In the submitted study, the author shows that Paul in the propositio (12,1-2) the section of encouragement (12,3-15,13), although he does not use the word syneidēsis directly, but the words used in it refer to him in conjunction with his basic functions and prove in this way how fundamental it is to renew the mind in the right, i.e. salvifically effective, education of Christian conscience. He does so in the encouragement context to make the recipients aware of how important it is to have a renewed mind and conscience in being and continuing to become a Christian in everyday and concrete living as well as practicing faith in Jesus. With propositio, he makes the foundation on which he builds the paraclesical message of the Letter. It clearly states that permanently renewed by the Gospel of God mind, is an absolute condition for an uninterrupted evangelical renewal of conscience. Thus, renewed in this way conscience is the only deity of mercy granted to sinful humanity, which guarantees constant faithfulness to its norms of judgment with God’s justice revealed in Christ, the Son of God, or his absolute righteousness, which is an indispensable condition for achieving eternal salvation.

The paper tries to defend the thesis that it is impossible to decide upon moral issues without any references to the ontology of the world we live in. An illustrative example of the main argumentation line is the choice made by Cypher—a second plan character in the movie Matrix. Cypher decides to betray human rebels fighting against machines for freedom and, as a reward, accepts affluent life in the virtual reality. His choice seems to be superficially reprehensible because of the abandonment of the real world and authentic life. However, one can argue that the dichotomy between the real and virtual world is seeming. By choosing the virtual reality Cypher decided to act in a world which, like the real world, makes it possible to be a moral subject and enables authentic experience. The difference between both the worlds lies in the type of determination limiting any conscious subject. Cypher prefers to live in a world determined by the algorithm of Matrix more than in a world where his behaviour is determined by genes and other biological factors.

Bogusław Wolniewicz presented his axiological system in four volumes of Filozofia i wartości (“Philosophy and Values”: 1993, 1998, 2003, 2016). For Wolniewicz, just as for his mentor Henryk Elzenberg, axiology is openly assertive and encompasses a painful confrontation of opposite moral beliefs. Wolniewicz’s vision of the reality is gloom, bitter, dramatic and deeply pessimistic. In history he detects unwelcome contributions of demonic powers (Manichaeism), he also believes that human moral character is genetically given and immutable (determinism), that some people are deprived of conscience (dualism), and that the tendency toward evil cannot be reformed (non-meliorism), human reason is not sufficient for a morally good action (voluntarism), while the so-called free will is no more than a manifestation of instincts (irrationalism). Everyone follows their pleasure (hedonism), but not everyone seeks pleasure in the same actions. In particular, some people take pleasure in cruel and destructive behaviour (demonism), while some others mind their own business (utilitarianism), and rare are those who devote themselves to higher values (perfectionism). Religion is a human invention and it emerges as a natural phenomenon in reaction to the fact of mortality. The institution of the Church should nevertheless be honored even by nonbelievers because it supports conservative values. In contemporary Western civilization a crisis can be observed between the conservative part of society (‘right-handed orientation’) and the liberal one (‘left-handed orientation’). Hateful emotions appear on both sides and are dangerous to Western unity. Conservative orientation is attached to the idea of fate, i.e. irrational power that occasionally turns human life into tragedy (fatalism). Wolniewicz’s vision is close to the theology of St. Augustine (original sin, predestination, radical dualism of good and evil) but without a consolation in hope for immortality.

In the author’s opinion the traditional image of a human is incorrect: it is not the rational soul that directs people’s behaviour, but a set of programs (neural applications) recorded in the brain. The ego (sense, awareness, will) is able to block their action as long as the upbringing of the person in question has created the right habits and thus initiated proper programs in the brain. Human (as well as animals) turns out to be a combination of the matter (‘body’), spirit (‘ego’) and abstracts (neural applications). The difference between humans and animals is the complexity of human’s neural software and the ability to pursue the non-utilitarian purposes.

The article presents Peter F. Strawson’s remarks on the free will debate, which he has presented in the essay ‘Freedom and Resentment’. Strawson avoids taking a stance on the question whether the thesis of determinism is correct. Instead he shows the essential difficulties and far reaching consequences of acknowledging this thesis. He recognizes the inseparable connection between freedom and responsibility in the philosophy after Kant. He consequently questions whether we really understand what it would mean to claim that determinism is true. He focuses on what he calls ‘reactiv attitudes’ triggered by the way in which other people behave toward us. Their behavior evokes emotional reaction in us – gratitude, respect, curiosity, but also distrust, resentment, disappointment. Those emotional responses are not purely subjective and they underlie moral judgments and complicated interpersonal relations. We suspend our reactive attitudes towards animals, very small children or people that we think are mentally ill. Instead we adopt objective (psychiatric, scientific) attitudes towards them. But to acknowledge the thesis of determinism implicates that we should treat all people this way. The paper is not so much concerned with an analysis of advantages and weak points of Strawson’s version of compatibilism, but focuses instead on the originality of his contribution to the debate on free will and on his brilliant treatment of reactive attitudes.

W artykule zestawiam ze sobą i zarazem oceniam dwa zupełnie odmienne sposoby ujmowania rzeczywistości moralnej. Immanuel Kant stworzył nie tylko bardzo wymagającą, ale zarazem zawiłą, sztuczną i nieempiryczną etykę. W dodatku jest ona mocno obciążona metafizycznie, a nawet teologicznie. Natomiast Peter Strawson w artykule z 1962 roku dokonał naturalistycznego i realistycznego opisu rzeczywistości moralnej.

The paper summarizes the debate concerning the divine hiddenness argument. First, it presents two versions of the argument that was initially formulated by J.L. Schellenberg and subsequently discussed over the last twenty years and it marks its most important theses. Then the author indicates some possible rebuttals, segregating them according to the challenged premises. Particularly noteworthy, he argues, are these theistic answers that accuse the images of God assumed by the hiddenness argument of excessive anthropomorphism and those that try to point out higher goods justifying divine hiddenness. In conclusion the author claims that the hiddenness argument proves atheism only if by theism one understands theistic personalism. Other positions, such as ultimism or theism of transcendence, are not threatened by the argument.

Akratic actions are usually defined as intentional actions which conflict with the agent’s best judgement. As both irrational and conscious, actions of that type stand in need of an explanation. In this paper I reconstruct and criticize Donald Davidson’s classical standpoint on the problem of akrasia. I show the disadvantages of Davidsonian conception of practical reasoning and I defend the conception of syllogistic reasoning. I also criticize the theory of intention as unconditional normative judgement. Against Davidson’s view, I argue for the theory of intention as an act of will (not a judgement). According to this theory of intention and practical reasoning, akratic actions should be explained as actions caused by an act of will which conflicts with the best judgement. I propose to interpret the inclination of will to conflict or to follow the best judgement by the theory of habitus.