Humanities and Social Sciences

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

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Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria | 2020 | No 4 |

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Abstract

This biographical sketch is based on materials from the Roman Ingarden Archive, as yet unrecognized in philosophical literature. These materials are preserved in Krakow by Krzysztof Ingarden, the grandson of the philosopher. On their basis, a two‑volume biography was prepared by R. Kuliniak and M. Pandura I am a philosopher of the world (Κόσμου φιλόσοφός εἰμι) – Roman Witold Ingarden (1893–1970), Parts I and II, Wydawnictwo Marek Derewiecki, Kęty 2019–2020). This presentation is an abridged version of those volumes.
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Authors and Affiliations

Radosław Kuliniak
1
ORCID: ORCID
Mariusz Pandura
2
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Koszarowa 3, 51-149 Wrocław
  2. Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Biblioteka Wydziału Nauk Społecznych, ul. Koszarowa 3, 51-149 Wrocław
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Abstract

The author examines ontological premises adopted in the Controversy over the Existence of the World by Roman Ingarden. He points out that these premises have been informed by mereological insights. This reading of Ingarden is substantiated by the postulate that ‘pure qualities’ are components of ‘ideas’ and constitute their proper parts. This is the reason why they cannot be attributed to individuals as their properties. The role of properties is consequently filled in by ‘concretizations’, proposed as a new category of existence. This author claims however that ‘concretizations’ can be easily dispensed with by reinterpreting ideas in the distributive mode. Assuming this new rendition, one makes it possible to interpret ‘pure qualities’ as properties of possible individuals, which results in a comfortable simplification of Ingarden’s ontology.
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Authors and Affiliations

Adam Nowaczyk
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Abstract

The article considers Roman Ingarden’s fundamental questions in the context of the position called philosophical fundamentalism. It turns out that the defining feature of this position, i.e. the search for answers to the question about the conditions of validity of statements in the sphere of traditional branches of philosophy: ontology, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics, finds its counterpart in Ingarden’s ontological and epistemological assumptions in phenomenology. They guarantee the legitimacy of any other claims. Ingarden’s philosophical fundamentalism, considered here in relation to the work- ‑scheme, weakened with time, which seems to be evidenced by the author’s doubts as to the legitimacy of the existence of the sphere of ideal objects determining this work. It seems highly possible that this is Ingarden’s bow to culture, and to cultural and historical relativization of the unchanging sphere of ideal objects.
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Authors and Affiliations

Barbara Kotowa
1

  1. prof. em., Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Wydział Filozoficzny, ul. Szamarzewskiego 89c, 60-568 Poznań
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Abstract

Roman Ingarden was an eminent philosopher who worked in various fields of philosophy, especially in the areas of ontology, aesthetics and ethics. In addition to his systematic analyses, we find in his work remarkable statements regarding the nature of philosophy, its relation to science, or the specificity of its methods. These metaphilosophical remarks were formulated in systematic works as well as in texts of more disputable nature. In this paper Ingarden’s metaphilosophy is presented in the context of thought of Franz Brentano and Tadeusz Kotarbiński. It is also discussed against the background of metaphilosophical assumptions of the logical positivists from the Vienna Circle.
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Authors and Affiliations

Ryszard Kleszcz
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90-131 Łódź
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Abstract

In the extensive oeuvre of the eminent Polish phenomenologist Roman Ingarden there are very few passages and hints which would enable one to determine his attitude towards analytic philosophy and its achievements. A brief sketch of an assessment of this philosophical movement is included in a letter to Henryk Skolimowski, which contains Ingarden’s response to a succinct account of his philosophy in Skolimowski’s book Polish Analytical Philosophy (1967). Ingarden emphasizes there that it is completely inaccurate to describe his contribution to philosophy as a fusion of German phenomenology and the so‑called Polish analytic philosophy. According to Ingarden he did learn nothing from analytic philosophy in its Polish version. His attitude towards analytic philosophy in its entirety is critical and hostile, since it has a general tendency to move all substantial issues on the linguistic level, and that pernicious tendency has led to a terrible impoverishment of philosophy.
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Authors and Affiliations

Tadeusz Szubka
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Instytut Filozofii i Kognitywistyki, ul. Krakowska 71-79, 71-017 Szczecin
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Abstract

