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Knowledge of Language and a Radical Scepticism

Tomáš Čanal
Filozofia i Nauka | 2019 | Tom 7 | Część 2 | 265-281
Keywords Cartesian doubt certainty Descartes epistemology Evil Deceiver knowledge scepticism Wittgenstein
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Abstract

According to Descartes, it is possible to doubt successfully that there is external world, all around us, yet still to have language, in place, without any complication. According to Wittgenstein, to doubt everything about the external world except language means nothing more than to doubt everything about the external world including language. Why? No speaker is more certain about the meaning of his words than about the external things he believes to be unassailable (for example, that he has two hands and two legs). Without this constitutive connection there would be no communication of a definite sense. Wittgenstein suggests that, after the author of the Meditations on First Philosophy adopts the hypothesis of evil deceiver, we are only under the impression that we deal with language (or that we read a text). We instead deal with symptoms of something rather different. The objective of this paper is to critically reassess Wittgenstein’s criticism of the possibility of holding such a radical sceptical position.

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Authors and Affiliations

Tomáš Čanal

Embryonic Architecture with Built-in Self-test and GA Evolved Configuration Data

Gayatri Malhotra Punithavathi Duraiswamy J.K. Kishore
International Journal of Electronics and Telecommunications | 2023 | vol. 69 | No 2 | 211-217 | DOI: 10.24425/ijet.2023.144352
Keywords Embryonic BIST Self-test Genetic Algorithm Cartesian Genetic Programming
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Abstract

The embryonic architecture, which draws inspiration from the biological process of ontogeny, has built-in mechanisms for self-repair. The entire genome is stored in the embryonic cells, allowing the data to be replicated in healthy cells in the event of a single cell failure in the embryonic fabric. A specially designed genetic algorithm (GA) is used to evolve the configuration information for embryonic cells. Any failed embryonic cell must be indicated via the proposed Built-in Selftest (BIST) the module of the embryonic fabric. This paper recommends an effective centralized BIST design for a novel embryonic fabric. Every embryonic cell is scanned by the proposed BIST in case the self-test mode is activated. The centralized BIST design uses less hardware than if it were integrated into each embryonic cell. To reduce the size of the data, the genome or configuration data of each embryonic cell is decoded using Cartesian Genetic Programming (CGP). The GA is tested for the 1-bit adder and 2-bit comparator circuits that are implemented in the embryonic cell. Fault detection is possible at every function of the cell due to the BIST module’s design. The CGP format can also offer gate-level fault detection. Customized GA and BIST are combined with the novel embryonic architecture. In the embryonic cell, self-repair is accomplished via data scrubbing for transient errors.
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Authors and Affiliations

Gayatri Malhotra
1 2
Punithavathi Duraiswamy
2
J.K. Kishore
1
  1. U R Rao Satellite Centre, India
  2. M S Ramaiah University of Applied Science, India

Antirealism, Cartesianism and world

Krzysztof Czerniawski
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2021 | No 1 | 43-69 | DOI: 10.24425/pfns.2021.136779
Keywords antirealism Cartesianism M. Dummett G. Frege H. Putnam T. Williamson L. Wittgenstein
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Abstract

Antirealism is often regarded by philosophers as a model example of contemporary anti‑Cartesianism, chiefly because of the argumentation by Hilary Putnam presented in his Brains in a Vat and deeply rooted in antirealist semantics. But if we look closer, relations between Cartesianism and antirealism cannot be reduced to an opposition but are much more complex. Like Cartesianism, antirealism also attaches great significance to methodology universal for all philosophy, although antirealist ‘philosophy of thought’, contrary to its Cartesian counterpart, is antipsychological and boils down to Wittgensteinian philosophy that interprets language as something inherently public. But Dummettian antirealism contains also a Fregean concept of systematic theory of meaning, which should provide clear view of language rules and give us an ability to correct our imperfect language practice. For Wittgenstein and Putnam, who view this practice as the essence of language, this kind of attempt to correct language from outside is unacceptable. In this matter, Michael Dummett seems to be rather in harmony with the Cartesian ideal of thought as pure and distinct, and with the program of detached rationality. This impression is strengthened by his demand to adopt a ‘full‑blooded’ theory of meaning. Moreover, as it has been noted by Timothy Williamson, antirealism demands luminosity of meaning, which makes you wonder if it is not, like Cartesianism, one more case of epistemological foundationalism. These problems of antirealism seem to suggest strong internal tensions arising from an attempt, not entirely successful, to unify the thought of later Wittgenstein with more traditional rationalisms of Descartes and Frege.
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Bibliography

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2. Candlish S., Wrisley G. (2019), Private Language, w: E.N. Zalta (red.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ fall2019/entries/private‑language/
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Authors and Affiliations

Krzysztof Czerniawski
1
ORCID: ORCID
  1. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa

How Monsieur Descartes challenged Don Quixote to a duel and lost disgracefully, defeated with his own weapon

Iwona Krupecka
Ruch Literacki | 2022 | No 6 (375) | 975-992 | DOI: 10.24425/rl.2022.143002
Keywords Miguel de Cervantes (1547–1616) Don Quixote literature and philosophy substantialism Cartesian cogito ontology of becoming consciousness perspectivism narrative identity
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Abstract

The goal of this article is to show the interdependence of the reception of Don Quixote and the concept of identity. The argument is founded on the rejection of Don Quixote perceived as an invented character from the world of fiction and treating him instead as a Cartesian subject, in possession of the cogito faculty and defined by the truth. The Cartesian project, though, comes under pressure when the cogito constitutes itself by telling a story about itself. Cartesianism, a philosophy of consciousness, contains an embryo of a new reflection about subjectivity. With the new approach comes a positive reappraisal of the figure of Don Quixote and an acknowledgement of the key role of fiction in the process of becoming human. The liberation of identity from the tyranny of substantialism and the foundation of the subject on action has paved the way for treating the goals of action as originals produced by the subject rather than copies or reproductions.
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Authors and Affiliations

Iwona Krupecka
1
ORCID: ORCID
  1. Uniwersytet Gdański

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