test the hypothesis, Barcelona (ibid.: 35-42) discussed some examples provided by Taylor (1995), e.g. *loud colour*, *black mood*, *high notes (on a piano)*, and *high smell*. What he found was that there were two types of metonymic motivation in these metaphorical expressions. The first one, present in *loud colour*, consisted in metonymic understanding of the source and target domains (of COLOUR and SOUND). This meant that out of many subdomains of colour and sound, only one of them was selected to represent the whole domain (the part-whole metonymy): respectively, DEVIANT COLOURS and DEVIANT SOUNDS.

The other type of motivation, metaphor arising as a generalisation of a metonymy, was found in the remaining expressions. In *black mood* the metonymy DARK FOR NEGATIVE STATES CAUSED BY DARK is shown to extend to the metaphor NEGATIVE IS DARK. As to the other two expressions, Barcelona indicated two metaphors underlying them: MORE IS UP and SPATIAL MEASUREMENT SCALES ARE PATHS. He also noted, following Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 16-20), that there is a metonymic (causal) link between the act of piling objects onto one another and the pile's rise in height. Consequently, through generalisation, this metonymic basis led to the formation of the two conceptual metaphors upon which the expressions are formed.

In other words, with the already mentioned reservations and assuming a very broad definition of metonymy, Barcelona managed to prove his hypothesis that all metaphors are motivated by metonymies. It should be noted, however, that his research differed from Goossens' in one respect: he pointed to several possibilities of understanding the phenomena in question and consequences of adopting each definition. At the same time, like Goossens, he focused on the interplay between the functioning of metaphor and metonymy solely in language.

A different approach to metonymy was adopted by another scholar – Croft (1993 [2002]). Its characteristic feature was that the author tried to delimit somehow the notion metonymy. First, he introduced two of Langacker's (1987) ideas: the notion of domain matrix and the distinction between entities/ domains that are intrinsic or extrinsic for the meaning of a concept. In Langacker's (1987: 151) sense, the elements that are intrinsic are more important in defining the given concept within the domain matrix than the extrinsic ones. Then



he claimed that metonymy should be limited to the cases when the mapping takes place between the entities/ domains that are extrinsic in the domain matrix.

This means that, for instance, *Proust is tough to read* is a metonymy because the (sub)domain of Proust's literary works is less central to the characterisation of the concept PROUST than the person (sub)domain. At the same time, the sentence like *This book is a history of Iraq* will not be a metonymy. Although the phrase *this book is a history of Iraq* has a different sense than in *This book is heavy*, for it denotes the semantic content of the book rather than its physical properties, the domain of semantic content figures prominently (is intrinsic) in the characterisation of the concept BOOK. This, according to Croft (1993 [2002]: 180), would be an instance of "a continuum between clear cases of metonymy and the highlighting of highly intrinsic facets of a concept".

It needs to be noted that this publication marked a significant step, in relation to Lakoff and Turner (1989), towards indicating definitional differences between metonymy and other phenomena. At the same time, this approach has been challenged by other scholars, for example Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000). This author adopted a perspective stemming from the CMT, that is, he assumed that the basic difference between metaphor and metonymy is that the former is a two-domain, and the latter a one-domain phenomenon. Then he claimed that one of the notions developed within the CMT, mapping, appears in two types: one-correspondence and many-correspondence mappings.

On this basis, he pointed to a boundary between metaphor and metonymy. Many correspondence mappings are characteristic for metaphors, e.g. *The senator's proposals were attacked in the newspaper*. The researcher (ibid.: 110-113) pointed out that there are many correspondences between the domain of POLITICS and WAR: the proposal corresponds to the position of an army, words – to bullets/ guns, criticising – to attacking, etc. At the same time, metaphors can also be one-correspondence, like *Achilles is a lion*. Contrary to Lakoff and Turner (1989: 196), who saw there three parallels (person – animal, human behaviour – animal behaviour, and Achilles' courage – lion's courage), Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez claimed that the actual correspondence takes place between Achilles and lion, the other correspondences being subdomain-based.

