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Is Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ deontological?

Krzysztof Kędziora

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 207-221 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138982

Keywords deontology J. Rawls teleology theological ethics utilitarianism

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Abstract

In this paper I inquire whether Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ is a deontological concept. By arguing that it is, I place Rawls’s understanding of the deontological nature of his theory of justice in the context of the history of the notion of deontology. I argue that Rawls’s understanding of deontology is based on the choice of (inter)personal relations as the proper subject of ethics. To explicate this idea I draw on Rawls’s senior thesis A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation based on the Concept of Community (1942).

Bibliography

Adams R.M. (2009), The Theological Ethics of the Young Rawls and Its Background, w: J. Rawls, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation based on the Concept of Community with On My Religion, red. T. Nagel, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, s. 24–101.
Bentham J. (1983), Deontology, w: tenże, „Deontology” together with „A Table of Springs of Action” and „The Article on Utilitarianism”, red. A. Goldworth, Oxford: Clarendon Press, s. 117–281.
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Cohen J., Nagel T. (2009), Introduction, w: J. Rawls, A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation based on the Concept of Community with On My Religion, red. T. Nagel, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, s. 1–23.
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Frankena W.K. (1973), Ethics, wyd. 2, New Jersey, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice‑Hall. Freeman S. (1994), Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right, „Philosophy & Public Affairs” 23 (4), s. 313–349.
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Rawls J. (1998), Liberalizm polityczny, przeł. A. Romaniuk, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Rawls J. (2000), Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, red. B. Herman, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls J. (2009a), A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation based on the Concept of Community with On My Religion, red. T. Nagel, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls J. (2009b), Teoria sprawiedliwości. Wydanie nowe, przeł. M. Panufnik, J. Pasek, A. Romaniuk, przekład przejrzał i uzupełnił S. Szymański, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Reidy D.A. (2015), Deontological vs. Teleological Theories, w: J. Mandle, D.A. Reidy (red.), The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, s. 198–201.
Sandel M.J. (1982), Liberalism and Limits of Justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schneewind J.B. (2002), Jeremy Bentham. Introduction, w: tenże (red.), Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, s. 460–462.
Sidgwick H. (1907), The Methods of Ethics, wyd. 7, London: Macmillan and Company.
Timmermann J. (2014), Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, w: B. Eggleston, D. Miller (red.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, s. 239–257.
Timmermann J. (2015), What’s Wrong with „Deontology”, „Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society” 115 (1), s. 75–92.
Weithman P. (2016), Rawls, Political Liberalism and Reasonable Faith, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Authors and Affiliations

Krzysztof Kędziora

1

e-mail:

ORCID:

Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90‑131 Łódź

Institutions and practices: The ontology of John Rawls’s ‘well‑ordered society’

Wojciech Graboń Marcin Woźny

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 335-346 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138991

Keywords institutions practices J. Rawls social ontology „A Theory of Justice”

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to highlight the relationship between normative theory and social ontology through an analysis of John Rawls’s concept of ‘well‑ordered society’. By expressing the ontological assumptions underlying Rawls’s theory, it is possible to better understand the role of practices and institutions in A Theory of Justice and to counter some of the criticisms levelled against Rawls’s institutionalism. The proposed interpretation of Rawls’s theory may be recognized as a contribution to the interactionist approach in the field of social ontology.

Bibliography

Berkey B. (2016), Against Rawlsian Institutionalism about Justice, „Social Theory and Practice” 42 (4), s. 706–732.
Ciszewski W. (2020), Rozum i demokracja. Wprowadzenie do koncepcji rozumu publicznego Johna Rawlsa, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
Cohen G.A. (1997), Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive Justice, „Philosophy & Public Affairs” 26 (1), s. 3–30.
Diver N. (2004), Institutions and Social Justice [nieopublikowana rozprawa doktorska], University of Pennsylvania.
Frega R. (2018), The Social Ontology of Democracy, „Journal of Social Ontology” 4 (2), s. 157–185.
Kwarciński T. (2006), Możliwości czy dobra pierwotne? Dyskusja Amartyi Sena z Johnem Rawlsem na temat właściwej przestrzeni sprawiedliwości, „Roczniki Filozoficzne” 54 (1), s. 81–106.
Mandle J. (2009), Rawls’s „A Theory of Justice”: An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mandle J., Reidy D.A. (red.) (2014), The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Murphy L.B. (1998), Institutions and the Demands of Justice, „Philosophy & Public Affairs” 27 (4), s. 251–291.
Nozick R. (1974), Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books.
Pettit P. (2005), Rawls’s Political Ontology, „Politics, Philosophy & Economics” 4 (2), s. 157–174.
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Sen A. (2009), The Idea of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Authors and Affiliations

