

Maria Kokoszyńska's Correspondence with Kazimierz Twardowski

1

Vienna, 23 XI 1934

Dear Colleagues,

I arrived in Vienna on November 21st in the evening. On the train, the search at the Austrian border was quite strict, although I was spared it. On the other hand, all the other passengers (who belonged, by the way, to a national minority) had to unpack their bags. (They were especially searched for vic-tuals!)

Arriving at the university the next morning, I went at once to Schlick's lecture (he is currently teaching *Logik und Erkenntnistheorie*, 4 hours a week). The lecture formed a complete unit and was devoted to the issue of whether intuitive cognition exists and of what it consists. Schlick took a negative position here: intuition is not cognition, because 1) for cognition to occur, we must think something, and we have intuition when we at most experience something without thinking about it (when, for example, we experience a sensation of blueness in looking at the sky); 2) knowledge must be expressed in words, while intuition cannot be expressed in words; 3) knowledge always includes at least two elements – one corresponds to what is known, the other to how – as what – something is known (*als etwas erkennen*); in intuition, on the other hand, only one element can be expressed – that which is given. Through intuition one can become familiar with something (*Kennen*), but not know it (*Erkennen*). Knowledge is always discursive. Phenomenologists, who believe they will achieve knowledge by immersing themselves in intuition, are of a different opinion. Speaking of phenomenology, Schlick read various quotations from Husserl and his disciples and made fun of them a bit, especially their method of finding beautiful-sounding terms that explain nothing. He stated at the end that, despite the great hopes that phenomenologists had attached to the method of intuition, to this time they had reached no other incontrovertible results by this path than the assertion that black is different from red and so forth.

I quite liked the way Schlick lectured. He speaks rather casually and without excitement, but he speaks clearly and has a sense of humor. All his comportment is characterized by social adeptness and discretion. I had the opportunity to observe this that same day in the evening. Prof. Schlick – when I approached him after the lecture – invited me straight away for the evening, to the first meeting of the [Vienna] Circle after more than a year's break. Of course, I was at the meeting, enjoying the happy coincidence that I had arrived a day earlier and not later. Among those known to me by sight or hearsay, [Friedrich] Weismann, [Egon] Brunswik, [Karl] Menger and another young man from Prague (he stayed together there with Brunswik) were there. In total, there were about 16 people – including two Chinese (one undoubtedly). As a program for the next meeting of the Circle, Schlick designated papers on questions concerning [Walter] Gordon's indeterministic consequences of the new physics for other sciences, and essays on logical positivism (Menger seems to be reporting on [Paul] Bernays and [David] Hilbert's *Grdlg [Grundlagen der Mathematik]*).

At yesterday's meeting, Schlick reported for the most part on Lewis's critical essay on the Vienna Circle, titled *Experience a[nd] Meaning*. This dissertation primarily attacks Carnap's *Der logische Aufbau d[er] Welt*. Carnap – as can be seen from his (unpublished) answer (Schlick read excerpts from it) – feels affected by these attacks and withdraws from his positions. Schlick, however, believes that this criticism does not strike at the true logical positivism the Circle represents. Two objections to the Circle were mainly taken into account: 1) solipsism; 2) an extremely narrow understanding of meaning. The solipsism – in the opinion of the critics – stems from the fact that all the objects of the world are constructed on the basis of one's own psychical experiences. Schlick believes that this objection can be refuted by pointing to the neutral nature of the base (the concept of different people, including oneself and one's own experiences, belongs to a much higher level than the concept of objects from the base). It does not seem to me that the matter is that easy, but I do not want to start on criticism at this moment.

As to the second objection, Lewis states that, according to logical positivism, only statements about the present have meaning. Such a consequence – it would seem – derives from the position of Carnap, who assigns to each sentence only as much meaning as the protocol sentences resulting from it (the meaning consists in verification, or respectively, falsification). According to Schlick, however, the meaning is that “I can give the circumstances in which a sentence is proven or, respectively, falsified”. The sentence “I will wake up tomorrow” has meaning then. But the sentence “There is an afterlife” also has meaning, according to Schlick. It will be verified if I begin – after death – to feel, think, perceive, etc. This is very different from the interpretations given in Lwów for the concept of meaning among the Viennese. Similarly, one might be

surprised at Schlick's [position] that the proposition "The world is water" and many other propositions of traditional metaphysics are perfectly meaningful propositions. However, this is understandable, i.e., one could get used to such an understanding of meaning in which it would be true, and this, along with other [propositions], can be extracted from the nebulous formula to which Schlick limits himself when defining meaning.

When it comes to the administrative matters of the local institute, I cannot omit to mention – as a former assistant – the fact that books are said to disappear here in droves. Just yesterday, an assistant handed Schlick a whole stack of cards of the books that had gone missing. I admired her good humor and the lightheartedness with which she did it. Apparently, she had had time to get used to it!

