Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

From childhood, Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) was educated in a house where he had contacts with members of the Mersenne Academy. Due to these circumstances he was familiar with the achievements of mathematicians, physicists and other pioneers of the Great Scientific Revolution of 1540–1640. He formulated an important theorem on conic sections, built a mechanical calculator, and together with Pierre de Fermat laid the foundations of the calculus of probability. In physics, he made important research on vacuum and atmospheric pressure. He did not make important theoretical or experimental discoveries in this field, but he played a great historical role because he gave experimental research and theoretical inquiries on these subjects a more systematic form than other physicists of his time. And systematic treatment lies in the nature of science.

The paper is devoted to Blaise Pascal perceived as a mathematician and a philosopher of mathematics. The following of his mathematical achievements have been presented: the theorem on a hexagon inscribed in a conic, his idea of a calculating machine, the arithmetical triangle, his works connected with the probability theory as well as his ideas connected with the infinitesimal calculus. Historical context of his results and their impact are discussed. Also Pascal’s considerations about mathematics as a science have been presented. His main philosophical theses concern methods of mathematics as well as dispersed remarks on the infinity and on types of mathematical thinking are surveyed.

This paper discusses Blaise Pascal’s account of the void and his struggle against the traditional concept of horror vacui (‘fear of the void’). The historical part of the paper relates the story of how Pascal was informed about Evangelista Torricelli’s experiments, how he got interested in the problem of the void and how he conducted his experimental research. Next comes a presentation of Pascal’s dispute with Father Étienne Noël, a Jesuit and Cartesian. Noël’s arguments against the void and Pascal’s counter-arguments in defence of the void are reiterated and discussed. Some reference is made to Pascal’s remarks on the void contained in his later works, such as Les Pensées. The presentation of Pascal’s research on the void is enlarged by some general remarks on his role in the 17^th century scientific revolution.

Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) is undoubtedly a great figure in the history of modern science and a classic of French literature. However, his importance as a philosopher can be disputed. In this domain, he is sometimes accused of being an expressive (i.e. strong) irrationalist. The paper analyzes Pascal’s epistemological and methodo-logical views, both within and outside scientific knowledge. The category of the ‘heart’ is also considered, which (allegedly) is a symptom of irrationalism. In the author’s opinion, the qualification of Pascal as an irrationalist is a significant simplification and an expression not so much of critical thinking as of thinking by using stereotypes.

In the article I analyze the argumentative-interpretative strategy used by Blaise Pascal in Les Pensées as a kind of critical method. He uses this method while presenting various issues, in particular when discussing justice, but also when he problematizes the power of reason itself. This method involves a constant reversal of reasons in the movement from ‘for’ to ‘against’, and in the search for the hidden reason of phenomena-appearances. In this article, I am interested in the paradoxes and ambiguities associated with the use of this method, which I diagnose on several levels, primarily as the effect of employing the ‘unity of opposites’, but also as a manifestation of inconsistency in assessing the possibilities of reason, which in social matters led Pascal to extreme pessimism and cynicism.

In this paper I take up the question announced by the title: which of our cognitive faculties and inclinations lie, according to Pascal, beyond the limits of reason. I focus on these faculties and attempt to determine their value for our cognition, for our attitudes and our way of being in the world. Although, according to Pascal, some elements lying beyond the pale of reason are extremely valuable, while other interfere with cognition or even exert a destructive effect on it, the boundary between the praiseworthy and the deceptive items are sometimes blurred and difficult to decipher. Some contemporary theoretical proposals address this problem by attempting to qualify and evaluate our extra-rational capacities and inclinations in various ways. The text identifies two of these concepts: intuitionism and the dual process theory. Each of them addresses in a different way the problem which Pascal has left unresolved.

By designating to the heart a separate and efficient human cognitive power Blaise Pascal singled out a group of ideas that make his thought an inspiration for philosophical reflection and a subject of lively discussions. However, over 350 years of research on this issue proved less than is needed to develop a uniform interpretation of his position. The article presents some of the most important views on the relationship between the order of the mind and the order of the heart. Through the centuries, an interpretation that attributed irrationality to Pascal was dominant. But in the later time several other opinions were developed side by side with the old one. Today a variety of views is supported. Some scholars emphasize rationality of cognition which they attribute even to the heart. Other stress vacillations of reason. Still other find in Pascal’s thought a belief in the integral operation of all human cognitive faculties. There is little hope that a single, uniform interpretation of Pascal’s philosophy will ever be available.

