

Is Poland Ready for Transferable Fishing Concessions? Transition Fatigue with a Twist

Elizabeth Figus¹

(University of Alaska Fairbanks, School of Fisheries and Ocean Sciences)

ABSTRACT:

Commercial fishers in Poland demonstrate a unique version of “transition fatigue” (Rovelli, Zaiceva 2009). The situation leading to this phenomenon is related to three changes that occurred during the twentieth century. First, communist rule was marked by an orchestrated process of industrialization and a shift toward state-controlled fisheries after WWII. Second, political and organizational changes during the transition from a socialist to a free market economy in the nineties weakened social support and welfare structures in place during communism (and failed to replace them with something else). Third, accession to the European Union in May of 2004 introduced a new fisheries management strategy to the Polish fishing industry and the communities on the Baltic Sea coast. A regulatory vacuum created during the nineties has had negative effects on contemporary management strategies. EU-wide goals to reduce overcapacity since 2004 have significantly altered the composition of the Polish Baltic Sea fleet, while it is unclear that decommissioning schemes in Poland have had the positive results intended (Kuzebski, Marciniak 2009). A fishing closure and subsequent protests throughout the cod fleet in 2006 and 2007 underlined persistent problems in the management of Atlantic cod (*Gadus morhua*). In light of a potential shift to transferable fishing concessions in the cod fleet, policy-makers should account for “transition fatigue” during the implementation process.

Keywords: Poland, commercial fisheries, transferable fishing concessions, individual transferable quotas, transition fatigue, Common Fisheries Policy

1. Introduction

A majority of European countries now belong to a single set of legally binding agreements governing fishing rights, called the European Union Common Fisheries Policy (EU CFP). In Poland, the Baltic Sea fishery for cod (*Gadus morhua*) has traditionally been managed under season limits and an annually allotted vessel quota program, to conform to a national total allowable catch (TAC). ICES—the International Council for Exploration of the Sea—has been and continues to be an important source of scientific advice for determining these TAC quotas. During the 1990s, apportionment of cod in the Baltic to national quotas was negotiated through the International Baltic Sea Fisheries Council (IBSFC). In 2004, when Poland was admitted to the European Union (EU), Polish catches of cod in the Baltic came under jurisdiction of the EU CFP. Since 2007, all vessels longer than 8 meters have been subject to a short-term individual quota program, called the Multi-Annual Plan (MAP) for cod. Regulations proposed at the beginning of the 2009 EU CFP reform process were projected to include a long-term individual transferable quota system for cod as soon as 2014.

The potential individual transferable quota program for Baltic Sea cod was devised as part of an EU-wide push for the implementation of such programs, called transferable fishing concessions (TFCs). In 2009, the European Commission proposed to oblige all Member States to implement TFCs starting in 2014. The goals of TFC implementation included reducing overcapacity, providing ways for fishers to exit the industry in exchange for compensation, and allowing fishers to plan their fishing activity more consistently in line with market developments (European Commission 2013: 1). It is now unclear whether or not transferable fishing concessions will be implemented in Poland, because protests from both Polish fishers and other Member States resulted in the removal of a legal obligation for implementation (for Polish case, see:

¹ ecfigus@alaska.edu

Eur-Lex 2012: 3.5). However, it is apparent that the EU CFP may move towards individual transferable quota systems over time. This means that it is useful to determine how fishers might react if such programs are implemented, and how the situation in Poland—as a Central and Eastern European (CEE) country—might compare to that of other EU Member States, around the Baltic and elsewhere.

2. Transition fatigue

In 2007, the *Journal of Democracy* put out a call for papers focusing on a re-evaluation of the state of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (Plattner, Diamond 2007). Some of the published responses reference a fatigue, or dissatisfaction, that CEE countries have experienced with transition and democratization processes. This fatigue stems from the observation that, although there is a general consensus that democracy has been secured throughout CEE, several countries have shown signs of “backsliding” (Rupnik 2007: 17).

The transition process from communism to democracy has had different impacts across different interest groups and countries (Rovelli, Zaiceva 2009: 1), which has led to differences in how people react to transition. However, transition fatigue describes a general “burnout exhaustion” resulting from fast-paced changes in all the governments and economies of CEE countries since 1989, as well the newer pressures of European integration (Rupnik 2010: 107). In Poland, conditionality clauses placed on the state before EU accession made acceptance contingent upon stable, functioning state institutions, but Polish people tend to have low levels of trust in those institutions today. In addition, although the conditionality of EU accession worked well to push forward reforms until the country got in (Mungiu 2007: 14), now that accession has been achieved there are fewer incentives for implementing reforms and strengthening institutions (Rupnik 2007: 22).