After the meeting, I had a long talk with Mr. Brunswik, the founder of the psychology of "von Gegenstande her". He explained to me with great enthusiasm the main tasks of this psychology. It can be briefly summarized as follows: the task is to characterize living beings by means of the objects intentionally achieved by them. An object is called intentionally achieved by a being always and only when this being has created a certain system of reactions assigned in a one-to-one correspondence to the object. The number [here: size] of the set is, for example, the object intentionally achieved by a person. To some extent, it is the observed quantity (*Sehgrosse*) of objects. According to Mr. Brunswik, a given living being intentionally achieves all those objects that are important to it in life. Apparently, experiments confirm this quite clearly. Mr. Brunswik thinks that all psychological questions can be resolved by this new psychology (!). He promised to present these matters to me in detail when the occasion arises and invited me to a psychological colloquium that he and [Karl] Bühler are organizing.

As for Bühler, whom I also had the opportunity to hear yesterday, he makes a rather unpleasant impression. His lecture, which I attended, on the theory of mind, is very elementary – maybe that contributed to this impression.

Please send me news from Lwów. I would be very grateful to Iza [Izydora Dąmbska] if she would write to me, among other things, about the papers that have recently been presented at the Society – and in general about what is happening "philosophically" in Lwów. And I will be very grateful to everyone who remembers me with a letter or card.

Yours very cordially,

M. Lutman-Kokoszyńska

2

Vienna, 14 XII 1934

Dear Honorable Professor,

Thank you very much for your kind letter. I am glad you liked the roses. However, I was surprised that you did not read my letter, which I had in fact addressed to Prof. Ajdukiewicz, but with the request that he also deliver it to you. I reported there on my first “philosophical” impressions of Vienna. I also gave my address there. Probably due to the fact that you did not come to the university in recent days, it was difficult for him to deliver the letter. Please consider, thus, that my apparent silence is excused. I received your letter addressed to Katowice and thank you for it. I am concerned to hear that you are suffering from various ailments. Perhaps when the winter weather settles in, they will pass; I do not know what the weather is like in Lwów, but it is still warm and rainy here. There has been no snow at all. In the attached pages I will try to continue to give an account of what I have heard here. I am writing it separately on purpose, so that you can give it – if you want – to Professors Ajdukiewicz and Dąbska. You will probably see Iza D[ąbska]. It will not be difficult for her to drop a letter into Prof. Ajdukiewicz’s box at the university, if she does not see him (or she could give it to Tadzio Witwicki when the occasion arises). Do not be angry with me for the trouble – it is that I would like everyone to know that I remember them, and it is difficult for me to write to each of them individually the things that I would like to tell them. I will be very grateful for news from Lwów.

Yours respectfully and faithfully,

Marysia

3

Vienna, 14 XII 1934

Almost three weeks have passed since the first letter was written. In the meantime, two colloquia at Menger’s and one new meeting of the Vienna Circle have taken place. In addition, I attended one colloquium with the Buhlers. Of course, I am not counting lectures. I am attending Schlick’s [lectures] on philosophy, Brunswik’s [lectures] on psychology (he lectures on the psychology of wholeness and form 2 hours a week) and Menger’s [lectures] on mathematics (*Axiomatic construction of projective and Euclidean geometry* – that is the title of the lectures).

I will start with matters concerning the Vienna Circle. In his lectures, Schlick discussed his concept of meaning at great length. He pointed out that

we get to know the meaning of a word only by learning the circumstances in which it is used (thus, according to Schlick, all words have a meaning which Prof. Ajdukiewicz calls the habitual meaning). The meaning of a word is determined by the rules of its use. A word has meaning as long as such rules exist for it (stated in one way or another). A sentence is true always and only if the use of the words in it accords with the rules for those words. A sentence may be empirically (practically) and logically unverifiable. It is empirically unverifiable if it is known in which circumstances it should be recognized and in which it should be rejected (rules for using the relevant words exist); however, the laws of nature will never allow, for example, these circumstances to be ascertained. A sentence then is fundamentally unprovable if there are no rules for using it at all: the user of the sentence cannot state the circumstances under which he would consider the phrase to be true or under which he would consider it false. An essentially unprovable proposition is a meaningless construct; it is not a sentence. (It is a dubious matter whether the impossibility of giving only the circumstances in which the sentence would be false or respectively the circumstances in which the sentence would be true already deprives the sentence of meaning, and then whether there could not be meaningful sentences for which there are only rules stating under what circumstances they are true, or only those that say under what circumstances they are false. This matter was explicitly raised* at the meeting of the Circle, but it was not resolved.)

Only sentences – it would seem – beginning with “There are... (*es gibt*)” are verified; general sentences – are falsified. But these are things that have been read and are known.