Wojciech Graboń

1

e-mail:

ORCID:

Marcin Woźny

2 3

e-mail:

ORCID:

Uniwersytet Warszawski, Szkoła Doktorska Nauk Humanistycznych, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28, 00‑927 Warszawa
Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00‑927 Warszawa
Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Prawa i Administracji, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 26/28, 00‑927 Warszawa

The principle of reciprocity and its role in constructing the political conception of justice according to John Rawls

Dariusz Dańkowski SJ

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 275-292

Keywords capitalism democracy political liberalism J. Rawls reciprocity social justice

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Abstract

The idea that everyone should accept the terms of a contract, provided that others do so, is the core normative idea of John Rawls’s doctrine of social justice, presented in his major books: A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. In the present paper I argue that the principle of reciprocity makes it possible for Rawls to intertwine coherently two competing thought streams in the liberal tradition – the first one focusing on economic equality and the second one rooted in liberty. The idea of reciprocity adopted with the intention of satisfying the ideal of reasonableness in a well‑ordered society is the foundation of a genuine acceptance of the political conception of justice and of the civic ties and civic friendship. However, the historical and cultural analysis supports the conclusion that the Rawls’s project is buttressed by multigenerational experience of the discipline and ethos of the free market economy, which has not been openly endorsed by Rawls. Without support from such experience social solidarity within ethically neutral institutions would be hard to achieve unless it is expressed in terms of communitarian, patriotic or religious values.

Bibliography

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Nozick R. (1999), Anarchia, państwo, utopia, przeł. P. Maciejko, M. Szczubiałka, Warszawa: Fundacja Aletheia.
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Rawls J. (1996), Political Liberalism. Reply to Habermas, w: tenże, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press.
Rawls J. (1998), Liberalizm polityczny, przeł. A. Romaniuk, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Rawls J. (2001a), Collected Papers, red. S. Freeman, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rawls J. (2001b), Prawo ludów. O idei publicznego rozumu raz jeszcze, w: tenże, Prawo ludów, przeł. M. Kozłowski, Warszawa: Fundacja Aletheia.
Rawls J. (2003), Justice as Fairness. A Restatement, red. E. Kelly, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Ziembiński Z. (1992), O pojmowaniu sprawiedliwości, Lublin: Daimonion.

Authors and Affiliations

Dariusz Dańkowski SJ

1

e-mail:

ORCID:

Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie, ul. Kopernika 26, 31‑501 Kraków

A slightly lifted veil of ignorance

Artur Szutta

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 363-379 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138993

Keywords original position principles of justice J. Rawls veil of ignorance

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Abstract

The article discusses Rawls’s idea of the original position. I present two arguments in support of the claim that it is impossible to meet the necessary conditions (proposed by Rawls) for recreating the reasoning that presumably is performed in the original position. I claim therefore that the idea of the original position cannot fulfil its function of justifying the principles of justice. As the solution to the problem I propose a modified version of the original position argument, which can be labeled ‘a slightly lifted veil of ignorance’.

Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

Artur Szutta

1

e-mail:

ORCID:

Uniwersytet Gdański, ul. J. Bażyńskiego 4, 80‑309 Gdańsk

Can we be happy in a poorly‑ordered society, or what is the value of self‑respect according to John Rawls?