The article explores the influences and reinterpretations of Roman Ingarden’s philosophy that can be found in Leopold Blaustein’s work. The latter studied in Lvov under Ingarden and established a long‑life philosophical dialogue with his mentor. There is a common agreement in comparative literature on the two authors which claims that Blaustein was influenced by Ingarden mainly in the field of aesthetics. This author supports a different proposition that these influences were much wider and encompassed methodology and theory of consciousness as well. The article is divided into three main parts. First, Blaustein’s critique of eidetic methods in phenomenology is reconstructed. In this context, it is claimed that Blaustein’s arguments aim at Ingarden’s concept of phenomenology rather than at Husserl’s. Yet, even if Blaustein tended to understand phenomenology as descriptive psychology, and Ingarden – as eidetic analysis, they both seemed to agree that phenomenology consisted in rigorous description of the ways of how the objects are given in experience. Secondly, Blaustein’s argument against Husserl’s theory of consciousness is reconstructed. The author claims that the argument is based on Ingarden’s differentiation between ‘living through’ and ‘experiencing’ sense data. Finally, the author examines some points that connect or divide both aesthetical theories.
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Authors and Affiliations

Witold Płotka
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Wóycickiego 1/3, 01-938 Warszawa
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Abstract

In the paper, I analyze four types of ontic subordination, which constitute key elements of Ingardenian ontology: heteronomy, derivativeness, non-self‑reliance and dependency. This analysis leads to the conclusion that the concepts constructed by Ingarden are either logically incorrect, or are not sufficiently explained, or refer not to ontic but to semantic relations.
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Authors and Affiliations

Jacek Jadacki
1

  1. prof. em., Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa
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Abstract

The concept of the existence of the absolute being can be characterized by four criteria which correspond to four existential aspects of the ultimate reality. In volume one of the Controversy over the Existence of the World Roman Ingarden argues that the absolute being is to be characterized as self-sustained, primary, self‑activated and independent. When some general remarks are put aside, the article focuses on arguments that have been adduced by the author in support of three claims. (1) Ingarden accepts the existence of the absolute being and flanks it by additional seven kinds of relative beings. The author finds the abundance supernumerary in the material world. (2) No material (or physical) object possesses properties (or existential moments) that belong to the absolute being. (3) There are fundamental reasons which exclude the possibility that the physical world (the manifold of all material objects) can be identified with the absolute being (absolute existence).
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Authors and Affiliations

Marek Łagosz
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Koszarowa 3, 51-149 Wrocław
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Abstract

The subject of the article is the assessment of the way of presentation of the issue of realism and idealism in the Controversy over the Existence of the World by R. Ingarden. First, the author of this paper offers his own systematization of the issue of ‘realism – idealism’, then he goes on to show Ingarden’s position. The modern opposition ‘realism – idealism’ can be divided into three main areas: (1) the problem of the existence of the so‑called ‘constitutive a priori’, (2) the problem of the argumentative transgression of the immanence of consciousness (the so‑called ‘bridge problem’), (3) the problem of the causal genesis of the image of the world at the disposal of human cognitive subjects (skeptical hypotheses). The author undertakes to show that the Controversy over the Existence of the World takes as a starting point only a specific interpretation of the issue of realism and idealism: the interpretation contained in the writings of E. Husserl, while omitting the fundamental issue of the nature of time and space, and is limited thereby to the interpretation of realism and idealism from the point of view of the question of the existence qualified as constitutive a priori.
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Authors and Affiliations

Stanisław Judycki
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Gdański, Instytut Filozofii, Socjologii i Dziennikarstwa, ul. J. Bażyńskiego 4, 80-309 Gdańsk
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Abstract