Perhaps it is interesting to apply these concepts to various philosophical problems. I have had the opportunity to hear them applied to two such problems: 1) Is it possible to know the experiences of another?; 2) the skeptic's question: Are all our recollections false? The first of these problems was discussed by Schlick in his lectures, the second in his proseminar**. Both these problems were considered deceptive; attempts were made to show that upon closer examination they dissipate (*verdunsten*, like fog). I have the impression that it will be easy for me to give the general prescription for use in these cases. First of all, it was pointed out that those who ask such questions pass imperceptibly onto the grounds of a different language than the ordinary one. After all, on the basis of our usual way of expressing ourselves, we cannot have the slightest doubt that we sometimes recognize the experiences of another, or that certain recollections are true. A philosopher who has doubts in this respect obviously means something different by “getting to know other people's experiences” or “the falsity (truth) of recollections”. In his questions there is an attempt to give words a new meaning. But what is this new meaning of words? Well, it turns out that there is none. The philosopher understands the

expression “knowing other people’s experiences” in such a way that he precludes any experience from convincing him that he recognizes other people’s experiences. He understands the expression “the truth of recollections” in such a way that he precludes any experience from convincing him that he has found the truth of any remembrance. There are therefore no rules for the words he introduces. Sentences built from these words (“You cannot know someone else’s experiences”, “All memories are false”) are thus essentially indecipherable, meaningless – and therefore they are not sentences. And the pertinent question is not a question; it only seemed to be. In short, it is indicated that the philosophers who raised certain problems did so by means of words understood in some new and at the same time completely unspecified way; they deprived them of the old meaning, and did not give them a new one. Consequently, their questions were just a juxtaposition of empty sounds. It is true that Carnap wrote this in the article *Überwindung der Metaphysik durch logische Analyse der Sprache*, but these examples give the matter – it seems to me – more life, although the conclusion is still questionable.

At Schlick’s seminar, at which there are discussions about what a psychical phenomenon is, and various definitions of what is psychical are discussed, almost two sessions were devoted to the question of whether colors conceived as psychical phenomena can be assigned a localization in objective space, and if not, why. The problem was solved by invoking the rules for the use of the term “color” and stating that these rules do not stipulate that the term can appear in sentences of the form in which spatial coordinates are assigned to something*** and therefore it is not known what is to be understood by these sentences. Expressions assigning coordinates in objective space to colors must therefore be considered meaningless and in this sense colors as psychical phenomena should be denied their localization in space (psychical phenomena should be considered non-spatial). [Therefore, it is] a solution similar in spirit to the solution to the problems mentioned above. However, it cannot be claimed that everything one hears here is completely clear and decisive. I have the impression that the mixing of statements with statements about those statements – that is, of language with metalanguage – flourishes here on a large scale.

I also want to write a few words about Menger and his circle. Menger is young, handsome, very polite, outgoing, always terribly busy, in a hurry, immersed in brilliant creativity. At least – it would seem – that he would like to make that last impression. He speaks excellent English, French, and Italian – at his colloquiums, both times, all of these languages were spoken (aside from German, of course). He writes mathematical dissertations, philosophical books, and is said to be engaged in belles lettres. His productions, however, are not widely appreciated here. Apparently, [Hermann] Weyl, with whom one of the people here studied, warned against reading, for example, Menger’s work on intuitionism.

In contrast to him, there is Godel. Quiet, small, with a slightly ironic, barely perceptible smile, extremely quiet, moving in the shadows. Everyone turns toward him wherever he appears. Menger, in his colloquiums (as far as I can judge), is constantly looking at him intently, as if trying to guess what he is thinking and saying. And he does not say much, but I think he understands a hundred times better and faster than everyone else. In other words, he makes a very positive impression. I asked him for a copy of his work *Über einige unentscheidbare Satze*; I want to send it to the Institute in Lwów. He promised willingly – but so far he has not given it to me. At Menger's colloquiums, a bit of logic is done. That is as far as they interest me.

I would also like to write about my impressions from the colloquium at the Buhlers', where she seems to lead the way, and he respectfully submits (maybe the cause was that this time, when I was there, the topic, child psychology, was more familiar to her). But I am already horrified by the volume of this letter. Please do not hold it against me for writing so much and do not read the uninteresting details; I felt the need to set forth at least generally the various things I had heard and seen; if it is even in part interesting to the reader, it will have fulfilled its task completely.

Please send me news from Lwów.

Very cordially yours,

Maria L.

* By Menger.

