@ARTICLE{Grobler_Adam_On_2021,
 author={Grobler, Adam},
 number={No 4},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 pages={195-206},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2021},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={In the paper John Rawls’s account of desert that serves as a premise of the difference principle is questioned. According to Rawls no merits can be located in the self because they arise from random genetic and social factors. Consequently, an individual does not deserve any appreciation for the virtues that can be attributed to them. Against this view I argue, in the first place, that the asymmetry between distributive and retributive justice, as it is professed by Rawls, is not tenable. Next, I question Rawls’s radical separation of the self from its attributes. I argue that random factors are not the only source of the attributes of the self. A person, regardless of her endowment, is able intentionally to develop new meritorious qualities and even transform her character and thereby earn personal deserts. The latter, however, cannot be credited to the individual alone, for they arise from shared aspirations and communal social transactions. In conclusion a reconciliation between the difference principle and a version of desertism is proffered.},
 type={Artykuły / Articles},
 title={On desert‑attribution},
 URL={http://journals.pan.pl/Content/121749/PDF/2021-04-PFIL-11-Grobler.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2021.138981},
 keywords={desert, desertism, difference principle, distributive and retributive justice, J. Rawls, self/person},
}