A key contributor to transition fatigue is simple: when CEE countries imitated models of older democratic states in Western Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union, some consequences were negative. Like older democracies, CEE countries demonstrate low political participation, a gulf between citizens and political elites, low levels of trust in parliamentary and state institutions, and the rise of populist and nationalist challenges to liberal democracy (Rupnik 2010: 108). Transition fatigue may therefore explain the recent rise of populism throughout Poland, an increasing power of the political philosophy that the common people are engaged in a struggle against the political elite. In the long term, Rupnik (2007: 22) argues that, “without a change in political culture [in Poland], the formal adoption of [EU] institutions or norms may merely create an empty shell and possibly undermine the EU from within.”

Transition fatigue throughout Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as a result of democratization and Europeanization is most often discussed in the context of large-scale political changes. However, transition fatigue may also affect the ways that fisheries policies and regulations are implemented throughout the region. After the May 1, 2004 round of accessions to the EU, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became Member States, and the scope of the EU CFP on the Baltic changed. This means that the Baltic is now almost completely self-contained within the EU CFP policy arena, with eight of her nine border states also EU Member States (the exception being Russia)². However, only four Baltic border countries are longstanding Western democratic

² Baltic Sea border states are Poland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia.

states, while five are post-communist states, including Poland. It might therefore be expected that differing socio-political attitudes towards new EU CFP regulations between new and old democratic states will have important effects throughout the region. This article focuses on the manifestation of transition fatigue in affecting the attitudes of contemporary commercial fishers in Poland, through an analysis of three recent shifts in the fishing industry.

3. Three eras of change and the Polish cod fleet

Polish fisheries have changed significantly since WWII in demographic composition and geographic location. Since democratic transition began in the 1990s, Polish commercial fishing efforts have shifted from a focus on large-scale high seas factory trawling, to smaller scale operations on the Baltic Sea. Today, the majority of Polish national fishing effort is focused on the Baltic Sea, and is divided into two sectors: “i) boat fisheries (coastal) operating in inshore territorial waters and the Vistula and Szczecin lagoons; ii) [a] cutter fishery operating exclusively on the Baltic Sea” (FAO 2012: 2). “Cutters” are 15 meters or longer and some are part of the industrial trawl fishery targeting sprat (*Sprattus sprattus*). “Boat” or “coastal” fisheries are composed of vessels under 15 meters in overall length, and are generally artisanal operations not involved in sprat fishing.

Socio-political attitudes in Polish fishing communities today may be understood in relation to three changes that occurred during the twentieth century. First, communist rule was marked by an orchestrated process of industrialization and a shift toward state-controlled fisheries after WWII (from the fifties through the eighties). Second, political and organizational changes during the transition from a socialist to a free market economy in the nineties weakened social support and welfare structures in place during communism. Third, accession to the European Union in May of 2004 introduced a new fisheries management strategy to the Polish fishing industry and the communities along the Baltic Sea coast.

3.1. Stage one: 1946 to 1989


Commercial fisheries worldwide underwent dramatic changes during the twentieth century. A push to “modernize” fishing all over the world before and after WWII marked the rise of industrial trawling and the decline of traditional fishing communities (Mansfield 2011). Factory-processor trawling vessels (that could catch more fish with fewer crew members than ever before) blanketed the world’s oceans. In the Polish commercial fishing industry, the period from 1946 (after WWII) to 1989 was characterized by fleet build-up, government support, (relatively) reliable landings data, and an overall focus on the far-seas fleet.

The communist regime built a global, industrialized Polish fishing fleet during the second half of the 20th century. Even in the relatively small Baltic Sea a major industry was built up. In 1975, Polish fishing vessels landed 786, 442 tonnes of fish (Figure 1). The Polish fleet was diverse, and its organization was based on a mixed structure of state-controlled firms and cooperatives. Along the Baltic Sea, cooperatives were especially important.

The communist regime promoted the growth and influence of cooperatives, because they provided a way to assert control over fishers not functioning within the state-controlled fishery (Jentoft, Marciniak 1991: 72). At the same time, cooperatives provided a form of protected independence for groups of Polish Baltic Sea fishers, and

provided essential support for people in Polish coastal communities directly after WWII.

