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Number of results: 16
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Abstract

The article tackles the problem of weak definite descriptions, i.e., it attempts to explain the mysterious uses of definite descriptions which do not meet Russell’s uniqueness condition. The author discusses theories of weak definite descriptions offered in relevant literature and proposes an original solution to the problem which she presents in terms of modern type‑theoretical semantics.
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Authors and Affiliations

Justyna Grudzińska
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa
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Abstract

The article traces Bertrand Russell’s interest in anarchist thought. I take his The Roads to Freedom as the main reference point, because that was the book where Russell applied himself most consistently to the study of the ideas put forward by anarchist thinkers. Those ideas – as he points out – undertake to conceive more imaginatively a better ordering of the human society than one finds in ʻthe destructive and cruel chaos in which mankind has hitherto existed’. He emphasizes that across the ages individuals had to face harsh conditions in which state ensnared them. The conflict between freedom and enslavement was the most important aspect of that condition. Bertrand Russell i anarchizm 513
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Authors and Affiliations

Jacek Uglik
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Zielonogórski, Instytut Filozofii, Al. Wojska Polskiego 71a, 65-762 Zielona Góra
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Abstract

The distinction introduced by Bertrand Russell between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description is the starting point for analyses related to the concept of acquaintance. I propose to assume that the following three concepts used by Russell are equivalent: knowledge of things, knowledge by acquaintance, and acquaintance. Then I present linguistic analyses concerning the construction of ‘know‑NP’ and ‘znać‑NP’, which lead to (i) division into a direct and indirect acquaintance and (ii) separation of knowledge from acquaintance, recognizing them as two different cognitive relations. Then, through the prism of knowledge, I describe the concept of acquaintance, pointing to the common properties of these concepts (aptness, non‑voluntariness, dispositiona-lity, contextual dependency), and postulate similar normative functions. This paper can be treated as an introduction to the concept of acquaintance and an elucidation of its role in epistemology.
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Authors and Affiliations

Rafał Palczewski
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Fosa Staromiejska 1a, 87-100 Toruń
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Abstract

In the broad spectrum of Bertrand Russell’s interests the socio‑political issues had a special role. The possibility of peaceful global co‑existence was most important to him. Occasionally he took part in the disputes between West and East accepting the role of a mediator. He saw a chance for peace in the creation of a world government. Kant had proposed a similar project of a supranational community and hoped it could result in the emergence of a global society, embracing all nations. With this achievement in place, the project of ‘eternal peace’ could be completed, he hoped. In this way, relying on ethical and legal principles, Kant designed a permanent international peace alliance.
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Authors and Affiliations

Grażyna Szumera
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Śląski w Katowicach, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Bankowa 11, 40‑007 Katowice
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Abstract

An enormous output of Bertrand Russell breaks down into three groups. The first consists of works on logic, especially on philosophy of mathematics. But the program of reducing mathematics to logic, instead of providing certainty that Russell was looking for, multiplied our doubts. As a by‑product of these works, a program of logical analysis of ordinary language emerged and exerted a huge impact on the history of philosophy of the 20th century. But it did not fulfil the original hopes connected with it. The second group contains results of ontological and epistemological investigations. Here Russell achieved nothing, and what he proposed lay beyond the mainstream of 20th‑century ontology and epistemology. The third group was an outline of a social utopia, addressed to the general public. Professional philosophers ignored these works by Russell, and as a possible program to build a better world, they have become obsolete.
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Authors and Affiliations

Wojciech Sady
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Śląski w Katowicach, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Bankowa 11, 40-007 Katowice
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Abstract

In a few short paragraphs of The Problems of Philosophy Bertrand Russell presents his theory of introspective knowledge based on the concept of knowledge by acquaintance. In this article, I critically analyze these comments by Russell and their proposed application by contemporary authors, including Brie Gertler (2001; 2011) and Laurence BonJour (2003). I show how these theories differ from the competing ‘inner‑sense theories’ and try to show that they are inconsistent with Gareth Evans’s ‘transparency’ observation. Then I compare acquaintance theories with Alex Byrne’s (2005; 2012) ‘transparency’ theory and show that Byrne’s theory offers a simpler account of mechanisms governing introspection and attribution of mental states to other agents than the observer.
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Authors and Affiliations

