One of the main traits of a society of reflexive modernity is the critical analysis of categories that in the past appeared unquestionable. Socio-cultural gender and health or illness/mental disorders are categories of this type. Above all, they are socially constructed, that is, they are dependent on culture and on political, economic, and religious factors. The author undertakes to analyse the relations between the diagnostic criteria used in the international system of classifying mental diseases (DSM-IV and ICD-10) and traditional schemas of masculinity and femininity. Confirmation of the incidence of particular diseases in connection with gender is the author’s entry point for seeking answers to why individuals suffering from certain illnesses/mental disorders display behaviour corresponding to traditional gender roles, even though contemporary gender roles are fluid in many respects, and hypotheses about biological differences as causes of incidence of disease in men and women have not been empirically confirmed.
Landscape is an object of perception, while its image is the sum of ideas on this object. Both terms used in the title of the paper have fairly strong impact on each other. In order to manage the city’s image well, it is necessary to take care of the landscape in all its areas especially in the “forgotten” and degraded ones. The aim of the author was to identify elements of landscape exposure along railway lines – areas with low aesthetic value in many cities around the world. The research area includes railway lines, in Cracow and Wrocław. The method adopted for the implementation of the study is the analysis of mental maps made in 2018 during field workshops. The paper is ended by conclusions on the landscape impact on the image of the city.
In the article, the topic of mentalization as the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others is considered. The author concentrates on the aspect of the mental states in different approaches to mentalization. She proposes that the inclusion of various mental states is justified, although it induces some difficulties. In the conclusion, consequences of applying current conceptions and using them to elucidate the variety of mental states are presented.
Evolutionary Developmental Biology (Evo-Devo) is becoming to be popular in psychology, and by certain is even seen as a new biology for psychology (Hofer 2014). In particular, it is about the concept of extended inheritance This concept claims to be (neo-) Lamarckian. According to it inherited is everything that contributes to resemblance across generations and that strongly affects the fitness of the offspring—starting by nuclear genes, by genes expression, maternal care, ecological niche, cultural niche, language, etc. In this paper I analyse the potential of the concept of extended inheritance on the example of transgenerational transmission of attachment style and mentalizing capacity. I present the neuroendocrine mechanism of transmission. Then I show that a) DNA methylation is complementary to neuroendocrine mechanism, but it does not revolutionize the latter as it is claimed; b) the concept of extended inheritance confounds the three questions rightly separated by Neo-Darwinism: origin of variation, fate of variation and inheritance, c) although the motivation of Evo-Devo goes against the alleged genetic determinism of neodarwinism, the concept of transgeneration inheritance is determinist (although it is an epigeneetic determinism).
This paper discusses particular traits of historical thinking, including the role of the historian’s mentality in the perception of history.
The goal of the article is to propose a different approach to – and therefore a new concept of – the history of thinking. Reflecting on the history of philosophy, it suggests a broader understanding of the latter. Yet traditional studies in the history of philosophy are not to be rejected; they need to be reformed, and such a reform could be performed basing on the experiences of the discipline of historiography. Thus conceived, the history of thinking could open us to a different future.
The new challenges for Polish theology in the beginning of the 21st c. in the context of possession and exorcism include a theological reflection on possession and exorcism in the Bible, in patristic texts as well as in medieval and modern theological literature. Another issue is an elaboration of a new theological anthropology, which should acknowledge the achievements of human sciences like psychology and psychiatry. The existence of the psychic sphere in the human being is to be distinguished while the human spiritual sphere is to be convincingly justified. More precise criteria will be needed in order to distinguish psychic problems from those of a spiritual nature, including possession.
Created in the distant past, attitudes and patterns of thinking have caused the mentality of contemporary Poles. The collective memory about the greatness delusions of old-time nobilities and the traumas suffered in the annexed territories today infl uence their thinking and behaviours as well national self-evaluation.
The paper presents the mental files framework focusing on its seminal form invented by P.F. Strawson and on its contemporary parallel rendering by F. Recanati. It also outlines the main ideas that stood behind the introduction of the framework. These are in particular the problem of the informativeness of identity statements (for Strawson) and the controversy between singularism and descriptivism (for Recanati). The paper presents also a further enrichment of the framework, based upon some other themes from Strawson’s philosophy of language. The main ideas of the enrichment are: introducing into the structure of the files a section of the metadata, containing information about the files themselves as mental particulars, and adopting Strawson’s referring use as a triggering mechanism for opening/activating of the files.
Most philosophers believe that a unified philosophical account of mental and non -mental actions is possible. This article presents two arguments indicating that in fact it is not possible. The first one says that thinking is not an activity. Its formulation, however, is exposed to significant difficulties. The second argument avoids these difficulties and puts forward a different, though sometimes erroneously identified, thesis that mental and non-mental actions differ significantly, and therefore one theory should not be expected to include both phenomena. Acceptance of this result sheds new light on the problems associated with the language of thought and gives promise to a new answer to the question “What is Le Penseur doing?”
en
pl