The paper discusses philosophical problems arising from a philosophical confusion caused by a careless use of the concepts: rhetoric, sophistry, casuistry. Although Pascal had not been personally responsible for creating this confusion, he used these terms as did his contemporaries, which means, he used them erroneously. His reckless manner of expressing his opinions led him to a distorted interpretation of the controversy between the rigorists and the laxists. This confusion was resolved only a few decades ago, in the context of bioethical discussions. The corrected version of the debate throws a new light on the views supported by the Jansenists, Jesuits and Dominicans of the 17^th century.

The aim of this article is to analyze the category of l’esprit de finesse, which in Les Pensées is contrasted with the category of l’esprit de géométrie. The two types of mind distinguished by Pascal are: the intuitive mind, associated with concepts such as finnesse, délicatesse, justesse or sentiment, and the mathematical mind, following the Cartesian method of arguing more geometrico. In the course of this analysis I focus on translation and different ways of distinguishing between both Pascalian types of mind in the Polish, English and German editions. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the description accompanying the presentation of the l’esprit de finesse emphasizes the aesthetic character of the intuitive mind. To support this thesis, I refer to some representatives of the early aesthetics of the 17th and 18th centuries: Nicolas Boileau- -Despréaux, Dominique Bouhours, Lord Shaftesbury, Alexander Baumgarten. At the end of the article the aesthetic nature of l’esprit de finesse is confirmed by referring to the concept of Wolfgang Welsch’s ‘aesthetic thinking’.

The paper proposes a methodological analysis of Pascal’s Wager by the employment tools taken from the contemporary decision theory. This theory distinguishes decisions made under different circumstances: certainty, risk and uncertainty. The last case constitutes a natural environment for an analysis of Pascal’s Wager. The author claims that Pascal’s argument is circular if no additional premises are added.

In the lights of the contemporary use of the theory of probability Pascal’s assumption about non-zero chance of God’s existence is invalid. Rather, to be exact, we must say that this probability either equals zero or is indeterminate. I argue that Søren Kierkegaard may have anticipated this consequence in his critique of Pascal’s Wager. This line of reasoning can be interpreted as a proof that the probability of the eternal reward is infinitesimally small, which consequently means that its expected utility is indeterminate. If, however, we decide to rely on the prospect theory the expected utility of the eternal reward will be relative and therefore not necessarily infinite. This calls into question Pascal’s Wager even if we accept William James’s argument that undermines Kierkegaard’s critique by pointing to the cultural relativity. In the next step, I consider two other possibilities of justifying the assumption about non-zero probability of the eternal reward: one expressed in terms of the prospect theory, the other in terms of epistemic contextualism. I argue that both options must be rejected, and finally, as a last resort, I consider the possibility of justifying Pascal’s Wager solely in terms of the supposed impact of religious faith on the utility of temporal life. I conclude, however, that this impact is ambivalent.

The popular reading of Pascal’s Wager in contemporary analytical philosophy is predominantly influenced by the rational reconstruction proposed by Ian Hacking. It separates, however, one fragment of the text – the so-called mathematical wager – from the integral whole, entitled in Pascal’s four-page manuscript Infini rien. I argue that Hacking’s reconstruction leads to a significant distortion of Pascal’s original idea. We should note that Pascal used a paraphrase that can be found in Antoine Sirmond’s earlier text not with the intention of creating a valid and conclusive argument – i.e. constructed more geometrico – which predominates in Hacking’s reconstruction of Pascal’s text, but rather he used it instrumentally to bring to the fore the real obstacles which arise when libertines contemplate adopting faith. The wager points out that the adoption of faith and pious life is disrupted by passions and self-love. The acceptance of Hacking’s reconstruction blurs therefore the real intention of Pascal and imposes inconsistency on his thought, as Henri de Villars correctly pointed out. My paper challenges the interpretation proposed by Hacking by pointing out that it undermines the intentions expressed in Infini rien. This critique does not undermine the legitimacy of either interpretation of the wager, but indicates that they are different and must be analyzed separately. All the same, the historically correct understanding should be based on a literal reading of the entire text of Infini rien, even though the pure ‘Pascalian Wager’ (or as it should be named more accurately, ‘the Sirmondian Wager’) can be treated as an argument isolated from the historical whole. One way or the other, it adds an interesting gloss to numerous arguments about God’s existence.