** With Waisman, who conducts the proseminar here.

*** I.e., in intersubjective sentences (of such or such a form; of what kind – it was not clearly stated).

4

Vienna, 1 III 1935

Dear Honorable Professor,

On your name day, please accept my very sincere wishes for every good fortune for you. I am sorry I cannot offer these wishes in person. Let me also take this opportunity to thank you for the last note you sent me. I have been meaning to write more extensively for a long time and for that reason I have not yet thanked you separately. My time is very occupied here; I read a lot on my own, and in addition I talk a lot with people on philosophical topics. This month I would like to leave Vienna.

With my very best regards,

Maria Lutman-Kokoszyńska

5

Vienna, 18 IV 1935

Dear Honorable Professor,

I wish you all the best at Easter. Recently, I sent Prof. Ajdukiewicz a letter devoted in small part to local philosophical matters. I would be happy to have you take a look at it, too.

Kind regards,

Maria Kokoszyńska

6

Paris, 18 VI 1935

Dear Honorable Professor,

Your letter, so long and so pleasant in tone, was a pleasant surprise for me. I considered your silence to be self-evident given the amount of work with which you are constantly busy. It never crossed my mind to harbor any resentment or disappointment about it. On the contrary, I reproached myself for not yet writing to ask if you needed the further summaries from the “Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale”, which I had undertaken to do. But I was intending to ask about it sometime soon. If these summaries are needed, I will send them to you. I would just very much like to ask you to indicate the issues from which the summaries are to be made, and the date by when you need them.

Another reproach weighs on my conscience, namely that I have not yet paid this year’s contribution to the Philosophical Society – but I suppose they will arrange it for me at home.

I have been in Paris for over a month now. Coming from the Viennese milieu, which is very lively in terms of philosophy, I found myself here almost in academic solitude, because not only have almost all lectures come to an end here (I still managed to attend a few lectures and seminars), but I have also failed to find circles in which there would be lively philosophical interests and mutual exchange of ideas. Aside from conversations with MM. Koyré, Laland, Gilson, Vigneaux, and Cavallès, which lasted quite a long time, but – with the exception of conversations with M. Cavallès, who deals with logic – had no continuations, I cannot record any gains in terms of personal contact with philosophy here. I will talk with M. [Claude] Chevalley (who also deals with mathematical logic) in the coming days, but his article in the “Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Etranger” has already managed to fill me with horror. It is a completely different way of working than that to which I am

accustomed. However, I hope for the best – in accord with the principle that hope should not be lost; I will happily write about it if it happens. Perhaps it will occur only during the philosophical congress, which is to be held in September and to which time I would like to extend my stay here. However, it will be difficult for me to manage finances, because life here is very expensive. But maybe I will succeed. I cannot say yet whether after my return I will go back to Lwów or to Katowice. My husband is trying to get me a job in Katowice and insists on my coming to Katowice. It would seem that I will have to decide to do that.

Although my heart aches as I read letters from Vienna informing me of further lively philosophical meetings and discussions, I am comforted here by the books I have in abundance (especially Ockham's texts) and the peace I have to work in. In Vienna I wrote a small essay on the absolute concept of truth (in light of Carnap's and Tarski's works) and I am finishing that one here. Besides, I am thinking of working on the semantic concepts in Ockham, but I do not know yet whether and what will come of it. The theory of supposition turns out to be very important here, and its analysis could have – it would seem – great significance for a proper understanding of Ockham's nominalism. (Apropos of nominalism – in *Dictionnaire de la théologie catholique* there is an extensive article by M. Vigneaux on this subject; perhaps you are familiar with it; I liked it very much.) Besides, I am thinking a bit about general names and a bit about the issue of interpretation of geometry – but at the moment that is for later.

Thank you very much for the invitation to collaborate on “*Studia Philosophica*”.

I think I have already bored you with reports about myself. Unfortunately, I do not have much information from Lwów. I have already written two letters to Prof. Ajdukiewicz, but to no avail. However, I hope he is doing well, and I do not need to excuse his silence by imagining he has problems. Nevertheless, I would be very grateful to you if you could add some news on this subject – perhaps when you write on the matter of abstracts.

I am glad that you can now leave the house for walks. This shows there is improvement in your state of health – and I suppose the walks in the nice surroundings of Park Kilińskiego [Park Stryjski] will also contribute to it!

Once again, thank you very much for your letter and please continue not to forget me; your thinking of me is always very important to me and gives me great pleasure.

Marysia

Paris, 22 VII 1935

Dear Honorable Professor,

I was very happy to receive a letter from you today. I am really touched that despite your overflowing schedule you found a moment to write me a letter, and a long letter at that. All the news it contained was very interesting to me, and I thank you very much for it – and for the letter in general.