Maciej Tarnowski
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa;
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Abstract

The article analyzes Bertrand Russell’s distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description contained in his writings from 1910 to 1912. I point to some problems that arise from Russell’s concept of direct knowledge if they are observed in the light of modern psychological and neuroscientific research. In some cases knowledge by acquaintance may be mediated by certain unconscious operations and by mental representations of conceptual nature. I point out however that some of the examples given in The Problems of Philosophy can be characterized by a different degree of indirectness. Consequently, I propose to view Russell’s distinction as a typology. Because Russell narrows knowledge by description to specific descriptions, Russell’s division is not exhaustive and therefore is not a logical one. The article also shows that there are reasons for both narrowing his category of direct knowledge (e.g. by excluding universals) and for expanding it (e.g. by unconscious experiences).
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Authors and Affiliations

Andrzej Stępnik
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Wydział Filozofii Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieś-cie 3, 00-047 Warszawa
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Abstract

According to the usual, simplified picture of the Meinong‑Russell controversy, Meinong’s semantics is structurally amazingly simple but ontologically very expensive, while Russell’s theory contains some counter‑intuitive syntactic complica-tions, but to make up for this expense it releases us from almost all ontological troubles. Now the reality is much more complex. On the one hand it appears that the alleged ontological innocence of Russell’s solution has been highly exaggerated. In particular it assumes a Platonic ontology of universal properties. At the same time, if we look a bit closer, also Meinong’s theory turns out to be much more complicated than it looks at the first sight. It involves a hierarchy of objects exhibiting different degrees of completeness and in the later period of Meinong’s thought the structure of intentional reference takes a form very similar to that which has been proposed by Russell in his On Denoting.
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Authors and Affiliations

Arkadiusz Chrudzimski
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków
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Abstract

This article discusses the main points in the Bertrand Russell and Frederick Copleston’s debate about the existence of God. Copleston defended the cosmological argument based on a sufficient reason and argued against radical contingency in explaining the origin of the world. During the debate, the understanding of necessity was discussed, whether the word ‘God’ is a proper name or a description, whether the universe as a whole can have a cause, and the arguments about the origin of the world formulated in modern physics. The whole debate is an excellent example of the difference between a theist and an atheist with regard to Leibnizian type of the cosmological argument.i
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Authors and Affiliations

Ryszard Mordarski
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Kazimierza Wielkiego w Bydgoszczy, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Ogińskiego 16, 85-092 Bydgoszcz
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Abstract

This paper sets out to characterise and analyse logical atomism of Bertrand Russell. Main tenets of that theory are described by reference to Russell’s lecture Facts and Propositions (1918) and to other publications by that author. The essential claims of Russell’s position are discussed and confronted with tenets of ontology of situations developed by Bogusław Wolniewicz, a position inspired by logical atomism of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The author argues that several of Russell’s theses on logical atomism can be interpreted in the light of Wolniewicz’s ontology of situations. Finally, some minor concluding remarks are offered that can help to develop an ontology conceived in the spirit of the ontology of logical atomism. 366 Janusz Kaczmarek
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Authors and Affiliations

Janusz Kaczmarek
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90-131 Łódź
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Abstract

The aim of the article is presentation and critical analysis of various interpretations of neutral monism (in Bertrand Russell’s version). The subject of the author’s particular interest is the analysis of the main methodological assumptions of neutral monism, which are presented as a method of deriving logical constructions. The article discusses problems inspired by the following questions: What is the declared neutrality of base objects? Is neutral monism a kind of reductionism? Is it an ontological or logical‑epistemological position? What is the place of phenomenal consciousness in the universe of neutral monism? Can neutral monism be reconciled with different versions of emergence theory? Does neutral monism solve the mind‑body problem? Finally, the possibility of non‑standard interpretation of neutral monism is outlined by reference to information theory.
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Authors and Affiliations

