@ARTICLE{Krzak_Mariusz_The_2023, author={Krzak, Mariusz}, volume={vol. 39}, number={No 1}, journal={Gospodarka Surowcami Mineralnymi - Mineral Resources Management}, pages={149-171}, howpublished={online}, year={2023}, publisher={Komitet Zrównoważonej Gospodarki Surowcami Mineralnymi PAN}, publisher={Instytut Gospodarki Surowcami Mineralnymi i Energią PAN}, abstract={Mineral-resource mining is a pillar of many state economies and, in many cases, it determines the welfare of the society. The mining of mineral resources provides the market with the raw materials that are traded and drives the economic and social development of countries, although it can also be a source of tensions and crises (e.g. the “curse of wealth”, “Dutch disease”). The trade of raw materials is conducted by exchanges, bilateral deals and other forms of transactions, and is regulated by trade regulations and contract agreements, and in most cases, constitutes a source of income for exporters. In this paper, the use of game-theory modelling for creating the selling price of mineral products on the basis of Polish export quotas for refined copper raw materials is proposed. Using a characteristic function created on the basis of reported export values, possible cooperation arrangements are defined and solutions are calculated for an n-person game of hypothetical coalitions of the major (in terms of volume) recipients of refined Polish copper, i.e. Germany, Italy and France. Alternative markets and possible supplies of cheaper raw material are excluded from the analyses, while the price spread between the rates paid by the buyers is taken into consideration. Among the many possibilities, the game core, the Shapley imputation and the Gately point are arbitrarily adopted as permissible solutions to the defined system. The obtained results are used for a speculative analysis relating to the possibility of renegotiating prices between the producer and recipients of the raw material. Marginal contributions resulting from Shapley’s solution are taken into account as is the power of individual trading-participant coalitions. The paper demonstrates that the recognition and adoption of solutions based on the n-personnel game model as impartial would require the redefinition of contracts and the rates paid for the raw material.}, type={Article}, title={The selling price of raw material surpluses in an n-person market game model – exemplified by copper raw materials}, URL={http://journals.pan.pl/Content/126721/PDF-MASTER/Krzak.pdf}, doi={10.24425/gsm.2023.144631}, keywords={raw-material trade, n-person game, Shapley value, Gately point}, }