I will be happy to write concise reviews of both articles by Professor Ajdukiewicz; however, I would be grateful if you could tell me the approximate length that is desired for these reviews. As for the summaries from the “Revue [de Métaphysique et de Morale]”, I will try to get them to you in November. However, I think that I will write them after returning to the country. To this day I still do not know where I will be going back to. The matter of getting a job in Katowice is becoming quite complicated, especially since I want to return only after the congress. However, I want this job for fairly fundamental reasons: I am fundamentally opposed to the idea of a wife taking money from her husband for her needs, especially if she wants to maintain complete independence in her life decisions, as is the case with me.

Prof. Carnap read the article on the absolute concept of truth and wrote to me that he would gladly print it in “Erkenntnis”, unless I present it as a paper at the congress, which would settle the issue of printing. I do not know what I am going to do yet, but it is high time to make a decision*.

I have already collected some material for the work on Ockham, but unless I decide to limit the topic, I will have to devote a lot of time to the preparatory work of reading texts and making transcripts. In the near future I intend to write a critical study of Carnap’s *Logische Syntax* for “Przegląd Filozoficzny”. Since it would contain a series of important remarks by Tarski, with whom I talked a lot about this book, the study would come out under two names: mine and Tarski’s, as he and I have already agreed. (At the moment I have here a few pages of the proof of his work on truth, which, after being reviewed by Popper, I corrected at Tarski’s request and I am sending it with this letter to you at the same time; in a few places I had some doubts, which I marked with a question mark on the left margin of the relevant pages. Since I only had the Polish text at my disposal, and did not have the manuscript, I was unable to resolve them myself. In any case, the proof contains very few errors and makes a good impression.)

The heat in Paris has not bothered me lately because the air has cooled significantly. It is generally pleasant, though. I had some interesting conversations with M. [Claude] Chevalley. He is quite a young man, with a wife and a car; he is fairly unkempt and dirty, but at the same time he is extremely

willing to exchange ideas and has a wide range of interests (apart from philosophy and mathematics, he devotes himself ardently to popularization work on the basis of a certain political program, namely the *Ordre Nouveau* program). In addition, he is kind and obliging. His wife is also very nice. They are currently away from Paris for 2 weeks, but when they return, I intend to get in touch with them again.

Best regards,

Marysia

* At any rate, I feel like reading the paper at the Congress.

8

Paris, 27 VII 1935

Dear Honorable Professor,

I was quite disturbed at the sad news about the death of Professor Ajdukiewicz's father and I wrote immediately. Unfortunately, even the sincerest expressions of sympathy – it would seem – do not help much in such circumstances.

I sent a note to Tarski, but to the Viennese address; I had a couple of cards from him recently from his excursions, but the address was constantly changing. However, Tarski told me once in Vienna that he would probably give up the prints because of the expense that ordering them would entail. I do not know if this information will be of any use to you.

Did you receive the proof of Tarski's work that I sent? So far, I have not received anything else.

Best regards,

Marysia

9

Paris, 10 VIII 1935

Dear Honorable Professor,

Thank you very much for the two cards I received recently. I have already prepared the review of Prof. Ajdukiewicz's articles. By the way, it took me longer than I expected. I tried to include information about the content of the articles along with a brief description of their importance in the context of contemporary philosophy. It was not easy to formulate these things succinctly. And thus, the review stretched over 10 quartos of chancery paper, in my normal handwriting size. Will that be too much for you I wonder? As for

the content – before submitting it to you I would like to communicate with Prof. Ajdukiewicz to make sure it accurately reflects his intentions. Unfortunately, I do not know Prof. Ajdukiewicz’s current address. I think it is: Poronin, [Józef] Gut’s House – but I am not sure. I would be very grateful to you if you could give me the address when you can.

As to the review of Prof. Kotarbiński’s *Elementy*, which I gave you in the past, I am afraid you are making too much ado about it: if for some reason you do not like it, I really will not be in the least upset if you want to turn to someone else to write the review. Time passes, and “Ruch [Filozoficzny]” should have a review of this book. All right then, Professor? Please do not be so ceremonious with me – in the event my guess is correct.

The heat is bothering me again in Paris. I am thinking about changing my hotel because my room gets very hot during the day (it faces south) and then it is difficult to sleep at night. Nevertheless, I am pleased with my stay in Paris and trying to make the most of it.

I would be very grateful if you would send me news of your health and well-being. It seems there have not been any hot days in Lwów, or so they write me – so perhaps summer is less tiring. Are you not intending to get out of Lwów?

Best regards,

Marysia K.

10

Paris, 21 VIII 1935

Dear Honorable Professor,

Thank you very much for your letter of August 15th. I will give the attached letter to Mr. Tarski and the manuscript and translation of the *Nachwort* to him immediately after his arrival, which will take place – as far as I can judge from the news I have received – already in the coming days of this month. Looking through the *Nachwort*, I noticed the end was missing – the last of the pages sent ends at the beginning of some small print (*Historische Bemerkung*). Since in your letter you write as if about the whole *Nachwort* I feel obliged to let you know.