Barbara Grabowska

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 107-120 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138977

Keywords happiness justice J. Rawls self‑respect sense of self‑worth

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Abstract

John Rawls claims that self‑respect is arguably the most important of social primary goods. It has two aspects: the sense of self‑worth and confidence in one’s abilities. Both attitudes presuppose formation and completion of a reasonable life plan. Realization of a life plan is a stepping stone to personal achievement and happiness. Self‑respect implies acceptance of two rules of justice. Those rules presuppose an equal distribution of the social prerequisites for the growth of self‑respect. Self‑respect supports the sense of justice as well as political and social stability. A well‑ordered society makes it possible for everyone to achieve self‑respect through realization of an ambitious life plan, in accordance with Aristotelian conception of virtue. Virtue is also a prerequisite of happiness. In a poorly‑ordered society achievement of happiness is thwarted by socio‑economic inequality and artificial restrictions on selection of the life plans.

Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

Barbara Grabowska

1

e-mail:

ORCID:

Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Fosa Staromiejska 1a, 87‑100 Toruń

The problem of envy in the context of principles of justice and Rawls’s construction of the original position

Adrian Kuźniar

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 259-273 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138986

Keywords difference principle egalitarianism envy J. Rawls self‑respect theory of justice

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Abstract

The paper analyses and develops John Rawls’s defence of his theory of justice against the conservative objection that egalitarian conceptions of social justice are an expression of envy. The defence involves the following claims: (1) The content of the difference principle does not match an essential property of envy. (2) The parties in the original position are not motivated by envy. (3) None of the conditions imposed on the original position arise from envy. Next, it is argued that there are reasons to suppose that the parties in the original position would choose a more egalitarian principle of distributive justice than the difference principle. These reasons are grounded in the claim that self respect is the most important primary good and in the fact that the level of economic inequalities is negatively correlated with self respect among the least advantaged members of society. It is shown that even though the content of the more egalitarian principle matches the essential property of envy, the conservative objection remains unjustified.

Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

Adrian Kuźniar

‘Rational’ and ‘reasonable’ in the context of John Rawls’s thought

Ryszard Kleszcz

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 347-362 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138992

Keywords concept of justice Ch. Perelman philosophy of action „Political Liberalism” rational J. Rawls reasonable terminological analyses

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Abstract

The issue of rationality and the term itself appear in the works of John Rawls, for instance in his famous volume A Theory of Justice. At the same time, in another of his books, Political Liberalism, we can find not only the correlated terms ‘rational’, but also the term ‘reasonable’. In that volume Rawls enlightens their meaning. In this article, the author analyses the terms mentioned more closely and reflects on their use in various contexts. The explanatory hypothesis adopted by the author is that the use of these two terms, not just one of them, may enrich our conceptual network and increase the possibilities of analysing the sphere of human action. The aim of the analyses is to confirm this hypothesis and to extract the specific sense of the term ‘reasonable’, and of its use, especially in Rawls’s Political Liberalism.

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Rawls J. (1994), Teoria sprawiedliwości [1971], przeł. M. Panufnik, J. Pasek, A. Romaniuk, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Rawls J. (1998), Liberalizm polityczny [1993], przeł. A. Romaniuk, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Rescher N. (1954), Reasonableness in ethics, „Philosophical Studies” 5, s. 58–62.
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Authors and Affiliations

Ryszard Kleszcz

1

e-mail: ryszard.kleszcz@uni.lodz.pl

ORCID:

Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90-131 Łódź

Political conscience and its natural limits

Joanna Górnicka-Kalinowska

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 247-257 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138985

Keywords institutions justice I. Kant law moral sensitivity rationality J. Rawls rules social contract state

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Abstract

Although John Rawls’s theory is an extensive project of the state structure which also discusses the functions of various democratic institutions, the reader tends naturally to look for something more, namely his opinions about human nature and the psychological underpinnings that ultimately determine men’s and women’s responsibilities in a democratic community. The clues offered by A Theory of Justice are disappointingly scarce, as they tend to blur the distinction between the descriptive and the normative aspects of the problem. Rawls’s analysis of such categories as moral sensitivity, or human motives, or social obligations do not take into account the natural limitations that typically accompany the demands formulated by the just state. Or, to put the same complaint differently, Rawls’s opinions about human nature sound unduly optimistic, if compared, for instance, with Kant’s moral theory to which he makes frequent references.

