The aim of this article is a critical analysis of Peter F. Strawson’s theory of primitiveness of the concept of person contained in the third chapter of the Individuals. The problems associated with the distinction between M-predicates and P-predicates are pointed out. The article shows different ways of understanding primitiveness of the concept of person, and points to gaps in Strawson’s argumentation and to the dubious potential of the theory if it is used to solve some basic problems in philosophy of mind. It also deals with some of the difficulties outlined, but does not propose to solve them all.
The main aim of this paper is to propose a terminological approach to the standardization of onomastic terminology. Attention is paid to the primary importance of conceptual systems and to the onomasiological approach typical of terminological work. Terminology is presented as a discipline devoted primarily to the study of concepts. Then the main concepts of terminology are discussed and the relations between a conceptual system and a terminological system are explained. An outline of the issue of conceptual systems of onomastics and of their internal structure is made. Then two important metatheoretical concepts are introduced and defined: 1) the concept of theoretical legitimacy of concepts and 2) the concept of economy of conceptual systems. In the final part of the article, several suggestions concerning the standardization of onomastic terminology are made: 1) terms referring to concepts belonging to separate conceptual series are not to be used interchangeably; 2) terms based on different roots (in the English onomastic terminology: -onym, -onymy, -onomastics, in the Polish terminology: -onim, -onimia, -onomastyka) are to be reserved respectively for the concept of a single (type of) proper name, for the concept of a set of proper names and for the concept of a specific onomastic discipline; 3) concepts used or newly introduced in a text are to be defined clearly in onomastic works, 4) onomasticians aiming for standardization of onomastic terminology should start their work by (re)constructing conceptual system(s) of onomastics and only then assign terms to concepts; 5) one completely unitary conceptual (and terminological) system of onomastics cannot be achieved due to the theoretical pluralism of the discipline; 6) the first goal of any conceptual and terminological standardization of onomastics is to define its range: should the standardization cover the concepts of philological or general onomastics? should it cover only empirical (descriptive) concepts or highly abstract theoretical concepts as well?
The issue of the morphemic analysis of medical terminology is a crucial factor in terms of translation strategies and compilation of a terminological dictionary. The research was conducted in the context of author’s current lexicographical work called as English-Ukrainian-Russian defining dictionary of dental terms. To provide the user of the dictionary with reliable techniques to construct the meaning of terms, morphemes relative frequency in the area of dentistry have been determined.
While working on the oeuvre of P.F. Strawson (1919–2006), and especially on his metaphysics, I had a unique opportunity to exchange ideas with this eminent exponent of Oxford philosophy. Those exchanges, of which some have been reflected in private correspondence and in a published reply to one of my papers, were focussed on various interpretative questions. Three threads of those discussions seem especially pertinent for grasping the gist of Strawson’s philosophy and its general orientation. The first one concerned the nature of philosophical analysis, or to be more precise, the connective model of it, favoured by Strawson, and its relationship with the idea of concept presupposition. The second thread had to do with the position taken by the Oxford philosopher in the realism debate on three levels: semantic, epistemological, and metaphysical. Strawson made every effort to take a realist stand in this debate and avoid antirealism in any of its forms; however, his realism is in many respects very moderate and not so distant from antirealism. Similarly moderate was his stand in the traditional debate about universals, constituting the topic of the third thread of the exchanges with Strawson. He claimed that universals exist, but at the same time emphasized that they are objects of pure thought alone and as such do not form a part of the spatiotemporal world in which we live. One cannot also say much about the relation of exemplification in virtue of which universals manifest themselves in the world as particular instances. Presentation and elaboration of these three threads has led to the conclusion that although Strawson was a deeply systematic thinker, he avoided wide-ranging and ambitious statements and radical views. In characteristically minimalist way he dispelled some questions, and the ultimate resolution of many crucial and fundamental issues were for him choice and taking a particular attitude or stance.
Gaston Milhaud (1858–1918) was a French modern philosopher, who, having started from mathematics, came to philosophy (especially epistemology) and history of science. His works on the history of science were devoted to Greek science and modern science. Milhaud in his papers claimed that important concepts and principles of science (in different disciplines) result from decisions that simultaneously transcend both experience and logic. He emphasized the role of free creation and activity of the mind. The author discusses central problems of Milhaud’s thought, especially the problem of the relationship between science and philosophy.
The main aim of the following article is to juxtapose two methodological perspectives, influential in the field of the widely understood history of ideas, that is to say, the Cambridge School with the German tradition of Begriffsgeschichte. Presenting both opportunities and pitfalls that may result from applying these perspectives, I sketch the propositions to overcome possible shallows. In concluding remarks, I draw potential challenges for the history of ideas in Poland.
The article analyses the issue of the potential development of theoretical thinking in young children. The context for this discussion is found in the cultural and historical development theory of L.S. Vygotsky which constitutes the basis for assumptions regarding the thinking about development and education of children. It highlights the elementary education stage as a very important area of designing „developmental teaching” as understood by Vygotsky. The article emphasizes the role of an adult who builds the scaffolding for the child’s thinking and acting, and establishes the conditions and teaching environment necessary for the performance of a cognitive process directed at the development of theoretical thinking. In the author’s opinion building the foundation for theoretical thinking will be possible when teachers set „the right developmental and educational tasks” for a child who is constructing knowledge.
The text deals with the issue of “historical biography”. It aims to reconstruct the key concepts connected with the biographical publishing series “The Legacies of the progressive personalities of our past”. The text answers the question what conceptual framework surrounded and legitimised the edition.
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