This led to the conclusion that metonymy can be defined as a phenomenon occurring within one domain and revealing one-correspondence mappings. The author further elaborated the thought with the observation that mappings in metonymy are one-correspondence because there are just two possibilities of establishing a correspondence between a domain and one of its subdomains: either a part of domain corresponds to the whole domain or the whole domain corresponds to its part. As a result, he distinguished two types of metonymy: source-in-target (where the source domain is a subdomain of the target), and target-in-source (where the target domain is a subdomain of the source). An illustration of the former type is *The ham sandwich is waiting for his check*. The

target domain of CUSTOMER contains, as one of its subdomains, the ordered ham sandwich (the source domain), which is used as the reference point for the speaker. An example of the latter type of metonymy can be *Nixon bombed Hanoi*. The actual referent – the American army (the target domain) is referred to by means of one of its dimensions – the person controlling it – the president (the source domain).

This research ought to be seen as another attempt to delimit metonymy – this time in relation to metaphor. Actually, this direction of research has been continued in e.g. by Dirven and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2010) and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2011). At the same time, Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez's classification of types of metonymy (source-in-target and target-in-source) can be formulated more schematically as PART FOR WHOLE and WHOLE FOR PART. And these two kinds of relation, according to Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006: 309), constitute the core of metonymic relations.

A still different type of relations between metonymy and metaphor was proposed by Dirven (2002), who approached them as phenomena of different definitional properties. He pointed to a continuum between them or, more specifically, he (2002: 100-109) postulated a conceptual continuum between literal and metaphorical language. The continuum stretched between a literal statement such as *a car in a garage*, where both the car and garage denote the whole object, and a metaphorical one, e.g. *the head of the school*, which instantiates a mapping from the domain of the human body on the domain of an institution. Within this continuum, he distinguished three stages: pre-metonymic, metonymic, and post-metonymic, which can be interpreted as an attempt to delimit the scope of metonymy both from the perspective of metonymy as well as more detailed phenomena.

The pre-metonymic stage consists of two further sub types: modulation and frame variation. The former can be exemplified as *wash / fill a car*, which in fact do not refer to the whole car, but to specific parts of it (from Langacker's (1990) perspective the fuel tank would be called the active zone of the car), while the latter can be illustrated with *walk through the door*, which refers not to the object but to an element of reality that is proximate to it – the opening.

The metonymic stage is divided into three subtypes. The first of them is linear metonymy, where the expression *parts of the country*, like in *different parts of the country use "tea" differently*, means not geographical regions but the people living in them (based on the metonymy COUNTRY FOR INHABITANTS). The second kind is conjunctive metonymy, which is exemplified with one of the uses of the noun *school*: *The school broke up*. It can be interpreted either in the sense of the school year or of a pun for a building. The last type is inclusive metonymy, where *head* is used in the sense *a good head*. It denotes a referent different than the named, but closely related to the named entity – in this case, the adjective *good* signals the mental world. This is possible thanks to a chain of inclusive metonymies where more concrete elements comprise less concrete or abstract ones.

The last stage of the continuum before metaphor is post-metonymy. It covers cases that once had a metaphorical reading (ibid.: 109), but it has been lost now, though the expression retains a figurative meaning, like *knock sb. for* – criticise. DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING different elements of this continuum can be FOUND in several papers collected in Barcelona (2000a) as well as Dirven and Pörings (2002).

A similar, literalness – metonymy – metaphor scale was proposed by Radden (2002: 407-412). The author, drawing on the notions introduced by Grady (1997) and Grady and Johnson (2002): primary scenes, primary metaphors, the notion of conflation, and correlation metaphors, postulated a five-stage gradation between the three phenomena. The literal stage was illustrated with the expression *high tower*, where the *tower* refers to a physical entity and its modifier, *high*, is used in its basic, spatial sense. The metonymic stage was illustrated with the expression *high temperature*, which exemplifies a replacement of elements within the same domain: the scale of verticality for the degree of temperature. The metaphoric stage was illustrated with the expression *high quality*, which shows a mapping between two different domains: EVALUATION and VERTICALITY.