The article argues that, paradoxically, Roman Ingarden is unable to demonstrate that the world „exists” in any essential sense of the word „existence”, since he assumes (in line with Edmund Husserl) an ego-centered, living-through model of pure consciousness, and thus, again following Husserl, he postulates as the starting point of his considerations the existence of two separate realms of individual objects: the realm of pure consciousness (understood in a Husserlian manner as a stream of experiences) and the realm of objective world. Consciousness is grasped as a set of acts, not contents. However, consciousness (as pointed out in neo-Kantianism by Paul Natorp and in phenomenology by Jean-Paul Sartre) is something primary, in which only later on the world and the real existing subject can be constituted as such; hence consciousness cannot be equated with any subject whatsoever. Consciousness does not constitute anything but is a position from which we can see the constitution itself. Thus conceptualized consciousness does not contain the lived experience of the world but stands closely to the being itself. The fact that we have the living-through experience of the world is only secondarily conjectured by the subject already constituted in the primary consciousness. The failure of Ingarden’s project is caused by his Cartesian assumption regarding the primacy of the empirical conscious subject (a view shared with Husserl), his co-opting of the British- -empiricist model of epistemology, namely the distinction between the ‘sense data’ and ‘intentional grasping of the sensuous data’, in conjunction with something what Hermann Schmitz has called ‘metaphysics of the solid object’. In the aftermath of these considerations those aspects in Ingarden’s philosophy which truly lead toward realism are revealed.
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Authors and Affiliations

Andrzej Lisak
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Politechnika Gdańska, Wydział Zarządzania i Ekonomii, ul. G. Narutowicza11–12, 80-233 Gdańsk
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Abstract

In this paper I take up one of the fundamental themes of ontology concerning the proper understanding of such ontological objects as ideal qualities, properties (features) and tropes. These objects, i.e. properties, qualities and tropes, help us understand more fully what an object in itself (substance, being, object) happens to be. The aim of this work is to present Ingarden’s position on this subject, but also to present a certain new formal solution that uses tools of topological ontology. The background for the problems here is to be found in the works of Aristotle, Ch. Wolff and N. Hartmann.
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Authors and Affiliations

Janusz Kaczmarek
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90-131 Łódź
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Abstract

The problem of the existence of mathematical entities is the subject of lively discussions. Realists defend the independence and autonomy of mathematical objects, while antirealists point to their dependence and conventionality. The problem of the existence of mathematical objects is also strongly linked to the problem of mathematical cognition: do we recognize mathematical truths in special acts of intuition, as some realists claim, or do we create mathematical knowledge only by building appropriate formal systems – as some anti‑realists imagine? In this article we present the K. Gödel’s and W.V. Quine’s realistic stances and comment on them from the perspective of Roman Ingarden’s phenomenology. We point out the role that Gödel attributed to his mathematical intuition, and then we present the process of eidetic intuition in Ingarden’s perspective (indicating Gödel’s and Ingarden’s common points of view). We also argue that Ingarden’s rich ontology could contribute in a significant way to the debates currently taking place in the mainstream philosophy of mathematics.
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Authors and Affiliations

Bartłomiej Skowron
1
ORCID: ORCID
Krzysztof Wójtowicz
2
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Politechnika Warszawska, Wydział Administracji i Nauk Społecznych, Pl. Politechniki 1, 00-661 Warszawa
  2. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa
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Abstract

Social ontology is a philosophical discipline on the basis of which an inquiry about the actual ontological status of such objects as money or churches can be undertaken. Such objects belong to socio-cultural reality. Within the field of social ontology philosophers look for answers to the following two questions: (Q1) How does an objective social reality arise? (Q2) How does an objective social reality continue to persist? Roman Ingarden conducted advanced research on the question of existence and on different forms of existence. He was also engulfed in the study of arts and culture. In this article I undertake to analyze Ingarden’s views on socio‑cultural reality and consider his position on the nature of social ontology. I also propose answers to questions (Q1) and (Q2).
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Authors and Affiliations

Artur Kosecki
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Instytut Filozofii i Kognitywistyki, ul. Krakowska 71/79, 71-017 Szczecin
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is defined in the two title questions related to Roman Ingarden’s research: (1) What constitutes the specificity and uniqueness of human cognitive system? (2) Is Roman Ingarden’s answer defensible in the light of today’s naturalistic tendencies? In response to the first question, the multidimensional structure of human being is indicated, thanks to which man has access to the sphere of values. In the axiological and ontological aspect the power of man to create new realities is emphasized. In the epistemological and ontological aspect three dimensions of this structure are shown, which are correlated, complex and relatively isolated systems of body, soul and consciousness. Next, in response to the second question, Ingarden’s nonreductive approach is discussed against the background of information processes and the issue of self-knowledge. However, his strong ontological assumptions are shown as well. In conclusion, the author emphasizes that Ingarden’s main research strategy remains consistently grounded in ontology (and in this sense it is anti‑naturalistic), but in some aspects it is compatible with today’s naturalist approaches favored in neurocognitive studies.
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Authors and Affiliations