Figure 1. Polish capture production by year



The forced resettlements en masse of (mostly) Germans from the Polish coast to the west of the new Polish–German border at the close of the war left a void in coastal communities soon filled by ethnic Poles, eager to work but in need of guidance and support:

By helping to provide housing and employment, the fisheries co-ops contributed to the social integration and assimilation of the new inhabitants...They trained newcomers from all over Poland as fishermen, and provided proteins in a situation where farming activities were down, partly due to the problem of land-mines (Jentoft, Marciniak 1991: 74).

Cooperatives helped fishers pay to purchase vessels, repair gear, and in some cases even protected them from market fluctuations by guaranteeing certain prices throughout the season. Like Poles in the state-controlled fishery, cooperative members could depend on support and stability within their group; but they had relative freedom, more like private fishers.

The cooperatives were an important defense for small-scale fishers in the face of large-scale competition, and continued to be until the 1990s. Throughout the sixties, seventies and eighties, cooperatives accounted for around 20% of the official Polish Baltic Sea catch, and 60% of all fisheries turn-over (Jentoft, Marciniak 1991: 72). However, the post-WWII shift to a communist structure based in fisheries cooperatives along the Baltic Sea coast had replaced an existing system of informal cooperatives, called “*maszoperias*”³. Paradoxically, the communist cooperatives that replaced these

³ *Maszoperias* were patriarchal organizations created to control fishing grounds and to distribute fishing profits among community members within the ethnically Kashubian fishing communities along the coast (Marciniak, Jentoft 1997: 78). *Maszoperias* functioned as prominent community structures into the 1960s,

maszoperias were, “atomistic and stratified,” and fulfilled only a portion of the socio-economic role that the *maszoperias* had (Marciniak, Jentoft 1997: 84).

Figure 2. Trawler in Kołobrzeg Port, fall 2011



(Photo by Elizabeth Figus)

Communist leaders in Poland dismantled the old system on the Polish Baltic coastline, reorganizing and artificially supporting new mechanisms for fishery controls where old ones (like the *maszoperia*) may have sufficed. Then the communist governing system collapsed, and the state-run fisheries cooperative system went with it.

3.2. Stage Two: 1990 to 2004

The nineties marked a difficult period of transition for Polish Baltic Sea fishers. The industrialized part of the fishing industry went into decline even before the official fall of communism, and umbrella organizations that had worked as agents of government policies during communist rule were dissolved. One of the largest and oldest Polish cooperatives, *Rybmor*, lost 40% of its fishers between 1982 and 1987 (Jentoft, Marciniak 1991). Fishers who belonged to cooperatives were initially better off than private fishers in the free market system. But by 1993, the overall Polish catch had dropped by almost half, to only 395,406 tonnes (FAO 2013). The political legitimacy of cooperatives was called into question, because it was unclear whether or not they belonged to communism and a planned economy, or democracy and capitalism (Jentoft, Marciniak 1991). Cooperatives lost members, and then began to go out of business completely. The influence of cooperatives in Poland has since declined steadily.

and supported a consistent community identity, passed down through birth and tradition. They fulfilled a variety of social welfare functions and were even affiliated with the Catholic Church. During Communism, aspects of Kashubian culture like the *maszoperias* were suppressed. Today, Kashubian shore people find themselves for the most part under the same national and international fisheries controls as other Poles in the context of the EU CFP.

Major changes to national record-keeping systems during the transition from communist to democratic governance make it difficult to track changes to the Baltic Sea fleet structure based on vessel size, capacity, or catch. In addition, international negotiations for Baltic Sea fishing quotas that took place through the International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission (IBSFC) in the 1990s have been criticized for a lack of cohesion and consistency⁴. According to the University of Oslo, the Commission suffered from the “tragedy of the commons” phenomenon:

Scientific advice for the TACs come[s] from ICES. The negotiations are political and...almost always resulted in TACs well over the scientific advice. For environmentalists, it shows that there is a lack of a common sense of responsibility for the entire Baltic ecosystem and fish stocks and more of a run-for-the-catch scenario (UiO n.d.: 1).

The IBSFC was dissolved on January 1, 2006, to be replaced by EU CFP legislation and a bilateral agreement between the EU and Russia. ICES (the International Council for Exploration of the Sea) still provides much of the accepted scientific advice for determining TAC quotas for commercially targeted species in the Baltic. But now the international fisheries management process is mostly taken care of in Brussels. The declining role of cooperatives and state-controlled firms combined with unreliable landings data throughout the nineties meant that EU accession and membership in the EU CFP had intense but inconsistent results that have been difficult to track throughout the Polish Baltic Sea fishing fleet.