The intermediate stage between the literal and metonymic language was presented on the basis of *high tide*, which is weakly metonymic because of the UP FOR UP AND MORE metonymy – the element UP is not a distinct item but is a part of the element UP AND MORE. The last, intermediate stage between the metonymic and metaphoric stage, was exemplified with *high prices*. This expression, due to the type of evoked association, may be seen either as based on metonymy or metaphor. On the one hand, it can be metonymically interpreted if one assumes that it arises from a representation like the graph used in stock reports. This would suggest its origin in the metonymy THING FOR ITS REPRESENTATION. On the other hand, if it was interpreted as stemming from an association between two domains: of vertical orientation and quantity, the expression would have a metaphorical reading based on the metaphor MORE IS UP. What this model points to is that metonymy and metaphor should no longer be seen as separate phenomena but they “are to be seen as prototypical categories along a metonymy-metaphor continuum with a wide range of intermediate categories such as metonymy-based metaphor in between” (Radden 2002: 431).

This, naturally, does not exhaust all the possible types of metaphor-metonymy interactions, as over the years several other phenomena have been defined against them, e.g. synaesthesia (Dirven 1985) or synecdoche (actually, the very relation between metonymy and synecdoche has produced a considerable literature, e.g. Seto 1999, Koch 1999, Nerlich, Clarke 1999, or Bierwiazzonek 2006, etc.). Generally, it can be argued that metonymy-metaphor relation has contributed to the formation of another trend – treating metonymy itself as a gradable phenomenon. Traces of this trend can be seen in both in the already discussed approaches to metonymy (e.g. Dirven 2002 or Radden 2002), the stance adopted by Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006) (discussed in section 4.2), as well as in e.g. Barcelona 2003b or Barcelona 2011.

At the same time, concluding the section concerned with trends in the study of metonymy, it needs to be mentioned that all three approaches outlined in section 3 have been explored and elaborated on. However, apart from the two divergent directions of research in the development of the cognitive thought on metonymy, a more unifying one can be observed: towards providing a concise definition of the phenomenon, which is the topic of the following section.

## 4.2. Developing the definition of metonymy

Apart from the discussion concerning the above-mentioned issues, a considerable scholarly effort has been directed towards a more complete understanding of the phenomenon of metonymy. Let us now trace the most significant observations and consequent stages leading to the present-day state of the art.

The first publication that needs to be mentioned here is the paper by Croft (1993 [2002]). Its main aim was to present, discuss, and combine certain elements of two theories – CMT and CG and, on this basis, formulate certain generalisations concerning metonymy. Actually, a considerable portion of that paper was devoted to summarising the major points in Langacker’s (1987) theory: the notions of profile, base, domain, domain matrix, as well as basic and abstract domains. He also introduced certain modifications to them, e.g. reduced the notion of domain to just a “semantic structure” (Croft 2002: 166), whereas what Langacker (1987: 147-153) stressed was that domains are conceptual constructs and basic domains are provided by our sensory capacities, that is, exist independently of particular expressions (Langacker 2008: 53).

The next stage in Croft’s (2002: 178-180) paper was an application of Langacker’s notions to the CMT and, consequently, modifying some of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) postulates. One of such changes was shifting metonymy from within one domain to two domains within a domain matrix (Croft 2002: 177). As has been mentioned, this claim was completed with the distinction between entities or domains that are intrinsic or extrinsic for a definition of a concept, which allowed Croft to distinguish metonymy from simple highlighting of intrinsic facets of a concept.

There is one more theoretical point that needs to be made about Croft’s paper – while discussing metonymy he introduced the notion of domain highlighting (2002: 179). What this meant was that the use of metonymy leads to focusing attention on (highlighting) a domain (of a matrix) that is secondary in the literal meaning. Actually, Croft (ibid.) called it “a necessary though not sufficient condition for metonymy”. This meant that highlighting is not limited just to metonymy, e.g. *The book is heavy*, in its literal reading, highlights the domain of the physical object.

Concluding, it must be stressed that this publication was significant in several respects. First of all, it showed that it is plausible and profitable to apply notions from one theory to another – applying CG constructs to CMT helped to see many of the discussed phenomena in a different light. Also, through its insights

and claims, it opened new directions of research and became a paper that many researchers still refer to.

The historical order would require two publications to be discussed now: Panther and Thornburg's (1998) as well as Radden and Kövecses's (1999). However, to continue the discussion of the mentioned issues, a historical leap over the articles is made to the book that elaborated on the discussed topics – Barcelona (2000a). As for the two articles, the former is discussed later in the section, while the latter was discussed in section 4.1.1.

