@ARTICLE{Czerniawski_Krzysztof_Antirealism,_2021,
 author={Czerniawski, Krzysztof},
 number={No 1},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 pages={43-69},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2021},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={Antirealism is often regarded by philosophers as a model example of contemporary anti‑Cartesianism, chiefly because of the argumentation by Hilary Putnam presented in his Brains in a Vat and deeply rooted in antirealist semantics. But if we look closer, relations between Cartesianism and antirealism cannot be reduced to an opposition but are much more complex. Like Cartesianism, antirealism also attaches great significance to methodology universal for all philosophy, although antirealist ‘philosophy of thought’, contrary to its Cartesian counterpart, is antipsychological and boils down to Wittgensteinian philosophy that interprets language as something inherently public. But Dummettian antirealism contains also a Fregean concept of systematic theory of meaning, which should provide clear view of language rules and give us an ability to correct our imperfect language practice. For Wittgenstein and Putnam, who view this practice as the essence of language, this kind of attempt to correct language from outside is unacceptable. In this matter, Michael Dummett seems to be rather in harmony with the Cartesian ideal of thought as pure and distinct, and with the program of detached rationality. This impression is strengthened by his demand to adopt a ‘full‑blooded’ theory of meaning. Moreover, as it has been noted by Timothy Williamson, antirealism demands luminosity of meaning, which makes you wonder if it is not, like Cartesianism, one more case of epistemological foundationalism. These problems of antirealism seem to suggest strong internal tensions arising from an attempt, not entirely successful, to unify the thought of later Wittgenstein with more traditional rationalisms of Descartes and Frege.},
 type={Artykuły / Articles},
 title={Antirealism, Cartesianism and world},
 URL={http://journals.pan.pl/Content/119755/2021-01-PFIL-03-Czerniawski.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2021.136779},
 keywords={antirealism, Cartesianism, M. Dummett, G. Frege, H. Putnam, T. Williamson, L. Wittgenstein},
}