Robert Poczobut
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet w Białymstoku, Instytut Filozofii, Plac NZS 1, 15-420 Białystok
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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how Bertrand Russell depicts the relation of mysticism to three other areas of human activity: philosophy, science, and religion, and thus: its special role. In his essay Mysticism and Logic (1914), Russell defines mystical thinking as beliefs in (1) the existence of special insight, (2) the unity of all things, (3) the unreality of time, and (4) the effacement of the boundaries between good and evil. Although he considers full mysticism – as a belief about the ontic structure of the world – to be erroneous – as a life attitude he attributes to it an element of wisdom that is lacking in other areas of human intellectual activity. Mysticism proves wrong also at the epistemological level, i.e. as a certain test of truth. But in its spirit of inquiry, it contains something that science also benefits from, and from which, therefore, scientific philosophy should take its cue. What additionally gives mysticism its value is the claim of impartial contemplation which gives rise to an attitude of love towards the whole world. Significantly, it was the combination of the best features of mystical thinking with scientific thinking and method which gave rise to Russell’s advocacy of scientific philosophy. In light of this, I argue that according to Russell mysticism is not an exclusively religious phenomenon, which is demonstrated, among other things, by the fact that he attributes two aspects of mysticism to the field of mathematics.
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Authors and Affiliations

Tatiana Barkovskiy
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-047 Warszawa
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Abstract

We are familiar with the grammar and logic of relational predicates in predicate calculus, chiefly as transmitted through Whitehead and Russell. In natural languages however, relations are frequently expressed using what Peirce called relatives, that is, expressions like brother, gift, head, effect, successor, which require completion by one or more definite terms to yield general names or terms. Peirce developed a logic of such relatives which influenced Schröder and Tarski. Later, Leśniewski used relative terms such as part, overlapper, class etc. to formulate his mereology, rather than the predicates and operators subsequently and more standardly used. In this paper I con-sider aspects of the grammar and logic of such relative terms, particularly in regard to several areas of general logico-philosophical interest: cardinality; functions; abstrac-tion; the order problem of relations; and Russell’s multiple relation theory of belief and judgment.

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Authors and Affiliations

Peter Simons
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Abstract

Seldom did Bertrand Russell discuss the movement or the trend that he himself contributed in a large measure to establish. He did not make frequent use of the term ‘analytic philosophy’, which was entering circulation in the first half of the twentieth century. However, he was fully aware of the distinctiveness of this movement that he described, using the lenses of his own philosophical preferences, referring to it as new realistic philosophy or scientific philosophy. In his later works Russell vehemently and inadequately attacked the linguistic version of analytic philosophy that originated with and was developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, to be later continued by Oxford ordinary language philosophers. The juxtaposition and consideration of various Russell’s statements on analytic philosophy from the successive stages of the development of his philosophical views help the reader to better understand Russellian metaphilosophy and follow the evolution of the philosophical tradition that he exemplified.
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Authors and Affiliations

Tadeusz Szubka
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Instytut Filozofii i Kognitywistyki, ul. Krakowska 71- 79, 71-017 Szczecin
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Abstract

In the article I indicate and synthetically discuss issues that can be found in the achievements of Bertrand Russell, and which can be included in the domain of metaphilosophy. I point to Russell’s philosophical inspirations and to his views on philosophy. His views are intertwined with the threads of the traditional understanding of philosophy and innovative elements. These innovative elements include assigning a special role to mathematical logic, of which Russell is one of the founders, and emphasizing the role of analysis in philosophical research. It is also characteristic of him to emphasize the role of science for philosophical reflection. At the same time, however, Russell rejects the radical slogans of logical positivism. This justifies the thesis that in his oeuvre there are threads of both traditional and innovative understanding of philosophy and its tasks.
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Authors and Affiliations

Ryszard Kleszcz
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Lindleya 3/5, 90-131 Łódź
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Abstract

According to Kurt Gödel, Bertrand Russell misinterpreted the incompleteness theorem, but did it in ʻa very interesting manner’. To understand what he meant we need to consider their attitudes to defining truth. Even more revealing is the discussion of two fundamental approaches to logic: one is universalistic, and assumed by both Russell and Gödel, and the other is model‑theoretical, Alfred Tarski’s style. It turns out that a misleading or erroneous interpretation can be interesting, as it reveals something fundamental. William Byers claims that truly great ideas in mathematics and about mathematics are in a way false, as they lead to errors, but at the same time they can help to make advances in math. Logicism provides a good example. In addition it may be mentioned that when Russell argued in its favor, he committed a logical fallacy.
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Authors and Affiliations

Stanisław Krajewski
1
ORCID: ORCID

  1. Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Filozofii, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieś-cie 3, 00-047 Warszawa

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