@ARTICLE{Nowak_Marek_John_2021,
 author={Nowak, Marek},
 number={No 4},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 pages={315-333},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2021},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={In the Two Concepts of Rules (1955) John Rawls presents the following distinction between two concepts of rules governing human action: a rule as summary of past decisions versus a rule defining a practice. The latter concept was incorporated by John Searle (1964, 1969, 1991, 1995) as the key element of his ontology of social facts. For, according to Searle, a rule of such type is used to create a new practice or institution, and consequently, a new kind of conduct in the framework of such institution. Usually (but not always) a sentence expressing such a rule is a definition of special kind with an unexpected feature: what has been defined is a creation of the definition / of the author. The present paper is an attempt to reveal the essential contribution of Rawls to the early stage of development of Searle’s social ontology as well as an attempt to present its development from 1964 onward until the appearance of its full blooded version in 1995. Moreover, particular attention is devoted to the concept of Searle’s definition of institutional object. The special features of the definition indicate the need to distinguish a fourth concept of ‘definition’, a ‘creative definition’, over the three proposed by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz in his Three concepts of definition (1958).},
 type={Artykuły / Articles},
 title={John Rawls – author of social ontology?},
 URL={http://journals.pan.pl/Content/121758/PDF-MASTER/2021-04-PFIL-20-Nowak.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2021.138990},
 keywords={brute fact, collective intentionality, constitutive rule, institutional fact, rules of a practice, social fact, summary rules},
}