This commentary on the Court of Justice’s ruling in the Pawlak case concentrates on questions of the judicial application of EU law, in particular EU Directives. On the basis of the recent jurisprudence of the Court the authors present three issues: 1) the incidental effects of EU law for the procedural provisions of Member States; 2) the inability to rely on an EU directive by a member state’s authority in order to exclude the application of national provisions which are contrary to a directive; 3) the limits of the duty to interpret national law in conformity with EU law from the perspective of the Court of Justice and the referring court. Further, the article presents the judicial practice of the Polish Supreme Court, and in particular the follow-up decision of this Court not only taking into the account the ruling of the ECJ but also showing how the limitation of a conforming interpretation can be overcome in order to give full effect to EU law. In the authors’ view, this case is worth noting as an example of judicial dialogue in the EU.

This article concerns constitutional problems related to the implementation of EU directives seen from both the legal and comparative perspectives. The directives are a source of law which share a number of characteristic features that significantly affect and determine the specificity of Member States’ constitutional review of the directives as well as the legal acts that implement them. The review of the constitutionality of EU directives is carried out in accordance with the provisions of national implementing acts. Member States’ constitutional courts adopt two basic positions in this respect. The first position (adopted by, inter alia, the French Constitutional Council and German Federal Constitutional Court) is based on the assumption of a partial “constitutional immunity” of the act implementing the directive, which results in only a partial control of the constitutionality of the implementing acts, i.e. the acts of national law implementing such directives. The second position, (adopted, explicitly or implicitly by, inter alia, the Austrian Federal Constitutional Court, Czech Constitutional Court, Polish Constitutional Court, Romanian Constitutional Court and Slovak Constitutional Court) concerns the admissibility of a full review of the implementing acts. This leads to the admissibility of an indirect review of the content of the directive if the Court examines the provision as identical in terms of content with an act of EU law. Another issue is related to the application of the EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review. The French Constitutional Council case-law on review of the proper implementation of EU directives represents the canon in this regard. Nonetheless, interesting case studies of further uses of EU directives as indirect yardsticks of review can be found in the case law of other constitutional courts, such as the Belgian Constitutional Court or Spanish Constitutional Court. The research presented in this paper is based on the comparative method. The scope of the analysis covers case law of the constitutional courts of both old and new Member States. It also includes a presentation of recent jurisprudential developments, focusing on the constitutional case-law regarding the Data Retention Directive and the Directive on Combating Terrorism.

Wasteful spending of public funds, leading to the creation of “ghost airports”, is often described as a regulatory failure and a major deficiency in European State aid control. It is pointed out that decisions to build or upgrade an airport are often ill-conceived, poorly implemented, and without economic justification. This raises the question whether European law, namely its State aid control system, contains inherent flaws or whether the European Commission’s decision-making process can be improved by increasing reliance on objective economic reasoning under the existing legal framework. This article provides an analysis of the decision-making problems leading to failed aid efforts; of the role of the economic approach in State aids; and of the standard of economic assessment required in State aid cases. The article concludes with de lege ferenda postulates.

This article analyses the relationship between the Court of Justice and other international jurisdictions. In particular, it addresses the following question: To what extent is the Court of Justice ready to accept that some aspects of EU law are subject to the jurisdiction of an international body? The answer to this question requires analysis of the precise scope of the principle of autonomy of EU law as this principle could potentially constitute grounds on the basis of which the Court of Justice excludes the transfer of judicial competences to external bodies. For this reason, the article refers to the most important decisions in the field: Opinions 1/91 and 1/92, Opinion 1/09, Opinion 2/13, judgment in C-146/13 Spain v. Parliament and Council and judgment in C-284/14 Achmea. It also discusses the consequences of the application of Article 344 TFEU.

Hardly any sector has been hit as hard by the COVID-19 pandemic as the air transport industry. As lockdown measures are lifted, a recovery phase begins that will shape the global economic landscape for the years to come. In this context this paper raises the question of whether the pre-existing EU instruments for subsidizing air operations – Startup aid and the Public Service Obligation – none of which was designed with economic recovery in mind – can be adapted to the new circumstances after the current ad hoc measures under the Temporary Framework have dried up. The hypothesis which is taken as a starting point is that the existing state aid toolbox has built-in deficiencies which are hampering recovery efforts. This paper therefore attempts to determine whether alternatives can be sought within the confines of the EU state aid law, and if so what such alternatives might be.

The relevant ruling concerns discrimination based on religion, in particular the question of the incompatibility of national legislation with EU Directive 2000/78. Following a short presentation of the factual background, the opinion of the Advocate General, and the judgment of the Court, the article offers comments on questions raised in the judgment, including the direct horizontal effect of the general principle of non-discrimination. In its previous case law the Court confirmed that the principle has “the horizontal exclusion effect.” However, in Cresco Investigation the question was whether it can be the source of rights for individuals. The ECJ adopted a firm approach, ruling that the general principle of non-discrimination as enshrined in Art. 21(1) of the Charter is sufficient in itself to confer rights on individuals which can be invoked in disputes with other private parties. This means that the Court recognised “the horizontal substitution effect” of the general principle of non-discrimination, which is connected with both setting aside any discriminatory provision of national law and applying to members of the disadvantaged group the same arrangements as those enjoyed by persons in the privileged category. The possible consequences of this approach are discussed in the article.