The author considers – in a formal way – Blaise Pascal’s thought. In the first place, he distinguishes the situation (‘Pascalian situation’) in which believers have to decide whether they should obey the recommendations of their religion or not. He also compares their situation with the situation that was described by J.P. Sartre (‘Sartrean situation’), as one in which the persons involved must choose between equally priced values. Secondly, the author analyses Pascal’s thinking, i.e. he focuses on the calculation which led Pascal to decide that by rejecting the eschatological promise of Christianity you achieve nothing. This incongruity is part of the basis on which Pascal rests the conclusion of his analysis. Thirdly, the author finds a solution to the incongruity that absorbed Pascal but he reaches this end through a non-Pascal’s assessment of probability and values. In this version the Pascalian incongruity has a reversed impact. The author claims that in this Pascalian situation placed are not only the persons who believe in God but also all those who risk their lives for their ideals. The author adds to the list of Pascalian topics the situation in which a medical patient has the choice between relying on the conventional medical methods and using non-standard medical therapies. This example has been inspired by the dispute about the vaccinations against COVID-19.

Relying on Pascal’s investigations concerning the possibility of repentance, I argue that he adopted a surprisingly modern theory of emotions. Pascal used the argument that even the best and the most persuasive of possible arguments are not sufficiently compelling to change the mind of those who hold an opposite view, and specifically, they are incapable of turning a nonbeliever into a believer. In fact, this is what Pascal tried to show in his famous thought experiment known as Pascal’s Wager. The Wager is crucial for the construction of Pascal’s theory. However, as I point out, the question whether The Wager constitutes a legitimate argument is not essential for his psychological analyses. Pascal seems eager to establish the possibility of efficacious repentance. In this context, he offers a convincing model of the change in one’s attitude. I present this model in order to show that Pascal’s proposal is irrefutable in the light of some unmistakably contemporary psychological and philosophical theories. In effect I claim that Pascal belongs among those thinkers who laid foundations to important aspects of the contemporary conception of the mind.

The article starts with the question, if reading Blaise Pascal can inspire a more accurate understanding of the meaning of human life. Is it possible that Christian apology can be accepted as a true religion by a contemporary person who resides in the world that is even occasionally called post-Christian? An answer to this question must take into account the relationship between reason and faith. Pascal examined this connection, and using several examples showed how propitiously Christianity had influenced the French culture which until today stands out among other European countries as one that has not been entirely engulfed by universalist humanism, i.e. by a lay religion which merged from Christianity itself. Contemporary Christianity, and the Catholic Church as its proper part, adapted to these new cultural trends. Laxism, which was critically examined by Pascal in the Lettres provinciales, has now scored a victory over the Christian faith which was once rigorous and demanding but now preaches love of all neighbors and forgiveness of sins for everybody. Reading Pascal anew helps us understand that Christian faith was once quite different from contemporary humanitarianism.

The author deals with the problem of Original Sin, which is central to Pascal’s philosophical considerations. She begins from an outline of the prevailing interpretation of Pascal’s views on that initial predicament. Using William Wood’s analysis, she draws attention to the cognitive consequences of the Original Sin. Referring to a passage from Pascal’s Les Pensées about entertainment, she addresses the problem of the duplicity that stains human nature, and which constitutes the ‘secret instinct’ mentioned in the title. Then she proceeds to analyze Pascal’s understanding of the ‘aversion to truth’ or the propensity for self-deception that results from the Original Sin. Finally, she envisages the problem that can hardly be avoided in view of Pascal’s acceptance of the existence of two opposite instincts in human nature. How can we explain the human condition after the Original Sin? Does it lead inevitably to two anthropologies resulting from the two visions of Christianity, of which one is grimly pessimistic but covertly favoured by Pascal, while the other, that promises eternal bliss, is shown to be no more than a positive result of a fairly technical mathematical speculation?

The purpose of this article is to show the relationship between Pascal’s thought and Jansenism, which played an important role in French theology and spirituality of the 17^th and 18^th centuries. Jansenism was characterised by an emphasis on the importance of the theology of grace preached by St. Augustine, and by a profound asceticism. My analysis of Blaise Pascal’s various statements shows that after his conversion he began to sympathize with the Jansenist movement. However, it is difficult to state unequivocally whether he identified with this movement, or did not.

