We analyze the medium- and long-run effects caused by an inflow of capital into a labor-abundant country. For that purpose, we incorporate directed technical change into a Heckscher-Ohlin model with a continuum of goods. This provides a comprehensive theory explaining the dynamics of comparative advantage based on differences in effective factor endowments, i.e. factor endowments adjusted by differences in technological levels. Our model constitutes an appropriate framework for understanding, e.g., the empirically observed changes in industrial structures of Central and Eastern European countries. Furthermore, we provide a theoretical foundation for the empirical Prospective Comparative Advantage index with new insights into the future dynamics of comparative advantage. Eventually, we show the importance of research spillovers and state dependence on the process of convergence.
This paper applies a DSGE model to find whether the way of financing QE2 matters for the reaction of the economy. The model includes a segmented bond market structure, thus the large-scale asset purchases may successfully influence the economy. It is shown that the effects on macroeconomic variables are very similar regardless of whether the government finances the purchases by lump-sum taxes or by short-term debt which signifies that the quantitative deviation from Ricardian equivalence introduced by bond market segmentation is insignificant. The redistribution effects caused by financing are noticeable.
This paper attempts to find out whether better quality of investor protection matters for the effect of capital ratio on loan growth of large EU banks in 1996-2011. We focus on several measures of the quality of investor protection with a proven track record in the banking literature, i.e.: anti-self-dealing index, ex-ante-control and ex-post-control of anti-self-dealing indices, and creditor protection rights index. Our results show that better investor protection decreases the procyclical impact of capital on lending. This effect is statistically significant for the ex-post-control index. This is consistent with the view that better shareholders rights reduces bank risk-taking, in particular during economic booms, which results in weakened sensitivity of bank lending to capital ratios in economic downturns. This effect holds for both unconsolidated and consolidated data and is robust to sensitivity checks.
pl
en