Bibliography

Feinberg J. (1975), Rawls and Intuitionism, w: N. Daniels (red.), Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ „A Theory of Justice”, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Frankfurt H.G. (1997), Wolność woli i pojęcie osoby, przeł. J. Nowotniak, w: J. Hołówka (red.), Filozofia moralności. Postanowienie i odpowiedzialność moralna, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Spacja – Fundacja Aletheia.
Hobbes Th. (2005), Lewiatan, przeł. Cz. Znamierowski, Warszawa: Fundacja Aletheia.
Kant I. (2005a), Antropologia w ujęciu pragmatycznym, przeł. E. Drzazgowska, P. Sosnowska, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFiS PAN.
Kant I. (2005b), Metafizyka moralności, przeł. E. Nowak, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
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Rousseau J.J. (1966), Umowa społeczna, przeł. A. Peretiatkowicz, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

Authors and Affiliations

Joanna Górnicka-Kalinowska

1

e-mail:

ORCID:

prof. em., Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00‑927 Warszawa

A sensitive society or an effective society? Moral laws of non-personal subjects in the light of John Rawls’s theory of justice

Adriana Schetz

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 293-302 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138988

Keywords animal rights egalitarianism liberalism moral pluralism J. Rawls theory of justice veil of ignorance

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Abstract

My current considerations concern the way in which the category of animals is present in contemporary philosophy, especially if it occurs in the context of moral philosophy and the theory of cognition and mind. These are, I suppose, the areas of inquiry inspiring wide interest, even if we focus on the narrow question of the place of animals in the domains of morality, cognition, and consciousness. Although John Rawls himself approaches these issues with caution, and his interest in these types of problems is marginal, they deserve some philosophical attention. There is a close relationship between the belief that non‑personal living entities such as animals are capable of feeling pain and pleasure on the one hand, and the human sensitivity or social sentience, on the other. We should face the question of what kind of society we want to live in: effective or sensitive. Ethical utilitarianism is in favor of an effective society. It may seem that there is no place for social sensitivity in it, and consequently that public interest is postulated in its place instead. However, I believe that an effective society is more sensitive to the harm done to or the plight suffered by non‑personal subjects than a sensitive society, if the latter is understood as Rawls frames it. Thus, we come to a specific paradox – which I shall refer to as the blunted sentience paradox – that the utilitarian, efficient society criticized by Rawls is in fact more morally sensitive than the egalitarian society he postulates. The paradox of the blunted sentience has its source in Rawls’s egalitarianism, for this egalitarianism is offered only to the chosen. It does not extend to those members of society who extend their care to those creatures whom Rawls denies subjectivity, but whose unhappiness constitutes an important factor in the social life of humanity. I propose to look at the fate of animals in modern society, and if we do so, we will notice some flaws in Rawls’s theory of justice that can perhaps be amended by espousing some aspects of emotivism. This proposed approach avoids what I have called the blunted sentience paradox.

Bibliography

Andrews K. (2020), The Animal Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animal Cognition, New York: Routledge.
Berkey B. (2014), Review of Robert Garner „A Theory of Justice for Animals: Animal Rights in a Nonideal World”, „Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews”, https://ndpr. nd.edu/reviews/a‑theory‑of‑justice‑for‑animals‑animal‑rights‑in‑a‑nonideal‑world/
DeGrazia D. (2002), Animal Rights: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Garner R. (2013), A Theory of Justice for Animals: Animal Rights in a Nonideal World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hobson‑West P., Davies A. (2018), Societal Sentience: Constructions of the Public in Animal Research Policy and Practice, „Science, Technology, and Human Values” 43 (4), s. 671–693.
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Sumpter D.J.T. (2006), The Principles of Collective Animal Behaviour, „Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences” 361 (1465), s. 5–22.

Authors and Affiliations

Adriana Schetz

1

e-mail:

ORCID:

Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Instytut Filozofii i Kognitywistyki, ul. Krakowska 71–79, 71-017 Szczecin

Rawls, political realism and contemporary liberal democracy

Zdzisław Krasnodębski

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 39-55 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138973

Keywords democracy liberal democracy liberalism morality normativity political realism politics J. Rawls

