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In our digitally driven era, safeguarding information has become paramount. Encrypting data is essential for keeping it safe and secure.

The writings of Lyudmila Ulitskaya, one of the most popular contemporary Russian novelists, attracts lots of attention from both Russian and foreign literary critics and scholars. The author’s popularity is also confirmed by the fact that her works have been translated into more than 20 different languages. The main goal of this article is to provide an analysis of the spiritual dimension of the novel The Kukotsky Enigma. At its very essence, the main subject of the study is the plot, which focuses on the anthropological aspect in the context of the transcendental dimension as such, hagiographic motifs and biblical metaphorics. The article also discusses the synthetism of genetic elements appearing in the novel that allowed the writer to combine Christian, mythopoeic, axiological, soteriological and theological contexts. Furthermore, an attempt was made to analyse the characters, considering spiritual and moral values they represent. The intersection of two spheres – the Sacred and the profane – together with the loci associated with them constitute additional object of the research.

We examine Turing’s intriguing claim, made in the philosophy journal Mind, that he had created a short computer program of such a nature that it would be impossible “to discover by observation sufficient about it to predict its future behaviour, and this within a reasonable time, say a thousand years” (Turing, 1950, p. 457). A program like this would naturally have cryptographic applications, and we explore how the program would most likely have functioned. Importantly, a myth has recently grown up around this program of Turing’s, namely that it can be used as the basis of an argument—and was so used by Turing—to support the conclusion that it is impossible to infer a detailed mathematical description of the human brain within a practicable timescale. This alleged argument of Turing’s has been dubbed “Turing’s Wager” (Thwaites, Soltan, Wieser, Nimmo-Smith, 2017, p. 3) We demonstrate that this argument—in fact nowhere to be found in Turing’s work—is worthless, since it commits a glaring logical fallacy. “Turing’s Wager” gives no grounds for pessimism about the prospects for understanding and simulating the human brain.