3.3. Stage Three: 2004 to 2013

Poland acceded to the European Union and the EU CFP on May 1, 2004. Since that time, implementation of the EU CFP rules, regulations and subsidies have changed many aspects of the Polish commercial fishing industry. Characteristics of the socio-political attitudes of fishers toward the regulatory system are dependent on such changes. In the Polish case, they can be described by focusing on two overarching regulatory issues: fleet overcapacity and cod management.

Poles entered into the EU CFP at a time when a popular buzzword was overcapacity. This continues to be true today. Overcapacity refers to the basic problem that fishers in the EU have the ability to catch too many fish. More specifically, the EU fleet in aggregate has enough vessel size, engine power and advanced gear technology to catch more fish than the ecosystem can sustain at healthy biomass levels in the long-term. Overcapacity not only creates an incentive for illegal fishing, but also contributes to large-scale discards. The Baltic Sea is seen as especially sensitive to capacity fluctuations because of its relatively shallow brackish waters, and its low level of bio-diversity. EU policy-makers now pay special attention to reducing overcapacity, in

⁴ Throughout most of the 20th century, there was no common regulatory management structure for Baltic fisheries. In 1973, seven Baltic Sea border states held a conference in Gdańsk, where the IBSFC was created to fill this void (UiO n.d.). The original members of the IBSFC were Finland, Denmark, West and East Germany, Poland, Sweden and the Soviet Union. The European Community then joined as a separate entity in 1983 (Eur-Lex 1983), and Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania entered in 1992 after gaining independence. Subsequent shuffles occurred with changes to membership in the European Community—later the EU—but for the last quarter of the 20th century, the IBSFC was the main arena for all border states to come together in an effort to effectively manage Baltic fish stocks.

part because EU CFP subsidies played a major role in exacerbating this problem in the past (European Commission 2009: 20).

The contemporary “entry/exit scheme” stipulates that capacity, measured in tonnage, is not allowed to rise above the level of January 1, 2003 (European Commission n.d.: 1)⁵. All EU fishing vessels are now registered in a Community Fleet Register, and are monitored closely. In addition, EU Member States have gone through decommissioning programs that use EU funds to actively reduce the capacity of their fishing fleet. Since accession, Poland’s fishing capacity has decreased by over 40% through incentive programs (Department of Fisheries 2011: 1; Table 1). The Polish fleet is now commonly described as, “among the smallest in the EU” (Farnet 2010: 1).

Poland would seem to be an example of capacity reduction success. However, this is a contested issue in Poland, because it is unclear that decommissioning schemes in Poland have had the positive results intended (Kuzebski, Marciniak 2009: 50-55 and 105; European Court of Auditors 2011). Successful or not, capacity reduction schemes have impacted the entire Polish fleet, and likely play a role in how fishers perceive management.

Table 1. Annual change in fleet capacity for Poland since EU accession

Year	Number Active Vessels	Total Gross Tonnage (GT)	Total Engine Power (KW)
2004	1283	58.882	160.984
2005	1134	40.564	130.896
2006	930	33.189	104.344
2007	888	31.690	101.233
2008	853	29.777	95.558
2009	837	41.031	98.950
2010	795	37.042	87.152
2011	796	37.408	87.268
2012	787	33.333	82.519
2013	812	33.501	82.017

(Data Source: Europa 2013)

A second overarching regulatory issue affecting socio-political sentiment of Polish fishers since 2004 has been the management of quota distribution for Baltic Sea cod stocks. The Atlantic cod is one of the most widespread and universally relevant species in European history. The twentieth century was marked by a drastic decline in cod stocks throughout the geographic range of this species due to overfishing, environmental changes, and short-sighted management schemes (Hilborn, Litzinger 2009).

⁵ In order to allow for changes, but not increases, within fleets: “Under the EU CFP, any new capacity entering a Member State’s fleet must be matched by the withdrawal of capacity of at least the same amount. At the same time, as a general rule, capacity leaving the fleet with public aid cannot be replaced. This ensures that the capacity reductions brought about through decommissioning programmes are definitive. However, it is permitted for Member States to rebuild 4% of the tonnage that had been decommissioned with public aid if the increase is designed to improve on-board safety, working conditions, hygiene or product quality. Member States have to give priority to small-scale fishing vessels when applying this derogation” (European Commission n.d.).

Cod stocks in the Baltic are no exception to this phenomenon (Eero et al. 2011; Eero, Koster, and Vinther 2012).

In 2009, the environmental organization BalticSea2020 released an educational film titled, “For Cod’s Sake” (BalticSea2020 2009). The film highlights the plight of cod stocks in the Baltic, and the fisheries that depend on them. It focuses on real-life examples of fishers from both Poland and Sweden, and addresses issues such as illegal fishing and discards. For Poles, this film became a contested issue soon after its release.