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Abstract

John Rawls’s theory is blamed by political realism for adopting the position of political moralism, i.e. for subordinating politics to morality and understanding political phi-losophy as applied ethics. This article addresses these charges. It addresses a number of issues: How does Rawls understand politics? Does he understand it at all? Does the theory of liberalism realistically describe democracies? What is its normative character? In what sense is it a ‘realist utopia’? By posing these questions this paper analyzes the self‑limiting, restrained character of political liberalism, which is a result of the realistic recognition of the fact of pluralism of reasonable doctrines in modern liberal societies. It is pointed out, however, that liberalism is not conceived as a self‑limiting political liberalism of Rawls, but as a ‘comprehensive doctrine’ that constitutes a unified ideological foundation for modern ‘liberal democracy’. The self‑limitation of liberalism cannot be sustained in this way, however, as is evidenced by the fact that Rawls’s theory attempting to separate the political sphere from the ‘background culture’ has clearly failed.

Bibliography

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Krasnodębski Z. (2011), Cztery sposoby unicestwienia polityki, w: tenże, Większego cudu nie będzie, Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, s. 135–147.
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Authors and Affiliations

Zdzisław Krasnodębski

1 2

e-mail:

ORCID:

Akademia Ignatianum w Krakowie, Instytut Nauk o Polityce i Administracji, ul. Kopernika 26, 31‑501 Kraków
Universität Bremen, FB 8 Sozialwissenschaften, Bibliothekstraße 1, 28359 Bremen, Niemcy

On desert‑attribution

Adam Grobler

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 195-206 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138981

Keywords desert desertism difference principle distributive and retributive justice J. Rawls self/person

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Abstract

In the paper John Rawls’s account of desert that serves as a premise of the difference principle is questioned. According to Rawls no merits can be located in the self because they arise from random genetic and social factors. Consequently, an individual does not deserve any appreciation for the virtues that can be attributed to them. Against this view I argue, in the first place, that the asymmetry between distributive and retributive justice, as it is professed by Rawls, is not tenable. Next, I question Rawls’s radical separation of the self from its attributes. I argue that random factors are not the only source of the attributes of the self. A person, regardless of her endowment, is able intentionally to develop new meritorious qualities and even transform her character and thereby earn personal deserts. The latter, however, cannot be credited to the individual alone, for they arise from shared aspirations and communal social transactions. In conclusion a reconciliation between the difference principle and a version of desertism is proffered.

Bibliography

Bergson H. (2007), Dwa źródła moralności i religii [1932], przeł. P. Kostyło, K. Skorulski, Kraków: Homini.
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Authors and Affiliations

Adam Grobler

1

e-mail:

ORCID:

prof. em., Uniwersytet Opolski, Katedra Filozofii, ul. Katowicka 48, 45‑052 Opole

Rawls’s theory of justice in the light of Iris Marion Young’s critique

Dominika Jacyk

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 233-245 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138984

Keywords legal responsibility political responsibility J. Rawls structural hegemony theory of justice I.M. Young

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Abstract

Iris Marion Young was one of the most inventive political philosophers who responded to John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, published in 1971. This work had brought political philosophy to life in an unprecedented way, and prompted Young, as well as R. Nozick, M. Sandel, M. Walzer, Ch. Taylor and R. Dworkin to engage in penetrating criticisms. The extensive discussion had been triggered by the normative content of the two principles of justice. Young’s analysis did not diminish Rawls’s contribution to the history of socio‑political thought, but rather reinforced the ideas he had formulated. She did not present an alternative view of her own, but extended the original thought by incorporating two elements in the theory: (1) refinement of procedural requirements, (2) revision of the normative content in such a way that it takes into account historical and situational contexts, complementing thereby Rawls’s ‘original position’ through a ‘politics of difference’ that takes into account the reality of unjust differences in the position that various individuals and groups occupy in a society.