Almost simultaneously with the proof from you (pp. 345–360), I received a proof of the previous pages (pp. 337–344) from Popper, which – it would seem – have gone through very strange vicissitudes (due either to inaccuracies at the post office or the holiday trips of the interested persons); I had expected it much earlier (based on what Tarski had said) – at the end of July yet. I am sending you all these corrected pages along with this letter. Even though I had

at my disposal – aside from the Polish text – the first proof of the previous pages (which Tarski had provided for me at one time) – I had a few doubts during the correction, which, as before, I marked in the left margin with question marks. In particular, I recall (and infer from the first revision) that there was an issue at one time concerning some special way of printing the letter “W”, which was the convention used in the work to denote the notion of truth. I would be very grateful to you for checking whether the print on pages 358 and 360 is in fact different from the previous pages (e.g., page 305).

I would like to send Prof. Ajdukiewicz the review of his articles for him to look over, as I am afraid of being exposed to the accusation that due to the concise form of the paper, I am distorting his thoughts. Thank you very much for giving me his address. In the meantime, I also received a letter from him, in which he writes to me about the possibility of coming to Paris. Needless to say, I was very pleased with this, not only for personal reasons, but – above all even – for the sake of Polish philosophy; it seems to me that he is especially suited to represent Polish philosophy at this congress. As for me, I am going to say a few words about syntax (in the sense used by Carnap), semantics, the logic of knowledge (*Wissenschaftslogik*); this paper is also to include – in the form of an illustration of the main line of thought – remarks on the “absolute” concept of truth. Originally, this paper seemed proper to me – today I have a little doubt about its suitability for this congress (as Tarski – contrary to his former intentions – submitted a paper on the bases of semantics), but one has to be consistent and carry through a decision once made.

In the past weeks, I took a day trip around France (organized by French Railways), which I was very pleased with. I also changed my lodging to a cooler and quieter one (and cheaper). My present address is Paris VI^e, 8 Imp[asse] des deux Anges, Hôtel Savoy.

Very cordially yours,

Marysia

* Written on one side.

11

Paris, 28 VIII 1935

Dear Honorable Professor,

For a few days now I have been intending to write you to thank you sincerely for thinking of me and sending me the interesting article from “Neue Freie Presse” about Paris. Therefore, I am doing this now, and at the same time – in response to your card, which I received today – I can inform you that I received the proof in question without delay, as I had given the necessary instructions

at the post office here. Tarski has been in Paris for two days now – of course, I immediately gave him your letter and the *Nachwort*. As far as I know, he has already sent you the *Nachwort*, with the proof. He is dissatisfied with the hotel where he is staying (rue de l'Échaudé VI) – so I suppose it will be more practical, if you want to reach him, to continue to direct mail to my address.

Very cordially,

Marysia

12

Paris, 22 IX 1935

Dear Honorable Professor,

I am very sorry that I am only writing back now, but until today, from the moment I received the letter from you, I have been busy all day for days with the congress and related matters – with the exception of Tuesday afternoon, which was set aside for M. Lecomte de Nouy's party. The sessions of the congress took place in the morning and afternoon (usually from from 9 AM to 2 PM and from 3 PM to 7 PM), and in the evenings people sat in cafés and talked. There were a lot of people (calculated at around 200), many of them from abroad. There were many papers – as you can see from the chronicler's report which I attach – so many that it was not possible to listen to all of them (if only for the simple reason that the sessions were held almost all the time in two rooms). The topics were generally interesting, but few really good readings were given, of benefit to the general audience. Carnap, [Otto] Neurath, and [Philipp] Frank spoke the best, and so did [Louis] Rougier (as far as concerns those I heard). The value of what was said can probably only be judged accurately after the texts have been printed; unfortunately, it was not possible to become acquainted with the content before the lectures (there were no printed summaries). The organization also failed in another respect: the time and place of presentations was changed without prior notice to the bulk of the participants. In general, however, everything went smoothly; interest was – it seemed to me – high, as evidenced by the long discussions (almost two hours) that took place at the end of each sitting (that is, all the papers were discussed together, not each of them separately).

B. Russell graced the congress with his presence; he did not have a paper, but he did contribute to the discussion a couple of times (after Tarski's paper on the foundations of semantics, after Scholz's paper on Frege, and after that of a young lady, Antoinette Reymond, who talked about his logic). He made an extremely appealing impression on me: not only a [very] intelligent man, but also one with great virtues of heart and character; moreover, everyone liked his

speech, which was full of reverence for Frege. I even met him personally during the congress and we exchanged a few kind words (he said he liked my paper very much – but I suppose there was more politeness than conviction in it).