The main Polish subject in the film is a fisher named Marcin Cholewiński, from Darłowo/Darłówko. He is taped illegally fishing, and portrayed as a stubborn fisher, who neither understands nor has interest in scientific facts about depleted fish stocks. The film prompted angry responses from Polish fishers and Polish Member of European Parliament, Marek Gróbarczyk, who spoke out against it being shown in the European Parliament (Sandecki 2010; Nasz Dziennik 2010). Many Poles found the film offensive because it portrayed Polish fishers in a negative light that has increasingly become standard since an illegal fishing scandal in 2006.

In 2005 and 2006, the European Commission sent inspectors to each EU Member State on the Baltic in order to check for discrepancies between national inspections of cod catches and their own findings. This was a pre-cursor to the larger Multi-Annual Plan (MAP) to improve the biological health of cod stocks in the Baltic (Eur-Lex 2007). In the inspection test, Poland was determined to have the least reliable catch registration system on the Baltic (European Commission 2007: 17). In 2006 Grzegorz Hałubek—president of the Polish Fisherman’s Association (ZRP)—explained:

All Polish fishermen fish above their quotas forced upon them by the EU Commission, because if they would abide by the quotas the fishermen would die of hunger...nobody abides by the quotas, therefore the (Polish) fisheries inspectors have stopped inspecting. A few years ago they still controlled the landings. Bribes were common. Not anymore, since they would have to prosecute all Polish fishermen, and no authority would like to have such a problem (Fisheries Secretariat 2011).

As a fisheries advocate and a fisher himself, Hałubek highlighted the scope of this regulatory problem. But his comments seem to have solidified a belief that Polish fishers are non-compliant within the regulatory system. The Commission’s response was to close Polish cod fisheries completely between July and December of 2007, and to lower the Polish cod quota by 5% for 2008 (Camilleri 2007).

Polish cod fishers were outraged at the closure. Some argued that the statistical data used by the Commission were inconclusive and flawed. And many were frustrated that (larger-scale) fishers from other states, like Sweden, were allowed to continue fishing in Polish waters. An estimated 56 Polish fishers protested by going out to sea during the ban, which resulted in harsh sanctions from the Commission for each vessel (Bierndgarski 2011). Some of the accused illegal fishers paid the fines, but many did not. The protesters then moved on to Warsaw, and to Brussels.

Grzegorz Hałubek (leader of the ZRP, referenced above) was appointed as the Polish Fisheries Minister in 2007, and was sympathetic to the protest movement (Bierndgarski 2007). The Polish Ministry of Maritime Economy did their best to avoid the matter altogether, releasing the statement: “The ministry is not talking the fishermen into breaking the rule but the ministry does not intend to punish them either” (SACN 2007). This prompted the director of the Sea Fisheries Institute (MIR), the largest fisheries research facility in Poland, to resign (SACN 2007).

The 2007 protests and the fines imposed upon the participants continue to be a contentious issue in Poland (Bierndgarski 2011; Figus 2012). Fishers who did not pay

their fines in full right away out of protest or based on inability are now faced with bankruptcy. Some owe as much as 350,000 PLN (Trubicka-Czapka 2011). The current Fisheries Department at the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development upholds the Commission's original sanction. Hałubek is no longer the Fisheries Minister, but continues to lead the ZRP. Fishers (mainly members of the ZRP) continue to protest throughout Poland regularly, and a resolution to this problem seems far away (Trubicka-Czapka 2011; Gość: gool 2011).

Figure 3. Rewal, fall 2011



(Photo by Billie Delaney)

The 6-month cod closure of 2007 was followed by the implementation of a three-year lottery system, called "*Trójpólówka*," by the Polish government (Fisheries Secretariat 2011). The *Trójpólówka* was a short-term stock recovery plan in place from January of 2009 to December 2011, in which only one third of the eligible Polish cod fleet was allowed to fish each year, using individual quotas allocated to each vessel. The other two-thirds of the fleet were compensated financially to stay in port. This system was meant to allow fishers to maintain their livelihoods while also allowing the cod stock some time for recovery.

Trójpólówka finished in December of 2011, and all vessels were allowed to begin fishing again in 2012. But due to the restrictions of the Multi-Annual Plan for Baltic Sea cod put into place in 2007, the national cod quota cannot be raised by more than 15% annually (European Commission 2009). This means that essentially the same quota that supported only one third of the fleet each year during the *Trójpólówka* must be shared between all.