Urszula Żegleń
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Instytut Badań Informacji i Komunikacji, ul. Bojarskiego 1, 87-100 Toruń
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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyze the assumptions and implications of Roman Ingarden’s concept of consciousness as a relatively isolated system in the context of contemporary discussions on mechanistic model of scientific explanation. Starting with a presentation of Ingarden’s position, I try to show that the key problem of the theory of consciousness is the discovery of its neurobiological mechanisms. The systemic approach proposed by Ingarden is only the first step towards a theory that integrates the phenomenology of consciousness and a mechanistic framework. The next step is to show that research on the mechanisms of consciousness is a natural extension and deepening of the systemic approach.
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Authors and Affiliations

Robert Poczobut
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet w Białymstoku, Instytut Filozofii, Plac NZS 1, 15-420 Białystok
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Abstract

The article is a critical analysis of Ingarden’s theory of how we learn about other people’s mental states. The author discusses arguments that have been offered by Ingarden against competing theories and highlights their shortcomings. Next, he presents Ingarden’s original theory, underlining its strengths and weaknesses. He shows that Ingarden’s theory, apart from giving an insight into the mechanisms underlying the cognition of other people’s mental states, has a limited explanatory power even if treated as a phenomenological description of a select class of cognitive situations.
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Authors and Affiliations

Andrzej Stępnik
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Warszawska Szkoła Reklamy, ul. S. Szolc-Rogozińskiego 3, 02-777 Warszawa
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Abstract

The article aims to show that the criticism of the psychophysiological theory of cognition formulated by Roman Ingarden in the work U podstaw teorii poznania (‘The Groundwork of Epistemology’) is in some aspects still sound. The psychophysiological theory of cognition is the forerunner of modern naturalized epistemology. Thus the author of this article undertakes to show that Ingarden’s critique applies to this modern epistemology. The paper focuses on an issue that is discussed in both theories, i.e. the problem of causal generation of cognition. Moreover, it investigates two allegations that Ingarden has formulated. The first concerns the causal explanations of the possibility of knowledge, namely the objection of a vicious circle in theory. The second concerns the objection that causal theory is unable to provide essential epistemological concepts and criteria that are necessary for the analysis of cognition. The author supports the charge of the vicious circle and agrees with the purport of the second objection by showing that it can be interpreted as the claim that causal theory is incapable of solving the problem of causal underdetermination of cognition. These responses seem to hold irrespective of whether one adopts foundationalism or anti‑foundationalism in epistemology.
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Authors and Affiliations

Rafał Lewandowski
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Gdański, Szkoła Doktorska Nauk Humanistycznych i Społecznych, ul. W. Stwosza 63, 80-308 Gdańsk
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Abstract

In this paper Roman Ingarden’s theory of meaning is presented. It turns out to be an interesting mixture of mentalist and anti-mentalist intuitions. Mentalists, like e.g. Edmund Husserl, claim that linguistic meaning has its source in the fact that our words express our mental states, while anti‑mentalists try to situate meanings outside our minds.
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Authors and Affiliations

Arkadiusz Chrudzimski
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków
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Abstract

The aim of the paper is to present the theory of meaning formulated by Roman Ingarden in the Controversy over the Existence of the World, The Literary Work of Art, and in The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. When this has been done here, I test Ingarden’s theory by applying it to selected problems of contemporary philosophy of language. These problems include the semantics of empty names, the controversy between Millianism and descriptivism over the nature of proper names, the problem of substitutability in intensional contexts, meaning holism, compositionality, and the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. My analysis of these problems within the framework of Ingarden’s theory and my presentation of their solutions as delivered by G. Frege, K. Ajdukiewicz, W.V. Quine and D. Davidson shed interesting light on this extremely complex and ‘fine‑grained’ theory based on Ingarden’s original ontology. Although Ingarden’s theory does not fall within the dominant current of language philosophy, it offers a solution to the problem of empty names, the relation of proper names to definite descriptions, and substitutability. The theory is not holistic nor does it blur the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. Unfortunately, Ingarden’s theory is not compositional and reifies meanings, which may be seen as a serious objection to it. Therefore, the assessment of this theory cannot be unequivocal.
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Authors and Affiliations

