@ARTICLE{Grobler_Adam_Pascal’s_2023,
 author={Grobler, Adam},
 number={No 4},
 pages={219-234},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2023},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={In the lights of the contemporary use of the theory of probability Pascal’s assumption about non-zero chance of God’s existence is invalid. Rather, to be exact, we must say that this probability either equals zero or is indeterminate. I argue that Søren Kierkegaard may have anticipated this consequence in his critique of Pascal’s Wager. This line of reasoning can be interpreted as a proof that the probability of the eternal reward is infinitesimally small, which consequently means that its expected utility is indeterminate. If, however, we decide to rely on the prospect theory the expected utility of the eternal reward will be relative and therefore not necessarily infinite. This calls into question Pascal’s Wager even if we accept William James’s argument that undermines Kierkegaard’s critique by pointing to the cultural relativity. In the next step, I consider two other possibilities of justifying the assumption about non-zero probability of the eternal reward: one expressed in terms of the prospect theory, the other in terms of epistemic contextualism. I argue that both options must be rejected, and finally, as a last resort, I consider the possibility of justifying Pascal’s Wager solely in terms of the supposed impact of religious faith on the utility of temporal life. I conclude, however, that this impact is ambivalent.},
 title={Pascal’s Wager, Kierkegaard’s Wager, James’s Wager: Meanders of Probability and Utility},
 type={Artykuł},
 URL={http://journals.pan.pl/Content/134636/PDF/2023-04-PFIL-15.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2023.148657},
 keywords={contemporary use of probability, maximization of expected utility, Pascal’s Wager, prospect theory, psychology of religion},
}