The paper discusses philosophical problems raised by Pascal in the Lettres Provinciales. I start from the question whether eternal salvation is determined by divine grace or by individual merits of the faithful. I do not attempt to focus on all relevant doctrinal viewpoints adopted by the protestants, the Jansenists, the Holy See, the Dominicans or the Jesuits. Instead I focus on philosophical problems and propose solutions to only some issues. I argue that a persuasive answer can be found when we employ the concept of coincidence. It is possible that individual attempts to earn salvation coincide with God’s decrees about human entitlements to after-life. This connection is not causal but coincidental. But even though it is coincidental, it may seem to be coupled or conjugated, even when it is not. Such a solution seems to aptly illustrate the match between the functions performed by the reason and by the heart. Such an abstract proposal is not openly advertised by Pascal. He may have considered, and rejected it, discouraged by its vagueness and its incongruence with the traditional conception of causality which is based on presumed physical connections rather than statistical evidence or the metaphysical conception of harmonia mundi.

This paper seeks to interpret Blaise Pascal’s religious existentialism as an alternative to rationalist naturalism. Pascal appears to be a kind of philosophical tenebrist who uses darkness and light in his search of ways of knowing ‘a hidden man’ and ‘a hidden God’. Human reason preserves the capacity of receiving the light of faith in spite of being wounded by the Original Sin. The paradox of man is manifested in the fusion of human misery and greatness at once. The logic of heart goes beyond the boundaries of reason but it does not abolish them. Pascal presents faith and reason as complementary. He defends religion against science and at same time he defends science against ecclesiastical authoritarianism. His postulate of separating religion from science is an answer to the affair of Galileo.

Pascal, an insightful reader of Michel de Montaigne, is a philosophical skeptic. However, his skepticism is not a goal, but a tool leading to an intuition of futility and a philosophical anthropology that reveals human misery. The presentation of man as a tainted being is the basis for an attack on the pure self which, according to René Descartes’ program, was considered a point immune to skeptical criticism. The rejection of the ego cogito makes possible eschatology in which salvation is possible through the abandonment of the self and devotion to God.Pascal, an insightful reader of Michel de Montaigne, is a philosophical skeptic. However, his skepticism is not a goal, but a tool leading to an intuition of futility and a philosophical anthropology that reveals human misery. The presentation of man as a tainted being is the basis for an attack on the pure self which, according to René Descartes’ program, was considered a point immune to skeptical criticism. The rejection of the ego cogito makes possible eschatology in which salvation is possible through the abandonment of the self and devotion to God.

Compared to other thinkers dealing with the problem of man, Blaise Pascal is an exceptional philosopher. To justify this statement, it is enough to draw attention to the connection between the way in which man is understood and the issue of the limits of reason. According to Pascal “man is an incomprehensible monster” and the autonomous reason does not provide us with certain knowledge. The purpose of this article is to draw attention to the implications that arise from Pascal’s philosophy both in relation to the way in which man is understood and the issue of the limits of reason. Because the two topics are related, I have described these implications as ‘monstrous’. In the context of Pascal’s philosophy ‘monstrous’ implications also means ‘strange and hard to accept but possible’. One of such implications is that man is a paradox. Another can be expressed by the question: Does setting limits of reason by reason mean crossing them?

In the reflections presented herewith I take the position that time is what we measure. This is the same kind of simplification of the problem of time as the one proposed by Albert Einstein. This simplification has a relative character because it makes room for a wide gamut of applications of various measurements of time and admits various types of clocks constructed for that purpose. In a broad sense a clock measures the emergence and functioning of diverse views and forms of human behavior in culture. In a narrow sense a clock measures the intellectual activity of individual persons. Pascal used these two significantly different concepts of the clock in several other of his works, also in Les Pensées.

The aim of the article is to identify and characterize gnostic motifs in the philosophy of Blaise Pascal. This text is based on the distinction between ʽgnosis’ and ‘Gnosticism’. Gnosis is a specific form of religious thought, according to which knowledge is the medium of self-salvation, while Gnosticism is the original and paradigmatic shape of actualization of that form of thinking from the first centuries CE. The work traces the presence of typically gnostic tropes in Pascal’s philosophy, such as the theme of the alienated life in the world, the opposition between the spirit and the world, the ‘remoteness’ of God, orders of existence, life as a dream and the ‘tumult of this world’. The result of investigations is promising. Pascal’s philosophy – probably because of his existential experiences analogous to those of the founders of various Gnostic sects – contains a number of motifs characteristic of the Gnostics. This mainly applies to the theme of alienation. Existence in the world of the thinking subject is filled with alienation, and the spirit does not feel part of the incomprehensible and thoughtless world. The dualism of the spirit and the world has an analogue in the opposition of God and the world, which betrays almost no traces of its origin in God. Pascal developed very creatively the theme of the ‘tumult of this world’ through reflections on entertainment. Nevertheless, his thought does not constitute gnosis, because it is in strong opposition to all the key elements of gnosis: the philosopher confronts faith with knowledge, grace with self-salvation, and the universalism of Christianity with elitism and hermeticism.