Janusz Maciaszek
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90-131 Łódź
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Abstract

Each work of literature creates its own world of fiction and presents a series of events that bring that world to life. Such a world is initially evoked by its author, but subsequently continues to exist supported by collective memory and imagination of the readers and critics. Altogether Roman Ingarden admits four metaphysical categories: the real, the ideal, the mental and the intentional world. A puzzling question arises if we inquire how various objects are included into any of these categories. Is it necessary that they meet some qualitative criteria, or is it possible that they are placed in a suitable category by being freely ascribed to it? The author chooses the second option and argues that this is compatible with the eminent role that Ingarden assigned to works of literature.
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Authors and Affiliations

Jacek Hołówka
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. prof. em., Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa
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Abstract

The main task for imagination in Roman Ingarden’s theory of literary work is to reconstruct fictional objects and their appearances, as well as to furnish details even not mentioned in the work but compatible with the schematic description contained in the work. Imagination, therefore, plays an essential role in the act of Ingardenian ‘concretization’, that is in an inner presentation of the written work by the mind of the reader. According to the program of anti‑psychologism, the imaginative activities do not belong to the literary work. In particular, the creative imagination of the author and the free inspirations experienced by a reader must not be regarded as part of the work. Ingarden understands imagination traditionally, as the ability of visualizing mental images. It is possible, however, to understand imagination in a different way, that may be called semiotic, when it becomes an art of giving meaning to fictitious, fantastical, metaphorical and symbolical sentences. Adopting such a conception of imagination reveals imaginative features in all the four levels of literary work indicated by Ingarden. In particular, the notorious Ingardenian ‘quasi‑judgment’ could be defined as the imaginative sentence.
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Authors and Affiliations

Łukasz Kowalik
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa
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Abstract

Looking at something is considered a fundamental act of awareness. What constitutes its embodied manifestation – the gaze – can be realized as a specific axiological variant of the value of evil. The article is devoted to this particular, closed-in-the‑gaze manifestation of the value of evil in the literary work. The point of reference is identified in two famous epic works: Doctor Faustus by Thomas Mann (1947) and The Kindly Ones by Jonathan Littell (2006). The evil gaze identifies the main characters of either novel, Adrian Leverkühn and Maximilian Aue. Whether the artistic structuring of the evil gaze is presented in the novels with the same means, or perhaps with the use of different tools of literary transmission of axiological content, is the issue lying at the center of considerations. In fact, it is not the only issue, as it is part of a broader reflection on the so-called restraining of values in a literary work in general. (Translated from Polish by Katarzyna Rogalska‑Chodecka)
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Authors and Affiliations

Beata Garlej
1

  1. Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Instytut Literaturoznawstwa, ul. Dewajtis 5, 01-815 Warszawa
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Abstract

In this article I use Roman Ingarden’s conceptual apparatus to show how the category of purely intentional objects can be used to analyze the consciousness of subjects who reside in intentional worlds and experience internal states invoked in their minds by sources external to them.
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Authors and Affiliations

Damian Leszczyński
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Koszarowa 3, 51-149 Wrocław
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Abstract

In the book The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity Roman Ingarden presented multi‑sided conception of the work of music. The crucial problems of this book are of ontological character and they concern the ontic category and the essence of the music composition. In the present article, Ingarden’s conception is criticized internally and externally. At first, Ingarden’s conception is analyzed from the point of view of his own assumptions. Then, the very assumptions are revised. Ingarden bases his investigation on the elitist analytic corpus (he considers only outstanding works of Western Music) and employs liberal ontological assumptions (he allows many different categories of objects). With these assumptions in place, Ingarden reaches his solution, namely that the work of music is a schematic, purely intentional object. This seems optimal. The perspective changes, if we go beyond the elitist corpus or accept more restrictive ontological assumptions.
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Authors and Affiliations

Anna Brożek
1

  1. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa
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Abstract