Throughout much of communist rule Polish Baltic Sea fishers were making higher incomes than people in other careers, enjoying more freedom and prestige than other jobs. Fishers on the Baltic had an imperfect but existing support system in the form of cooperatives. Entering the EU and the EU CFP changed a lot for Polish fishing communities. A regulatory vacuum created during the nineties has had negative effects on contemporary management strategies—affecting transparency, compliance, and data collection. Today many Polish fishers feel disenfranchised and the fishing heritage of their communities is in uncertain and unstable states. Fishers now generally express a low level of support for policy changes. Transition not only from communism to democracy, but also from fledgling democracy to EU membership, has led to fatigue throughout the Polish fishing fleet.

4. Conclusions

Exploring the characteristics of socio-political attitudes towards fisheries management is a key part of making sense of what it really means for Polish fishers to be members of the EU CFP. The historical reality of Polish fishing and the theoretical basis of transition fatigue in CEE both point to a need to treat Polish fisheries differently—to expect a low level of support for new policies, regulations, and rules. In addition, recent qualitative fieldwork (Figus 2012) confirms that a high degree of skepticism towards the EU CFP is present throughout the fleet.

Under the post-WWII communist regime, the Baltic Sea fleet constituted only a fraction of Poland's national fishing capacity. But the Baltic Sea has always been the heart of the Polish fishing industry; it was, and still is, where young people attend school to become maritime professionals. It is on the Baltic that the high-seas fishers and vessel captains of the post-War era first trained for their voyages. That high seas fleet is all but non-existent today. The Baltic fleet is still here, but it is struggling.

Adjusting to the EU CFP regime has not been easy for Polish fishers. EU-wide goals to reduce overcapacity have drastically altered the composition of the Polish Baltic Sea fleet, while capacity remains an unresolved issue (Kuzebski, Marciniak 2009; European Court of Auditors 2011; Figus 2012; Eur-Lex 2012). Increased attention by the EU to controlling cod fishing on the Baltic has also highlighted ongoing problems in the Polish regulatory system. But the historical context of the Polish reality places it as a post-communist CEE country, and this has left Polish fishers poorly prepared to deal with EU rhetoric. For many fishers the more “control” the EU attempts to gain over fisheries, the more the system feels like the old communist regime (Figus 2012).

Figure 4. Cutters in Ustka, fall 2011



(Photo by Billie Delaney)

CFP Reform Watch—an online database created by members of the European Parliament—points out:

No one is happy with [CFP] achievements and Member States, fishermen, environmentalists, scientists and third countries all agree with the need for fundamental reform. The CFP has failed to ensure the EU fisheries are environmentally, economically or socially sustainable (CFP Reform Watch 2009).

Over 80% of European fish stocks are categorized as “overfished” based on available data, and few actors may be said to be profiting in the long-term through the EU CFP policy scheme (CFP Reform Watch 2009). The transferable fishing concessions system proposed during the 2009 EU CFP reform cycle is one effort to solve ongoing problems with overcapacity and commercial cod fishing quota regulations. However, in the Polish fishing industry, both socialist and free market management strategies have failed to produce lasting stability. Through the cod MAP, the EU has succeeded in increasing control and organization in the Polish fishery, but some fishers argue that this has come at the cost of long-term health of fish stocks and the fleet (Figus 2012).

While in Darłówko in October 2011, I learned that Marcin Cholewiński (the fisher shown in “For Cod’s Sake”) comes from a family of artisanal fishers, who sell their product locally in the port. I found his father and sister at work in the family fish shop. Marcin’s fishing vessel, DAR-55, was sitting in the harbor because he had already had a turn in the *Trójpółówka*. At 8.88 meters long it is only just long enough to be regulated under the cod MAP. The effects of any illegal fishing done on DAR-55 could not be more than a symbolic offense on the national scale. For Marcin, it was more likely an assertion of a long-term sense of stewardship over the area, and the freedom to harvest resources from the Sea in order to provide for his family. I cannot know for sure, though, because I was not able to speak with him.

The question remains: What role might the transition fatigue phenomenon play in the potential success or failure of the implementation of transferable fishing concessions in Poland? In the case of Poland, fish are a resource in an industry that looks drastically different today than it did during communist rule. There is an overall discontent with the process of transition throughout CEE (Rovelli, Zaiceva 2009: 3), and there is a more specified discontent with the EU CFP within the Polish fishing fleet (Figus 2012: 100). Transferable fishing concessions are viewed by some stakeholders in Polish fisheries as the privatization of a public resource, and part of a process that increasingly focuses on controlling the actions of individual fishers. Many fishers in Poland do not trust that further regulatory changes will be beneficial (Figus 2012). The “excitement” of transition in Poland has turned into fatigue. This means that regulatory change within existing EU institutions should not be expected to enjoy high levels of support. In light of a planned transition to transferrable fishing concessions in the future, policy-makers should account for “transition fatigue” during the implementation process.