The book edited by Barcelona (2000a) constituted another major step towards a better understanding of the phenomenon of metonymy – what it offered was a set of contrasting definitions of metonymy. In the introduction to the volume, Barcelona (2000a: 4) proposed one that was based both on the CMT as well as Croft (1993): metonymy was seen as a conceptual projection between experiential domains “included in the same common experiential domain”. Unlike Croft (1993), Barcelona emphasised in this definition the experiential dimension of domain (also stressed within the CMT). At the same time, the definition followed Croft (and, primarily, Langacker) in reference to the domain matrix and the claim about “activation” of the target domain.

To illustrate the plausibility of this definition, Barcelona (2000a: 4) discussed the example *The ham sandwich is waiting for his check*, where the domain of CONSUMED GOODS represented by the ham sandwich is used in reference to a different domain – CUSTOMER, whose representative is the very customer. As the author (2000a: 4-5) explained, this mapping was possible due to the conceptual metonymy CONSUMED GOODS FOR CUSTOMER and the fact that both the domain of CUSTOMER and CONSUMED GOODS are situated within a more general domain – RESTAURANT.

At the same time, the other definition (Barcelona 2000b: 32-33) afforded a much broader view of the phenomenon: “metonymy is a conceptual mapping of a cognitive domain onto another domain, both domains being included in the same domain or ICM, so that the source provides mental access to the target”. First of all, this definition took into consideration also the notion of ICM (thus including the other construct introduced by Lakoff (1987)). It also stressed a significant function of the source domain indicated by Radden and Kövecses's (1999) – providing mental access to the target domain. Finally, as Barcelona (2000b: 33) noted, such a definition stresses the “*cognitive commonality*” between what he called the “prototypical” metonymy (the one proposed by Croft (1993)) and other kinds of “within domain mappings”, which he also considered metonymy (unlike Croft (1993)).

The last of the discussed definitions of metonymy from Barcelona (2000a) is the one proposed by Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000). His approach to metonymy was a modification of Lakoff (1987), Radden and Kövecses (1999), as well as Croft (1993[2002]). First of all, as shown in section 4.2.1, the author claimed that metonymy can be reduced to just two types: source-in-target and target-in-source or, more generally, PART FOR WHOLE and WHOLE FOR PART. This,

combined with the claim about two types of mapping: one-correspondence and many-correspondence mappings, allowed Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000: 130) to define metonymy as “a one-correspondence conceptual mapping within a domain where, if the target is part of the source, the target is not a primary or central subdomain of the source”.

By doing so, Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2000) rejected Lakoff's (1987: 78-79) and Radden and Kövecses's (1999) idea of metonymy as a relation between different parts of an ICM. From such a perspective, also Croft's (1993 [2002]) distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic subdomains was claimed immaterial. At the same time, Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez shifted attention from the extrinsic or intrinsic properties of a concept to the issue of correspondence between domains and the question how many types of metonymy there might be.

Before discussing more recent developments of the theory of metonymy, one more cornerstone broadening our understanding of metonymy needs to be mentioned: Panther and Thornburg (1998). Unlike the previously mentioned discussion, the scholars were not so much concerned with the constructs needed to describe metonymy (they conceded that both frames, ICMs, as well as scenarios are suitable for that purpose), as they were with exploring its further properties. They claimed that metonymy includes “more than its common function of indirect referring” (ibid.: 756) and claimed that there is also an equally important one: predicating. This means that one predication can stand for another predication, e.g. a sentence mentioning only the *possibility* of performing an action is conventionally interpreted as indicators that the action *was* performed, e.g. *The Chicago Bulls were able to nail down their fifth NBA championship* strongly implicates that *The Chicago Bulls nailed down their fifth NBA championship* (ibid.: 757). The authors identified also a general metonymic principle underlying it: POTENTIALITY FOR ACTUALITY (cf. Panther, Thornburg 1999).

There is one more type of metonymy identified by Panther and Thornburg (ibid.: 757-758): illocutionary. In this kind of metonymy “one *illocutionary act* stands for, i.e. has the same illocutionary force as, another illocutionary act”, which can be illustrated with the sentence *I don't know where the bath soap is*, which is normally interpreted by a native English-speaking person as *Where is the bath soap?* This boils down to taking into consideration the illocutionary force of the statement, that is, the fact that the speaker does not know something is part of locution, but the above assertion can be often used with the illocutionary force of a question.