In The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity by Roman Ingarden we are presented with a philosophical theory of the structure of the musical work. The author includes melody, rhythm and harmony among the primary elements of the musical work while dynamics, tempo and colouration (sonoristics) are classified as its secondary elements. The elements designated by the score constitute a schematic prescription for creating a particular work. Still, the scheme also includes numerous gaps and indeterminacies which can be filled in only through performance which makes the work an individualized concretum. However, it is puzzling why the list of the elements of the musical work does not include articulation. In this article I claim that the absence of articulation in the theory of the structure of the musical work indicates its omnipresence, thus the broader we understand the term articulation, the better it penetrates into the remaining elements of the musical work, preserving its distinctiveness at the same time.
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Authors and Affiliations

Andrzej Krawiec
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Grodzka 52, 33-332 Kraków
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Abstract

The author reflects on the issues raised in R. Ingarden’s article The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity. He considers them and presents them in a new light. This author believes that the musical works exist as special relations between special objects. At the same time, he refuses to consider musical creativity a product of human consciousness. In his opinion, consciousness only accepts or rejects musical phrases that present themselves as a product of unconscious brain activity.
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Authors and Affiliations

Jędrzej Stanisławek
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. (em.) Politechnika Warszawska, Wydział Administracji i Nauk Społecznych, Pl. Politechniki 1, 00-661 Warszawa
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Abstract

The question about a painting artwork assumes that its ontological, cognitive as well as aesthetic status is not clear and only a profound analysis can specify what lies hidden behind this concept. Ingarden underlines its ambiguousness and discerns that its elimination constitutes one of the major tasks of aesthetics. The ambiguity just mentioned can be discerned in the gap between a painting artwork and a canvas, Ingarden emphasizes. This distinction is already curious in itself, as the two terms may be considered synonyms, yet this affinity which presupposes a distinction seems to indicate that a canvas is not a painting and is not even a part of it but constitutes a separate physical item. In the first part of the article, I offer reasons, which prompted Ingarden to introduce and emphasize this distinction which underlies the answer to the question, what constitutes the painting artwork and what constitutes the canvas that bears it. The second part of my paper focuses on the essential relationship between the painting with its physical foundation. In the third section I discuss the consequences resulting from the maintenance of the distinction in question. This reconstruction of Ingarden’s views is accompanied by comments which are polemical in character but also constitute an expansion of the underpinnings involved in the distinction that has been analyzed.
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Authors and Affiliations

Artur Mordka
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Rzeszowski, Instytut Filozofii, Al. T. Rejtana 16c, 35-310 Rzeszów
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Abstract

The article focuses on the problem of possible relations of a work of art to the Absolute Being. The essence of the discussed issue can be put as a question: Is it possible, without mentioning God explicitly, to declare that a piece of art, as a carrier of beauty, indicates His presence? Relating to a number of Roman Ingarden’s significant statements that refer to metaphysical experience and the status of metaphysical qualities, and drawing upon Ingarden’s existential and ontological claims, the article presents metaphysical quality as a manifestation of existential dependence. This interpretation invokes the context of the primary being, and by extension, of the Absolute Being. If a work of art (or to be more precise, its concretization) is a carrier of aesthetic beauty through which a qualitative and metaphysical atmosphere emerges (and discloses its metaphysical quality) and if (as it is postulated in the interpretation suggested) it refers to the Absolute, then the thesis that beauty leads to God has been vindicated.
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Authors and Affiliations

Waldemar Kmiecikowski
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Wydział Teologiczny, ul. Wieżowa 2/4, 61-111 Poznań
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Abstract

In the text On Responsibility and Its Ontic Foundations Roman Ingarden stated that responsibility for an act requires the existence of a specific structure of objective and subjective realities, which presuppose the possibility of free choice, the existence of the past, non‑relatively understood values, and personal identity. However, Ingarden’s proposal, which includes ideas such as ‘relatively isolated systems’ or the ‘center of self’ as a condition of the ownership of action, results in insoluble theoretical difficulties. An important cause of this situation is the fact that the whole structure of the argument suggests reflection on the broadly understood issue of responsibility, while the actual intention of the text is narrower. The recurring theme in Ingarden’s A Little Book on Man is the question of inner dignity and the building up of a moral character by an individual, who in the moment of life’s predicament is able to make the right choice. The ontical foundations that Ingarden is looking for in the text On Responsibility and Its Ontic Foundations do not concern the general area of responsibility, but try to justify philosophically the belief in the project of building moral character.
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Authors and Affiliations