The juxtaposition of Blaise Pascal’s view with the philosophy of Epictetus is important for at least two reasons. First, Epictetus and Michel de Montaigne were the authors whom Pascal enjoyed reading more than any other writers. They were also his main philosophical inspiration. Secondly, the Stoics proposed a way of dealing with human misery, which was competitive to Pascal’s. The author of Les Pensées, by way of producing an apology of the Christian religion, presents the following alternative: we must either suffer misery of a man living without God, or we may rejoice in happiness with God. Thus Pascal’s effort to discredit Stoicism should be read as a proposal to find an alternative to Christianity. The aim of this article is to analyse Pascal’s objections to Stoicism and to compare Stoicism with Pascal’s positive proposal, which was Christianity. As it seems, Pascal’s objections to Stoicism are not confirmed in real life, as what Stoicism offers is a real possibility of obtaining happiness in this life, which is a view that undermines the position adopted by Pascal. The author of Les Pensées treats Stoicism as a remedy for human misery, which is a rival position to Christianity. This also means that Pascal failed to notice that Stoicism offered tools that could help the Christians cope with the challenges of worldliness and with the subordination of man’s will to God’s will.

This article is an attempt of a comparative analysis between George Berkeley’s and Blaise Pascal’s religious apologetics. In my intention the fruitfulness of this analysis shall constitute a preliminary justification for two postulates that belong to the methodology of the history of philosophy. First, it is advisable to reject interpretative habits, which are specific for what I call the ‘Enlightenment story’ in regard to the 17^th century philosophers (from Descartes to Berkeley). Secondly, it seems helpful to apply in regard to these philosophers a new exegetic key, which I call ‘the apologetic key’. In the first section, I detail the fundamental features of the ‘Enlightenment story’ and I show how destructive this story sounds when it is applied to Pascal and Berkeley. In the second section, I compare Pascal’s and Berkeley’s religious apologetics identifying differences and similarities between them. In the third and the fourth sections, I sketch a short historiosophical speculation about the hypothetical influence of the reception of Pascal’s Les Pensées on the shape of the apologetic project of Berkeley. In the fifth section, I explain why it could be fruitful to apply the ‘apologetic key’ to all the so-called ‘great philosophers’ of the 17^th century.

This text is an attempt to present Shestov’s view of Pascal’s philosophy. Pascal was for Shestov one of the few thinkers in history who resolutely and effectively argued against the complete dominance of rationalism (fixity, generality, necessity) in the interpretation of the world and human cognition. Shestov held a strongly critical view of the history of philosophy, and in his opinion Pascal presented the course of history in an incomparably better perspective. For Shestov the key theme in Pascal’s philosophy can be expressed in the injunction: „Jesus will stay in the jaws of death until the end of time; we must not disgrace ourselves by passing those years fast asleep”.

The aim of the article is to demonstrate similarities and differences between how Józef Tischner and Blaise Pascal understood infinity. In the philosophical project of the former, man has the status of a dramatic subject. This is often overlooked, however, as a result of the confusion between the belief that the roles people play are dramatic even though their condition in life is not dramatic. Human participation in the drama of life must not be interpreted as performing a role. Living one’s life is not acting in a drama, but dwelling within it at the deepest level of the existential participation. A human being is involved in his/her drama personally, directly and completely. As the subject of the drama, he/she opens himself/herself both to what is finite and to what is infinite, i.e. to objects and people. The stage on which we are positioned is not identical with the world itself, nor is time identical with the dramatic time which extends only from the moment when the question is heard to the one when it is answered. The dramatic condition of human being is determined by his/her opening up to the infinity that not only defines the world – as transcendent and different from the surrounding animalistic environment – but also emerges on the horizon of the desire, which must not to be confused with human needs. Needs are utilitarian, whereas desires are transcendent – both in their genesis and their forms of manifestation. Desire escalates over time in the course of being satisfied, in other words, it „feeds on its own hunger” (E. Lévinas). Finally, for both Pascal and Tischner, what guarantees the possibility of opening up to infinity is not human knowledge but religious faith.

In this essay, I focus on the concept of ‘affinity’. I consider two contexts of its use: one, immanent to Pascal’s Les Pensées, and the other characteristic for the Native American culture. This juxtaposition reveals not only an affinity between them, but also makes it possible to formulate an indication for the contemporaries to practice philosophy in the original sense of the phrase: ‘the love of wisdom’.