@ARTICLE{Markwart_Anna_On_2020,
 author={Markwart, Anna},
 number={No 3},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 pages={119-132},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2020},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={Sophie de Grouchy in her Letters on sympathy analyses the notion of sympathy, as a starting point using a critique of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments. She also points out that sympathising with other people’s joys brings us pleasure, other people’s good experiences make us happy (especially if we are the ones who contribute to their well-being) and we want to see other people happy and not suffering. As she assumes, we naturally seek other people’s well-being and not their harm. De Grouchy underlines the role of imagination and reason, discerning coincidental good deeds and those that are an effect of intended actions. The paper aims to reconstruct a way in which de Grouchy seeks the grounds for morality in sympathy that is based on feeling and observation of physical pain and pleasure. This presentation of her theory that Polish readers are not closely accustomed with is a good starting point to inquire whether the argumentation presented by the author of the Letters on sympathy is coherent within her theory and whether it has proper justification.},
 type={Artykuły / Articles},
 title={On the grounds for morality in Sophie de Grouchy’s philosophy},
 URL={http://journals.pan.pl/Content/117075/PDF/2020-03-PFIL-10-Markwart.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2020.133979},
 keywords={S. de Grouchy, sympathy, imagination, universal grounds for morality, pleasure, pain, A. Smith},
}