I will gladly write about my impressions from the congress – meanwhile, as I have already mentioned, I am sending you a short report. Unfortunately, despite my best efforts, I have not been able to find out the names of all the speakers or where they live. (They were neither in the program nor in the list of participants, which the organizers had at their disposal.) If you need this information, I will renew my efforts to that effect. I only ask that you let me know quickly in that case, because I intend to leave Paris soon. Anyway, after the first [October], I will not be here anymore. I am truly happy that in the near future I will be able to see you again, and for now I send my best regards and wishes.

Marysia

13

Katowice, 10 XI 1935

Dear Honorable Professor,

Thank you for the 2 issues of the “Revue [de Métaphysique et de Morale]”, which I received through Iza. I gave her the review of Prof. Ajdukiewicz's work for you; I do not know whether it will satisfy you, and above all whether it is not too long. Due to the length, I was thinking of putting what is at the end underneath the text; if it is not too long, I would prefer to weave it into the conclusion of the discussion of the first thesis; I would send a makeover of the relevant place.

I told my husband about the card you wrote to him during the holidays, but he claims he did not receive this card and therefore does not know what it is about. (He was away from Katowice throughout August.)

Very cordially yours,

Marysia

14

Katowice, 10 XII 1935

Dear Honorable Professor,

Thank you very much for remembering me; I will write more extensively in the coming days. I have not yet, because here in Katowice I do not feel well, and in such a mood it is hard to get down to writing. I was all the more pleased, though, with your letter.

To answer your question, I declare my consent to any changes you deem proper to introduce to my *Impressions of the Congress*. I will arrive in Lwów around the 20th and will take the liberty of coming to see you at once.

Kindest regards,

Maria Lutman

15

Katowice, 10 II 1936

Dear Honorable Professor,

I will begin with the “diplomatic mission” with which you entrusted me, namely the matter of persuading Tarski to send a copy of the German translation of his work on truth to the Philosophical Society. Well, I am ashamed to say that I did not succeed on this “mission”. Mr. Tarski, who was at first inclined, though not very willingly, to place the last copy of his work there, finally decided its fate otherwise: as he wrote me recently, he received from one of the philosophizing French mathematicians a request that he send him his work, so he sent the last free copy to him. Therefore, he no longer has any spare copies of his work at his disposal (unless I relinquish the one he gave me; if, as a member of the Polish Philosophical Society, I were to receive the entire volume of “*Studia Philosophica*”, I could do so).

I stayed in Warsaw for quite a long time, almost a week, and I bought books there as well (thanks to the courtesy of Mr. Tarski), so for the moment I am not suffering from a lack in Katowice. I am currently working on the philosophy of the Vienna Circle; I recently tried to compile the views of this Circle systematically and to talk about them at one of the meetings of the local Society of the Friends of Science. Since there are enough persons here who are interested in matters of philosophy and have a proper education, the matter of founding a philosophical society becomes more and more urgent; in fact, it would only be about making official what has already been in existence for several months: there have already been 5 private meetings with papers on philosophy and long and lively discussions. In this connection, I thought of the possibility that this society could be listed as a “branch” of the Polish Philosophical Society. I do not know if that is possible, though a relationship with some developed Society would be very desirable for us.

Prof. Ajdukiewicz’s two-day stay in Katowice was very pleasant for me, and I heard a lot of extremely interesting things from him. I was also glad that I could hear from him something of you and other close friends from Lwów. Nevertheless, I will still be very grateful for any news concerning yourself

and coming directly from you, and I kindly request it – as long you have the time and desire.

Very kind regards, from yours faithfully,

Marysia L.

16

Katowice, 1 V 1936

Dear Honorable Professor,

It was with great joy that I read in the daily papers the news that you had received the Łódź City Award for scholarship. I regret very much that I cannot congratulate you in person – I was also very sorry that I could not see you at Easter – but therefore I am doing it by letter. Really, I was quite affected by news of this award and sincerely pleased.

As you know, I was recently in Warsaw, where I gave a lecture at the Philosophical Society (I spoke differently than in Lwów) and attended the inaugural meeting of the Polish Logic Society; a large part of this meeting was devoted to organizational matters, but they were followed by a very nicely delivered and interesting lecture by Prof. Łukasiewicz. As he himself claimed, he made his own reflections on topics raised by Leibniz – reflections that allowed him to give such an arithmetic interpretation of logic theorems that all the theorems of Aristotle's logic and only these theorems are true. In addition, I listened to one lecture of Prof. Kotarbiński's and went to Prof. Witwicki's seminar, at his invitation, where the diary of some thief was read.

I spent one evening at Mrs. Ossowska's, and Prof. Kotarbiński, among others, was also there. As you can undoubtedly already guess from what I am writing, this time my stay in Warsaw was pleasant and interesting. However, I returned to Katowice quite willingly, because I wanted to work and was pleased that I would have a lot of time for it. I will be very happy if your activities allow you to write a few words to me; I will especially be grateful for any news of yourself.