Bibliography

Benhabib S. (2006), In Memoriam Iris Marion Young, „Constellation” 13 (4).
Dean J. (2006), In Memoriam Iris Marion Young, „Constellation” 13 (4).
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Maboloc Ch.R. (2015), Difference and Inclusive Democracy: Iris Marion Young’s Critique of the Rawlsian Theory of Justice, „Social Ethics Society Journal of Applied Philosophy” 1 (1).
Uhde Z. (2010), On Sources of Structural Injustice: A Feminist Reading of the Theory of Iris M. Young, „Human Affairs” 20.
Young I.M. (1990), Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Young I.M. (1995), Rawls’s „Political Liberalism”, „The Journal of Political Philosophy” 3 (2).
Young I.M. (2003), Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford Scholarship Online.
Young I.M. (2004), Responsibility and Global Labor Justice, „The Journal of Political Philosophy” 12 (4).
Young I.M., Allen D.S. (2011), Justice and the Politics of Difference, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Authors and Affiliations

Dominika Jacyk

1

e-mail:

ORCID:

Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Koszarowa 3, 51‑149 Wrocław

The question of presuppositions in the theory of justice. Paul Ricoeur’s interpretation of John Rawls

Jarosław Jakubowski

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 223-232 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138983

Keywords circularity considered convictions fairness justice presupposition J. Rawls reflective equilibrium P. Ricoeur

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Abstract

Paul Ricoeur claims that while John Rawls seeks to present his theory of justice as a purely procedural conception, which remains axiologically neutral, it is in fact entangled in certain presuppositions with ethical overtones. In order to bring those presuppositions out we need, according to Ricoeur, to consider that, contrary to appearances, its justification is not inherently linear but undesirably circular. This circularity of the justification of the theory of justice manifests itself in Rawls’s postulate to strive for a ‘reflective equilibrium’, which should reconcile accepted principles of justice with ‘our considered convictions’.

Bibliography

Dupuy J.P. (1988), Les paradoxes de «Théorie de la justice». Introduction à l'oeuvre de John Rawls, „Esprit” 134 (1).
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Mann M.H. (2012), Ricoeur, Rawls and Capability Justice. Civic Phronēsis and Equality, London – New York: Continuum Studies in Political Philosophy.
Michel J. (2006), Paul Ricoeur. Une philosophie de l’agir humain, Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf.
Rawls J. (1994), Teoria sprawiedliwości, przeł. M. Panufnik, J. Pasek, A. Romaniuk, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Ricoeur P. (1950), Philosophie de la volonté, t. 1: Le volontaire et l’involontaire, Paris: Aubier.
Ricoeur P. (1991), Lectures, t. 1: Autour du politique, Paris: Éditions du Seuil. Ricoeur P. (1995), Le Juste, t. 1, Paris: Éditions Esprit.
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Ricoeur P. (2005), Le juste, la justice et son échec, Paris: Éditions de L’Herne.
Welsen P. (2006), Principes de justice et sens de justice. Ricoeur critique du formalisme rawlsien, „Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale” 50 (2).

Authors and Affiliations

Jarosław Jakubowski

1

e-mail:

ORCID:

Uniwersytet Kazimierza Wielkiego, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Ogińskiego 16, 85‑092 Bydgoszcz

Ontology of social being. John Rawls’s theory of justice and political liberalism in the light of Józef M. Bocheński’s theory of systems

Janusz Kaczmarek

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 4 | 303-314 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.138989

Keywords J.M. Bocheński liberalism ontological foundations of political philosophy ontological object ontology of social being political philosophy principles of justice J. Rawls system

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Abstract

The paper attempts to place John Rawls’s social theory in an ontological frame of ideas. Józef M. Bocheński’s theory of systems was chosen to describe social reality without prejudging its role in the adequate theory. By adopting this approach the author presents several issues one by one: the characteristics of political philosophy and its relation to the ontology of social reality, Bocheński’s systems theory, the analysis of the industrial enterprise as a model example of a heterogeneous, dynamic and organic system, and Rawls’s structure of society. All this is done in terms of systems theory. The resulting outcome provides, among other things, a formal definition of Rawls’s basic social structure expressed in the language of systems theory, and it supports the thesis that the synthetic entity responsible for social functioning, such as the state, is correlated with the principles of justice as proposed by Rawls.

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Bocheński J.M. (1986), The Concept of the Free Society, „The Monist” 69 (2), s. 207– 215.
Bocheński J.M. (1993), Przyczynek do filozofii przedsiębiorstwa przemysłowego, przeł. J. Garewicz, w: J.M. Bocheński, Logika i filozofia, red. J. Parys, Biblioteka Współczesnych Filozofów, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
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Authors and Affiliations

Janusz Kaczmarek

1

e-mail:

ORCID:

Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90-131 Łódź

1

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