Bibliography

- BalticSea2020 (2009), “For Cod’s Sake” [Film, Directed by Folke Ryden]. Save OUR BALTIC SEA: A 10 year media project about the Baltic Sea environment. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from <http://www.saveourbalticsea.com/index.php/cod-full-version>
- Bierndgarski, H. (2007, August 29), “Pomorze. Grzegorz Hałubek nowym ministrem do spraw rybołówstwa.” *Naszemiasto.pl*. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from http://gdynia.naszemiasto.pl/archiwum/1513978,pomorze-grzegorz-halubek-nowym-ministrem-do-spraw,id,t.html#czytaj_dalej
- Bierndgarski, H. (2011, September 26), “Rybacy blokują drogi, bo nie chcą płacić kar za przełowienie dorszy.” *Gazeta Mój Biznes*. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from <http://wyborcza.biz/Firma/2029020,101618,10359087.html>

- Camilleri, I. (2007, November 28), "Polish fishermen want Joe Borg's head." *Times of Malta*. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from <http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20071128/local/polish-fishermen-want-joe-borgs-head>
- CFP Reform Watch (2009, December 17), What is the CFP? CFP Reform Watch; Follow the common fisheries policy online. Retrieved April 24, 2012, from <http://cfp-reformwatch.eu/2009/12/what-is-the-cfp/>
- Department of Fisheries (2011), POLAND: Annual report on the efforts to achieve a sustainable balance between fishing capacity and fishing opportunities. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Retrieved 13 June 2013, from http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/software/FleetManagement/FM_Reporting/AnnualReportDocs/2011_POL_MSAR_EN.PDF
- Eero, M., MacKenzie, B. R., Koster, F. W., Gislason, H. (2011), „Multi-decadal responses of a cod (*Gadus morhua*) population to human-induced trophic changes, fishing, and climate”, *Ecological Applications* 1(21): 214-226.
- Eero, M., Koster, F. W., Vinther, M. (2012), "Why is the Eastern Baltic cod recovering?", *Marine Policy* 36: 235-240.
- Eur-Lex (1983, September 26), Proposal for a Council Decision On the withdrawal by the European Community from the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources in the Baltic Sea and Belts. Bilingual display. Brussels.
- Eur-Lex (2007), Council Regulation (EC) No 1098/2007 of 18 September 2007 establishing a multiannual plan for the cod stocks in the Baltic Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks, amending Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 779/97. Official Journal L 248 P. 0001 – 0010. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:248:0001:01:EN:HTML>
- Eur-Lex (2012), Report from the Commission to the Council on the implementation of the Polish National Action Plan under Regulation No 338/2008 providing for the adaptation of cod fishing quotas to be allocated to Poland in the Baltic Sea (Subdivisions 25-32, EC waters) 2008-2011/*COM/2012/0706final*/. Retrieved June 10, 2013, from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0706:FIN:EN:HTML>
- Europa (2013), Fleet Register on the NeT. Retrieved June 12, 2013, from <http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet/index.cfm>
- European Commission (n.d.), Entry-exit: preventing fleet expansion. Fact Sheet. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/documentation/publications/cfp_factsheets/fleet_en.pdf
- European Commission (2007, January 24), Evaluation Report of Catch Registration in Baltic-Sea Member States 2005-2006. Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime Affairs. Unit D2. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from <http://www.fishsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Evaluation-Report-on-Catch-Registration-in-the-Baltic-Sea.pdf>
- European Commission (2009), The Common Fisheries Policy: A User's Guide. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- European Commission (2013), "Reform Package." Retrieved June 9, 2013, from www.ec.europa.eu/fisheries/reform/docs/tfc_en.pdf
- European Court of Auditors (2011), Have EU measures contributed to adapting the capacity of the fishing fleets to available fishing opportunities? Special Report No 12. Retrieved 13 June 2013, from <http://eca.europa.eu/portal/pls/portal/docs/1/10544728.PDF>
- FAO (2012), Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles, Poland. Fisheries and Aquaculture Department. Retrieved on April 21, 2012, from http://www.fao.org/fishery/countrysector/FI-CP_PL/en
- FAO (2013), Fishery and Aquaculture Country Profiles: Poland Capture Production. Retrieved June 8, 2013, from <http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/173/en>

