@ARTICLE{Ziemińska_Renata_Self-consciousness_2020,
 author={Ziemińska, Renata},
 number={No 2},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 pages={91-102},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2020},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={In the skeptical tradition self-consciousness was transparent and it served as a basis for expressing doubts and developing arguments leading to certainty. After the linguistic and naturalistic turns, contemporary philosophy developed skeptical arguments against certainty and epistemic priority of the data of self-consciousness (both reflective and pre-reflective). Self-reflection reports on the stream of consciousness ex post, but the reports are meager and dependent on subject’s conceptual scheme, while the pre- -reflective data is unclear. Two contemporary skeptical hypotheses have been developed: H. Putnam’s content externalism hypothesis and so-called Kripkenstein’s quus hypothesis. I put forth the question what kind of self is immune to erroneous misidentification. The immunity seems to be limited to the contentless self, reducible to the pre-discursive feeling of one’s own existence. There is no guarantee that any content whatsoever can be attributed to self without error. I cannot negate that I exist any more than I can negate that something external exists, but any description of either is fallible. So the content of self-consciousness is not in an epistemically better position than the content of external perception.},
 type={Artykuły / Articles},
 title={Self-consciousness and skepticism},
 URL={http://journals.pan.pl/Content/116309/PDF/2020-02-PFIL-05-Zieminska.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2020.133139},
 keywords={pre-reflective self-consciousness, minimal self, epistemic priority, content externalism, Kripkenstein’s quus, immunity to error through misidentification},
}