Kind regards,

Marysia

17

In Lwów, 6 XII 1936

Dear Marysia,

Your name day being the day after tomorrow does not allow me to delay writing to you any longer. I would like to offer you the most sincere, heartfelt wishes – I wish you all the best in the world, that your work conditions should always be as positive as possible and give you as much satisfaction as possible!

In sending you *my* wishes, I want to thank you with all my heart for the good wishes you have sent me twice – once in the letter of May 1st, on account of my being given the Łódź City Award, and the second time in a letter of October 20th on account of my turning 70. Both times you did it in such cordial words, so extremely kind to me, that I really read your wishes with emotion. Please accept my most sincere thanks for them. I wish you were represented in the wonderful album I received from my former students. You are not there, unfortunately. But I cannot help it, since it was your desire.

I must also thank you for the letter of March 10th and for the postcard from Zakopane of August 21st. In correspondence, I have fallen very much in debt to you again. Today, however, I want to reply to all the matters you have raised. But I must begin this letter by thanking you for your efforts with Dr. Tarski in order to obtain from him a copy of his work from “*Studia Philosophica*” for the Polish Philosophical Society at my request. Tough – since he disposed of his last copy differently, we must forget about having a copy of the publication in our library. I do not want to deprive you of the copy the author has given you. Thank you all the same for your good intentions!

It gives me great joy to see from your letter of March 10th that you are instigating and supporting a philosophical movement in Katowice. I would be very grateful if you could send me, for “*Ruch Filozoficzny*”, the title of the lecture you gave there on the views of the Vienna Circle, adding the date of the lecture and the exact name of the Society where the lecture took place. And perhaps it would also be advisable to give a brief note about those private meetings, with the philosophy papers, which were undoubtedly held at your initiative. Such private meetings were also held in Vilnius before the Philosophical Society was established there and “*Ruch Filozoficzny*” wrote about them at one time.

As for the establishment of the Philosophical Society in Katowice, it could not emerge as a branch of the Society here, because there is no appropriate provision for such a thing in the Society’s statutes. I believe that a completely independent Philosophical Society could be established in Katowice, provided a sufficient number of permanent members, around 25, can be counted on. The statute could be patterned on our statute, and I think you could acquire for the

members of the Society there the possibility of receiving "Przegląd Filozoficzny" (and of course "Ruch Filozoficzny") on the same conditions as those on which the Society here receives those journals.

In your letter of May 1st, you write that when giving a lecture at the Warsaw Philosophical Society, you spoke "differently than in Lwów". Would it thus be possible – in "Ruch Filozoficzny" – for you to refer to the lecture given in Lwów instead of to your Warsaw lecture? By the way, I have not got your report from the Lwów lecture so far and I would be very grateful if you could send it as soon as possible! Or maybe instead of the Lwów lecture, you prefer to publish a report from the Warsaw lecture in "Ruch Filozoficzny"? It is as you like. I am waiting.

I was pleased to read in your letter of May 1st that you had a nice time in Warsaw when you were there in April. Maybe now you will fulfill your intention of visiting Lwów in December. I would be very glad to see you then!

Repeating my name day wishes, I send you my warmest regards.

[Kazimierz Twardowski]

18

[Katowice], 17 XII 1936

Dear Honorable Professor,

I was very happy to receive your letter and touched that when you are so busy you found a free moment to write to me and that you remembered my name day. First of all, thank you very much for thinking of me and for the wishes.

Your scruples regarding the copy of Tarski's work were unfortunately misplaced: the author instructed me to return the copy in order to send it to someone abroad. In the absence of your response, he thought* the Polish Philosophical Society had given up on this copy. To justify Tarski, I must add that I offered him the copy back myself, seeing that he was very short of prints.

The philosophical lecture on the Vienna Circle, which I gave here at the Society of Friends of Science in Silesia, was titled *The Role of Science in the Modern View of the World* and took place on January 13, 1936.

I will gladly provide you with more detailed information on the private philosophical meetings. I leave to your discretion what you do with it. Thank you very much for the information on the establishment of the Philosophical Society. I am afraid, however, that the number of members, which has fluctuated around 25, is difficult to count on.

My Warsaw lecture is better suited to a report than the one in Lwów, because – it seems to me – it was arranged more deliberately. However, is

the matter of a report at all valid since everything I said is included – in a more extensive form, too – in the article in the quarterly, whose first part has now been published? I have not received my prints yet.

I am departing for Lwów on December 22nd. I am very happy that I will see my parents and friends and I have an inextinguishable hope (as if yearning) that this time, after such a long period of not seeing you, I will be able to meet with you again.

As always, yours cordially and faithfully,

Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutman

* In September.

Translated by Michelle Granas