@ARTICLE{Stępnik_Andrzej_Russell’s_2022,
 author={Stępnik, Andrzej},
 number={No 4},
 journal={Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria},
 pages={319-335},
 howpublished={online},
 year={2022},
 publisher={Komitet Nauk Filozoficznych PAN},
 publisher={Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego},
 abstract={The article analyzes Bertrand Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description contained in his writings from 1910 to 1912. I point to some problems that arise from Russell’s concept of direct knowledge if they are observed in the light of modern psychological and neuroscientific research. In some cases knowledge by acquaintance may be mediated by certain unconscious operations and by mental representations of conceptual nature. I point out however that some of the examples given in The Problems of Philosophy can be characterized by a different degree of indirectness. Consequently, I propose to view Russell’s distinction as a typology. Because Russell narrows knowledge by description to specific descriptions, Russell’s division is not exhaustive and therefore is not a logical one. The article also shows that there are reasons for both narrowing his category of direct knowledge (e.g. by excluding universals) and for expanding it (e.g. by unconscious experiences).},
 type={Artykuł},
 title={Russell’s division into knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description in the light of contemporary research},
 URL={http://journals.pan.pl/Content/129816/2022-04-PFIL-20.pdf},
 doi={10.24425/pfns.2022.143866},
 keywords={acquaintance, direct knowledge, foundationalism, knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge by description, B. Russell},
}