Anna Dziedzic
1

  1. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa
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Abstract

Considering responsibility as a key anthropological category, Roman Ingarden stresses that it could only be inquired through the lens of a subject that is perceived personally, and not as a ‘pure I’. On the one hand, responsibility determines the nature of personal existence, and on the other hand, personal existence constitutes a space for interrogating about any meanings of the concept of responsibility. What remains problematic, however, is an alternative outlined by Ingarden, which implies that perception of a personal subject must be conducted within either of two perspectives – one that refers to a substantial model of personal subject, or the other that relates to acts of actualising the subject, which unfold in the stream of consciousness. It seems possible to go beyond this contradiction and reconcile the two perspectives – which the modern philosophy of dialogue proposes to do. Ingarden emphasises that the analysis of the concept of responsibility should not be limited to the realm of morality. However, all four scenarios that the philosopher uses as research fields to scrutinise the concept point, or at least imply the necessity of including aesthetic issues. Furthermore, the four fields of analysis – when somebody 1) bears responsibility, 2) takes responsibility, 3) is held responsible, and 4) acts responsibly – should not be perceived as isolated from one another. The link between them is man, who appears as a person in certain situations, while in others, his personal status is unrevealed, although it still remains within a firm horizon of situations and meanings examined herein. Moreover, regardless of the polarisation of the research fields highlighted by Ingarden, moral context constitutes a permanent space of reference for a human person, who not only asks for the sense (meanings) of responsibility, but also determines his/her personal existence through meanings and with their help.
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Authors and Affiliations

Witold P. Glinkowski
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90-131 Łódź
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Abstract

Roman Ingarden in A Book about a Human Being uses the term ‘tragic’ three times with regard to man. The article follows his understanding of tragedy. Its types include: the tragedy of an inner splitting, the tragedy of incessant struggle, the tragedy of non‑fulfillment, the tragedy of passing away, and the tragedy of guilt. Axiological loneliness turns out to be a feature of all types of Ingarden’s tragedy.
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Authors and Affiliations

Bożena Listkowska
1

  1. Uniwersytet Kazimierza Wielkiego, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Ogińskiego 16, 85-092 Bydgoszcz
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Abstract

The aim of this article is to identify and analyze similarities in philosophical anthropology of two major Polish philosophers, Roman Ingarden and Henryk Elzenberg, with particular emphasis placed on their image of a human individual as a self- ‑overcoming being. A reconstructive method has been used here. Although reciprocal references between Ingarden and Elzenberg were not numerous, their concepts of human nature are very similar. According to both philosophers, man is essentially different from animals, but participates largely in what animals do as well. What is specific to man is determined by the spiritual element that transcends the physical world. Through spirit, man can overcome the biological part of him/ herself, and tries to overcome his/her condition, because in this way only can humanity reach out and create a world of culture. At the end of text, the most important differences between the discussed concepts of man are discussed.
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Authors and Affiliations

Antoni Płoszczyniec
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. Komisji Edukacji Narodowej w Krakowie, Instytut Filozofii i Socjologii, ul. Podchorążych 2, 30-084 Kraków
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Abstract

Roman Ingarden’s work is widely taken as promoting a philosophical anthropology in which considerations from philosophy of ecology, that is, ecophilosophy, have no secure place. I think this contention is too hasty, even though Ingarden himself did not undertake reflections on the responsibility of humans for their natural environment. It is true that here and there he was giving explicit expression to his conviction of the unimportance of biological origins of humans, and was putting a strong emphasis on culture and other intentional creatures of humanity. In my paper I have tried to trace and describe Ingardenian understanding of humans in relation to their environment, and especially to nature. I have made an attempt to show how free human actions are possible, which in turn enforces on humans some responsibility for their actions, including those that impinge upon the nature around them.
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Authors and Affiliations

Adriana Schetz
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Instytut Filozofii i Kognitywistyki, ul. Krakowska 71–79, 71-017 Szczecin

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