The authors also elaborated on the notion of a scenario (ibid.: 758-761) – a structured schema of a sequence of conditions and consequent actions that the participants of the scenario take part in (comparable to Lakoff's (1987) ICM). An important characteristic of the scenario is that depending on the distance and strength of metonymic link between the Core of the scenario and one of its components, the latter can more or less easily stand for the Core. This point can be illustrated with the question *Will you close the door?*, which is part of





whose offices are located in respective cities), and ENTITY & ADJACENT ENTITY: *round table* for people sitting around it, etc. The above examples instantiated the category “bounded”, that is, the situation where two bounded entities are somehow in contact. However, as Peirsman and Geeraerts (ibid: 283-4) point out, there is another possibility: a bounded entity can replace an unbounded one and an unbounded one – a bounded. This is what they call the “unbounded” type of relations, illustrated as follows: OBJECT FOR MATERIAL: there was *cat* all over the road (cat’s entrails), and MATERIAL FOR OBJECT: *brass* for “brass instruments”. The most extreme example of the “unbounded” PART-WHOLE relations is *chocolate* – the case where one unbounded substance made from cocoa beans can stand for another unbounded substance – a drink containing this substance.

Owing to an inspiration from Seto’s (1999) discussion of some temporal metonymies mirroring spatial relations, Peirsman and Geeraerts proposed a similar grid for three other domains: time; action/ event / process; and assemblies & collections, which results in a continuum from the spatial domain to the assemblies & collections domain. In each of the domains the relations seem to follow the same pattern: “metaphorical similarity in the form of a shift from the spatial and material domain to temporally characterized entities and to functional and abstract wholes, and similarity in the form of a gradual weakening of the contiguous part-whole relationship to looser forms of contact and adjacency” (Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006: 309-310).

This publication is significant in several respects. First of all, it goes back to a lot of earlier studies, e.g. Jakobson (1971 [2002]) or Ullman (1972). Along with these studies, Peirsman and Geeraerts pointed out the significance of the property that they considered prototypical for metonymy: contiguity. Second, they characterised metonymy without referring to the terminological apparatus provided by CL. Instead, they based their analysis on a nonunitary, prototypical definition of contiguity developed before the introduction of the notion of domain. Third, they indicated that metonymy is a gradable phenomenon that can be detected in several domains. Finally, as a result of their research, they pointed to the part-whole spatial relation as the core of the category that can be found in all the analysed domains.

The next publication to be mentioned is different: after over twenty years of research conducted within the Cognitive Linguistics paradigm, Geeraerts and Cuyckens (2007a) edited a publication that summed up the achievements in probably every field touched upon by CL. One of them was metonymy, summarized by Panther and Thornburg (2007), who discussed numerous dimensions of metonymy and suggested the following characterisation of the phenomenon:

- “a. Conceptual metonymy is a cognitive process where a source content provides access to a target content within one cognitive domain.
- b. The relation between source content and target content is contingent (conceptually nonnecessary), i.e., in principle defeasible.

- c. The target content is foregrounded, and the source content is backgrounded.
- d. The strength of the metonymic link between source and target content may vary depending, among other things, on the conceptual distance between source and target and the salience of the metonymic source” (ibid.: 242).

Attempts to elucidate metonymy did not stop at that stage. In 2011 a book was published (Benczes et al. 2011), whose contributors tried to accommodate the latest research into the theory of metonymy. An example of such an elaboration was the definition proposed by Barcelona (2011: 52). Accepting the previously mentioned achievements within the cognitive-linguistic approach to metonymy, Barcelona (ibid.: 50-51) enriched this knowledge with ascribing to metonymy the status of a reference point phenomenon (derived from CG). Then he proposed the following refinement to the existing definition of metonymy: “metonymy is an asymmetric mapping of a conceptual domain, the source, onto another domain, the target. Source and target are in the same functional domain and are linked by a pragmatic function, so that the target is mentally activated” (ibid.: 52).