- Farnet (2010, May 26), Axis 4 Factsheet: Poland [Brochure]. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from [https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:VU8bi1vCKeJ\]:https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/cms/farnet/sites/default/files/documents/Axis_4_Poland.pdf](https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:VU8bi1vCKeJ]:https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/cms/farnet/sites/default/files/documents/Axis_4_Poland.pdf)
- Figus, E. (2012, May), *Silent Voices: The Polish Baltic Sea commercial fleet seven years after accession to the European Union* [Master's Thesis]. Jagiellonian University: Krakow, Poland.
- Fisheries Secretariat, The (2011, September 30), "Polish fishermen protest 2007 sanctions illegal cod fishing." FISH. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from <http://www.fishsec.org/2011/09/30/polish-fishermen-protest-2007-sanctions-for-illegal-cod-fishing/>
- Geology.com (2013), Europe Map—Europe Satellite Image. Retrieved 10 June 2013, from <http://geology.com/world/europe-satellite-image.shtml>
- Geology.com (2013a), Poland Map—Poland Satellite Image. Retrieved 10 June 2013, from <http://geology.com/world/poland-satellite-image.shtml>
- Gość: gool (2011, October 2), "Hałubek to nieszczęście rybaków." Trójmiasto—Opinie i komentarze. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/w,769,129351980,129376836,Halubek_to_nieszczescie_rybakow.html
- Hilborn, R., Litzinger E. (2009), "Causes of Decline and Potential for Recovery of Atlantic Cod Populations", *The Open Fish Science Journal* 2: 32-38.
- Jentoft, S., Marciniak, B. (1991), "Burning Bridges? Polish Fisheries Co-operatives in Times of Transition", *MAST* 2(4): 72-86.
- Kuzebski, E., Marciniak, B. (2009, October), *Less Boats-more fish? Socio-economic consequences of capacity reduction programmes in the Baltic Sea*, Warsaw: WWF Poland.
- Mansfield, B. (2011), "Modern' industrial fisheries and the crisis of overfishing", in: Peet, R., P. Robbins, and M. Watts (eds.), *Global Political Ecology*, London: Routledge: 84-99.
- Marciniak, B., Jentoft, S. (1997), "Fisheries management in post-communist Poland: prospects of user-participation", *Ocean and Coastal Management* 1(34): 73-79.
- Mungiu, A. (2007), "EU Accession Is No 'End of History'", *Journal of Democracy* 4(18): 8-16.
- Nasz Dziennik (2010, February 2), "List europośla Marka Gróbarczyka do przewodniczącego Parlamentu Europejskiego Jerzego Buzka", Retrieved on April 23, 2012, from <http://www.naszdziennik.pl/index.php?dat=20100202&typ=po&id=po31.txt>
- Plattner, M. F., Diamond, L. J. (2007), "Is East-Central Europe Backsliding?", *Journal of Democracy* 4(18): 5-6.
- Rovelli, R., Zaiceva, A. (2009), "Transition fatigue? Cross-country evidence from micro data", *IZA discussion papers*, No. 4224, <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:101:1-2009062250>.
- Rupnik, J. (2007), "From Democracy Fatigue to Populist Backlash", *Journal of Democracy* 4(18): 17-25.
- Rupnik, J. (2010), "In Search of a New Model", *Journal of Democracy*, 1(21): 105-112
- SACN (2007, September 28), "Poland Defies EU Fishing Ban." SACN. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from <http://www.sacn.org.uk/print/338.html>
- Sandecki, M. (2010, February 8), "Rybacy: Nie jesteśmy pijakami. Jedziemy do Brukseli" *Gazeta.pl* Trójmiasto. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from http://trojmiasto.gazeta.pl/trojmiasto/1,49422,7540013,Rybacy_Nie_jestesmy_pijakami_Jedziemy_do_Brukseli.html
- Trubicka-Czapka, K. (2011, September 29), "Protest w Gdańsku: Rybacy walczą o uchylene im kar", *Dziennik Bałtycki*. Retrieved April 23, 2012, from <http://www.dziennikbaltycki.pl/artukul/456310,protest-w-gdansk-rybacy-walczą-o-uchylene-im-kar,2,id,t,sa.html>
- UiO (n.d.), International national key players in Baltic Sea fisheries. Ratifications .pdf file. Retrieved October 2, 2013, from <http://www.ccb.se/downloads/Keyplayers.pdf>