What Barcelona stressed in his definition was the property of the common domain – being functional, that is, being either an ICM or frame (that is, he seems to treat the latter constructs as subtypes of domain). What is more, he claimed that a domain does not have to be related to a function, whereas, in his opinion, frames or ICMs are (ibid.: 40-42). An illustration of the point can be GOVERNMENTS and BUILDINGS, which are two different domains, though they may be connected by a number of functional domains, e.g. the US FEDERAL POLITICAL INSTITUTION ICM “under which the U.S. government is linked to the White House” (ibid.: 41).

The last definitional attempt to be discussed, which is also one of the latest ones, was provided by Bierwiazzonek (2013). As the author admitted, his model carries some semblance to Seto’s (1999) proposal and, as a consequence, also to the model by Peirsman and Geeraerts (2006). At the same time, it was also different in several significant respects. First of all, Bierwiazzonek intended to propose a much more general model – a model that would enable a clear definition of not only metonymy and metaphor (together with a clear boundary between them), but also semantic relations, e.g. synonymy, meronymy, hyponymy, or synecdoche.

Another important characteristic of the model was that it defines metonymy independently of any domain (like Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006) for, as Bierwiazzonek (2013: 33) claimed, a definition against a domain would distort the conceptual, that is, domain-independent nature of metonymy. The next difference lay in the very terminology: Bierwiazzonek replaced the term *contiguity* with *association*, as a more neutral one. However, the most crucial point about Bierwiazzonek’s proposal was that he based his classification not on relations between objects in one domain, but on relations between concepts, which were defined “as conceptual regions within conceptual space determined by profiles in conceptual domains and other concepts” (Bierwiazzonek 2013: 36).

Another dimension of Bierwiazzonek's publication is continuing the debate initiated by Croft (1993[2002]) – whether or not it is possible to delimit metonymy from other linguistic phenomena and what such a boundary could be. What Bierwiazzonek indicated was that actually there is a special level of perception that reveals the required characteristics: the basic level. As Rosch (1978) defined it, basic level categories both “maximise the number of attributes shared by members of the category and b) minimise the number of attributes shared with members of other categories” (Bierwiazzonek 2013: 36, cf. Taylor 1995: 50-51). This, according to Bierwiazzonek, means that at the basic level categories are maximally distinct, while below it – considerably similar, which the scholar applies to the distinction between metaphor and metonymy: metaphor functions at the basic level and above it, while metonymy – below it.

On this basis, Bierwiazzonek distinguished five basic conceptual relations that are foundations of metaphor, metonymy, as well as are reflected in different kinds of lexical relations (fig. 3):

- a) unassociated separation – a situation when two concepts do not constitute parts of the same, larger conceptualization; as a consequence they can only be connected metaphorically through another concept, e.g. LOVE and FIRE. Because their conceptual regions are determined by different domains, they can only be linked through another domain – TEMPERATURE (like in the metaphor LOVE IS A FIRE illustrated by (Kövecses 2010: 36) with *burn with love*).
- b) associated separation – its essence is ontological similarity between two concepts, which is most characteristic for metonymy (encompassing both whole-part and part-part associations). If the two concepts come from one ICM, it may lead to metonymy, as in the relation between KETTLE and WATER (*the kettle is boiling* meaning “the water in the kettle is boiling”). At the same time, if those ontologically similar concepts come from different ICMs, e.g. LOVE and JOURNEY, they can be linked by means of a metaphor, as in LOVE IS A JOURNEY. Associated separation is also characteristic for e.g. meronymy, antonymy, reversiveness, and metonymic synonymy.
- c) small partial overlap – this relation is typical for metaphor engaging basic level categories, e.g. MAN and WOLF (*he is a wolf*). There is no link between them, though they both share the same conceptual region of the concept of MAMMAL; this relation is also reflected in metaphorical synonymy.
- d) large partial overlap – it is another metonymy-generating relation, though this time below the basic level, e.g. calling an Opel Corsa *a Mercedes*. This kind of relationship means that such concepts share a considerable, rich, and well-defined region of their hyperonym. That is why the intuition that they are related stems from the overlap and not, like in unassociated separation or associated separation, from a link. This relation is also typical for co-hyponymy below the basic level and one of the types of synonymy.
- e) inclusion – it is typically manifested in hyponymy, plesionymy, and converseness, though Peirsman and Geeraerts's (2006) classify some

examples based on taxonomy as metonymy, e.g. HYPERONYM FOR HYPONYM (e.g. *pill* for “contraceptive pill”) or HYPONYM FOR HYPERONYM (e.g. *Kodak* for “camera”).




Figure 3. Five basic types of conceptual relations  
(Bierwiczonek 2013: 37).

## 5. Conclusion

To delineate the progress that has been made since Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) publication, the major points raised during the discussion are recapitulated.

First, the five types of metonymy that have been distinguished over the years are pointed out. The first of them is the so-called *referential metonymy* that has been known since the ancient times (Koch 1999: 140). It is called so because traditionally it was assumed that the source expression, e.g. *Buckingham Palace*, achieves the same referential function as the direct expression, *the Queen* (Panther, Thornburg 2007: 237-238, cf. Panther, Radden 2005: 1-2, Panther, Thornburg 2004: 104, etc.). As has already been pointed out, this approach to metonymy was the starting point in CL.

Two further types of metonymy have already been mentioned (cf. section 4.2): *predicational metonymy* and *illocutionary metonymy* (cf. Gibbs 1994: 354-357, Panther, Thornburg 2004: 102-105, Panther, Thornburg 2007: 246-247, etc.). Still, two more types need a brief mention. According to Panther and Thornburg (2007: 246), when a referential metonymy is combined with a predicational metonymy, the result can be called a *propositional metonymy*. This case can be illustrated with the sentence *The saxophone had to leave early*, which combines the referential metonymy MUSICAL INSTRUMENT FOR MUSICIAN

and the predicational metonymy OBLIGATORY ACTION FOR ACTUAL ACTION (cf. Panther, Thornburg 2004: 103).

The last type of metonymy is either called *form-level metonymy* (Barcelona 2002a: 324) or *formal metonymy* (Bierwiaczonek 2007, 2013: 4-5). Actually, Bierwiaczonek (ibid.) points to the origin of this term in the already mentioned work of Jakobson (1971 [2002]), who focused on the structure of language, that is, its formal dimension. What is characteristic for this type of metonymy is that a salient part of a form is used to stand for the whole form. What is more, its working can be seen at various levels of linguistic structure, e.g. in morphology the morpheme *fridge* allows the reader to access the whole morpheme *refrigerator*. Similarly, at the syntactic level, it can be claimed that this metonymy motivates the ellipsis in the sentence *John ordered meat and Bill fish* (Bierwiaczonek 2013: 27).

One of the strongest tendencies that need to be identified is a gradual shift of the theory of metonymy towards the claims made within Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1990, 1993, 2000a, etc.). Some of these issues are: accessing the target element rather than replacing it, treating metonymy as a reference point phenomenon, applying the notions of active zone and domain matrix, noticing the significance of the compositional path, etc. (Croft 1993 [2002], Panther, Radden 1999, Warren 2002, Panther, Thornburg 2005, Panther 2006, Panther, Thornburg 2007, Barcelona 2011, Bierwiaczonek 2013, etc.).

Apart from that, CL makes use of several constructs to describe metonymic relations: *scenarios* (Panther, Thornburg 1998, 2004), *frames* (Fillmore 1982, 1985, Koch 1999), *domains* (Lakoff, Johnson 1980); *domain matrices* (Langacker 1987, Croft 1993[2002], 2006, Barcelona 2000b, etc.), and *Idealised Cognitive Models* (Lakoff 1987, Radden, Kövecses 1999); Although they designate similar constructs (cf. Langacker 1987: 150, Croft, Cruse 2004: 15, etc.), as Cienki (2007: 183) notices, each of them is best suited within a specific theoretical framework.

An important notion of the discussion was the continuum between metonymy and metaphor, which is postulated and explored in several different manners: as a gradation between extreme poles of the literal, through metonymic to metaphorical language (Croft 1993 [2002], Dirven 2002, Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2000, Radden 2002, etc.); as a metonymic motivation of metaphor (Goossens 1990 [1995], Barcelona 2000b), or understanding metonymy as a prototypical category (Dirven 2002 and Peirsman, Geeraerts 2006, Barcelona 2008, etc.).

Apart from Lakoff's term *mapping*, describing the relation between the entities within domains or between domains within larger constructs (Barcelona 2000b, 2003), other notions are also used. As inspired by Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1993), what happens to the target element can be called either *highlighting* it (Croft 1993 [2002]), *domain activation* (Barcelona 2000b), *foregrounding* it (Panther, Thornburg 2007), or its *prominence* (Panther, Thornburg 2004). At the same time, metonymy is seen as *enabling/providing a conceptual access to* the target (Panther, Radden 1999, Radden, Kövecses 1999, Panther, Thornburg 2007, etc.).



What also needs to be made clear is that metonymy is a phenomenon that operates at more than just the lexical level. Actually, in the above discussion some of those other areas have been already pointed out. At the same time, approaching the issue globally, it should be noted that metonymy can be found at all levels of linguistic organisation (for an overview see: Radden 2005, Barcelona 2008, or 2012, possibly inspired by Langacker 2004, 2009).

As for more detailed elaborations, metonymy operating at the level of phonology has been discussed by e.g. Barcelona (2002b) and Radden (2005). Certain facets of word-formation have been tackled with by Koch (1999), Dirven (1999), Panther and Thornburg (2002), as well as Bierwiazzonek (2013). Grammar has been addressed both generally, e.g. Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez and Mairal Uson (2008), as well as in particular points: Radden (2009), Panther and Thornburg (1998, 1999, 2009), Brdar-Szabó 2007, etc. Lexicon has been in focus of such publications as Lakoff, Johnson (1980), Barcelona (2005), Radden and Kovecses (1999), etc. Syntax has been discussed by, among others, Langacker (2000, 2009), Barcelona (2009), and Bierwiazzonek (2013). Pragmatics: by Panther and Thornburg (1998, 2007), Koch (1999), Ungerer (2000), Barcelona (2002b, 2005, 2007), Panther (2006), etc. Besides, metonymy has been shown to operate in language change (Paradis 2011) and is claimed to be one of the fundamental processes in grammaticalization (Traugott 1988, Heine, Claudi, and Hünneymeyer 1991, Traugott and Dasher 2005, etc.).

Closing this summary, the most important dimensions of metonymy explored during the expansion of the theory are enumerated: *distance* and *contiguity*, approached differently, though possibly possessing a common characteristic (Panther, Thornburg 1998, 2007, Seto 1999, Feyeraert 1999, Koch 1999, Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006, Bierwiazzonek 2013, etc.); *association* (Bierwiazzonek 2013, Croft 2006); *strength of metonymic link* (Panther, Thornburg 1998, 2007, etc.); *intrinsic* and *extrinsic properties* (Langacker 1987, Croft 1993[2002]; *prominence* and *availability* (Panther, Thornburg 2004); *contingency* (Panther, Thornburg 2004, 2007, Brdar-Szabo 2007), *correspondence* (Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2000), as well as *prototypicality* (also approached differently): either between metonymy and other linguistic phenomena (Croft 1993[2002], Goossens 1995, Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez 2000, Radden 2002, Dirven 2002, Bierwiazzonek 2013, etc.), as well as the prototypicality of the very metonymy (Dirven 2002, Radden 2002, Peirsman and Geeraerts 2006, Barcelona 2003b, 2005, 2008, 2011).

Concluding, it needs to be observed that the above discussion of trends and tendencies found within the study of metonymy was, by necessity, quite selective. However, as has already been mentioned, the interest in metonymy has resulted in so many publications that it is impossible to elaborate on them all. Instead, general tendencies in the field were indicated. Still, despite the account's brevity, the author hopes to have pointed out that the theory of metonymy has gone a long way since 1980.

Actually, its beginnings were really humble – it was no more than a twig of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory. Twenty years later, appreciating the devel-

opment of the theory of metonymy and its significance in linguistic research, Barcelona (2000a, 2002a: 214) used the term Conceptual Theory of Metaphor and Metonymy (CTMM). Another ten years and many publications later, taking into consideration the fact that the interest in metonymy has led to its immense growth, Dirven and Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez (2010: 39) introduced a separate term, “an equivalent partner of CMT”, the Conceptual Metonymy Theory (CMYT), which the joint effort of so many scholars really deserves.

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